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Abstract 
 
Some environmental issues for shipping are regulated globally with uniform standards and 
others with stricter regulations in specific areas. This thesis aims to provide an understanding 
of why a regional approach was chosen with SOx Emission Control Areas (SECAs) as the 
main form of control of sulphur oxide emissions from international shipping, with 
explanations based on documents from negotiations within the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) during 1988-1997. The documents were investigated in search of 
scientific and economic arguments (including supportive information and reported 
discussions). These were analysed through two ‘conceptual lenses’ to provide different 
explanations, focusing on the roles of science and economic interests. These lenses were 
expected to show many explanatory differences, but significant interactions were found.  
 
It was found that the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the IMO faced great 
scientific uncertainty on ship emissions and their contribution to acidification on land. This 
allowed for an increased role of economic interests, in particular when the Sub-Committee on 
Bulk Chemicals Handling began drafting regulations for Annex VI to the MARPOL 
Convention. The actors’ interests decided the policy relevance of science, which was used by 
the environmental and economic interests to compete rather than to enable consensus. Based 
on the economic interests of the actors that caused the problem and that would bear the costs 
of regulation, a science-critical policy environment emerged in which these actors showed as 
low a contribution as possible to acidification from shipping and extreme economic 
implications. The focus on the high costs for the oil industry and, in turn, higher fuel costs for 
shipping, was found to be the primary factor in explaining the regional approach. It was 
emphasized that economic self-interests are paramount in understanding both the economic 
and the scientific arguments and the way these could shape policy-making through the power 
of persuasion. Scientific arguments and claims were used to justify views with underlying 
economic arguments, which were strengthened with legitimacy. The IMO principles of a 
compelling need and taking into account costs and economic implications were the primary 
causes of the cost focus and the critical policy environment. This is a lesson for future policy 
issues in terms of achieving a balance between industry interests and environmental interests.  
 
This thesis’ empirical contribution is based on a large quantity of documents that revealed the 
scientific and economic basis of different actors’ policies and the policy choices and decisions 
made by two bodies of the IMO. It contributes theoretically by viewing an international 
environmental policy-making process through different conceptual lenses. In order to 
understand why policy-makers in some cases follow the path of environmental protection 
based on scientific claims and in others follow the path of economic self-interests, we need to 
take into account both with different conceptual lenses. 
 
Keywords: IMO, MARPOL, Annex VI, regional approach, SECA, SOx, international, 
shipping, environmental policy-making, conceptual lens, science, framing, policy 
environment, economic interests, directional problem, distribution, costs, benefits  
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This work is the result of a cross-disciplinary cooperation through the Lighthouse Maritime 
Competence Centre. My supervisor was Professor Thomas Polesie at the School of Business, 
Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg, and my co-supervisor Erik Fridell at the 
Department of Shipping and Marine Technology at Chalmers University of Technology. They 
deserve my highest gratitude for their guidance towards a PhD. It would not have been 
possible for me to do this thesis without Thomas and Erik. 
 
I would like to thank my financial contributors. The Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA) 
initiated my research project in 2008 and financed it between 2008 and 2011. Further 
financing has been contributed by Lighthouse Maritime Competence Centre, Västra 
Götalandsregionen and the Kaj Rehnström scholarship. 
 
My research involved crossing disciplines, which has been a real challenge. I have met many 
arguments among different traditional disciplines that my research area should be studied with 
just their methodologies and within just their way of thinking. The more I explored, however, 
the more I realized that what was missing among these disciplines was an attitude of openness 
to other thinking. The ways of thinking have been locked in traditions and norms within 
disciplinary boundaries that have to be followed in order to become a respected researcher. 
But like Frank Zappa said, progress is not possible without deviation from the norm. To 
deviate and stand up for your way is a necessity when conducting cross-disciplinary research.  
 
This realization and deviation from the norm was derived from discussions with Thomas 
Polesie, whose words I did not really understand the first year under his supervision. A 
common confusion has been that he sees connections to things that others, like me back then, 
would discard as irrelevant to the research. But doing some reading of the many books and 
references to books he has given over the years changed it all. His former strange words and 
ideas became clearer and clearer, and today I look back to things he said to me five years ago 
and wonder why I did not understand. Thomas seemed to have seen my confusion among 
disciplines and pushed me towards with self-confidence to stand up for myself. Thomas has 
been a mentor and a true friend guiding me in difficult times and simplifying complex 
phenomena. He has faithfully called me on late hours to see how it was going and how I was 
doing, as well as given me personal advice on many different things. I am very grateful. 
 
Many others before have emphasized their difficult journeys towards a PhD. I must say that 
this has indeed been a journey of mostly hard times, but also the most fascinating and 
inspiring time of my life so far. This thesis could not have been accomplished without the 
support, discussions and comments of colleges within the Maritime Environment research 
group, informants for my licentiate thesis and colleges and friends at Chalmers, the University 
of Gothenburg, and the SMA. It would be a long list to write down here, though the following 
deserve special gratitude.  
 
 Sven Lyngfelt (former co-supervisor), Karin Andersson and Klas Brännström  
 At the SMA: Willand Ringborg, Per Ekberg, Reidar Grundström, Stefan 
Lemieszewski and Pernilla Wilhelmsson  
 Camilla Gillberg, for providing me with copies of the IMO documents from the 
International Secretariat of the Swedish Transport Agency.  
 Mathias Magnusson, for letting me talk for hours at his office about the most peculiar 
things although he had his own deadlines. 
iv 
 
 Hannes Johnson, my office neighbour, for all our small talks at the highest 
philosophical level and, of course, for reviewing my work. 
 Philip Linné, for providing me with insights on international law, for reviewing my 
work and for his inspiring enthusiasm as co-author in our book chapter. But mostly for 
how he always in a dedicated way have taught me about everything from regulations 
to different coffee beans.  
 Zoi Nikopoulou, for reviewing my work and for giving criticism in a way that only a 
Greek could do. 
  
Gesa Praetorius; the reason you are not included in the list above is because you have been so 
much more than a former colleague to me. During these years you have inspired me with your 
passion and enthusiasm. You have helped me to overcome the most difficult situations and we 
have shared beers and tears. I will always be grateful. 
 
Although my closest friends never really did understand exactly what I have been doing the 
last few years, they have always supported me, inspiring me and bringing me the finest 
moments despite difficult times. In alphabetical order: David Farby, Gabriella Malmborg, Joel 
Wretborn, Linda Gustavsson, Nina Lindberg and Tommy Lindberg. 
  
Last but not least, with a very humble feeling, special thanks go to my father Sven-Olof 
Svensson, my brother Olof Svensson with family and my love Kajsa Öberg. Without your 
love and support I would not have been able to do this thesis. Kajsa deserves extra 
appreciation for always being there for me and for putting up with my late working hours, my 
babble about my research and for the lack of time spent together.  
 
 
 
Erik Svensson 
 
Gothenburg, November 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD .................................................................................... 1 
1.2 SOX EMISSIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND MARPOL ANNEX VI .......................................................... 1 
1.3 A REGIONAL APPROACH: PROBLEMS AND PUZZLING POLICY CHOICES .................................................................. 3 
1.4 AIM, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................ 5 
1.5 SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 5 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS ........................................................................................................................... 6 
2 BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................................... 7 
2.1 IMO: A SPECIALIZED UN AGENCY .............................................................................................................. 7 
2.2 ACTORS AND INTERESTS OF IMO NEGOTIATIONS ............................................................................................ 9 
2.3 ADOPTING AND AMENDING IMO CONVENTIONS .......................................................................................... 11 
2.4 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDIED PROCESS ................................................................................................... 14 
2.5 EARLIER RESEARCH ............................................................................................................................... 16 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................. 19 
3.1 ALLISON AND CONCEPTUAL LENSES ........................................................................................................... 19 
3.2 CONCEPTUAL LENS 1: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE ............................................................................................... 20 
3.3 CONCEPTUAL LENS 2: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS .............................................................................. 24 
4 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................... 33 
4.1 RESEARCH APPROACH ........................................................................................................................... 33 
4.2 DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................. 35 
5 INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF ‘SCIENCE’ ............................................................................................... 39 
5.1 BACKGROUND ON PRIOR FRAMING ........................................................................................................... 39 
5.2 1988-1989 ....................................................................................................................................... 42 
5.3 1990-1991 ....................................................................................................................................... 43 
5.4 1992: TOWARDS A REGIONAL APPROACH .................................................................................................. 47 
5.5 1993-1994 ....................................................................................................................................... 53 
5.6 1995-1996 ....................................................................................................................................... 63 
5.7 1997: FINAL DRAFTING AND ADOPTION OF THE COMBINED APPROACH ............................................................. 70 
6 INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS ........................................................................... 73 
6.1 1990-1991 ....................................................................................................................................... 73 
6.2 1992: TOWARDS A REGIONAL APPROACH .................................................................................................. 77 
6.3 1993-1994 ....................................................................................................................................... 82 
6.4 1995-1996 ....................................................................................................................................... 88 
6.5 1997: FINAL DRAFTING AND ADOPTION OF THE COMBINED APPROACH ............................................................. 93 
7 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................. 97 
7.1 EXPLAINING BY THE ROLE OF ‘SCIENCE’ ...................................................................................................... 97 
7.2 EXPLAINING BY THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS ..................................................................................... 112 
7.3 TWO EXPLANATIONS: CONNECTIONS AND DIFFERENCES ............................................................................... 129 
7.4 METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION ..................................................................................... 136 
7.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................................................................................... 141 
8 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH ........................................................ 143 
8.1 FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF ‘SCIENCE’....................................................................................................... 143 
8.2 FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS ....................................................................................... 144 
8.3 CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS ................................................................................................................ 145 
8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS TO POLICY-MAKERS AND STAKEHOLDERS ....................................................................... 146 
8.5 FURTHER RESEARCH ............................................................................................................................ 147 
vi 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................. 149 
REFERENCES................................................................................................................................................ 151 
LITERATURE AND WEBSITES .................................................................................................................... 151 
MEPC SESSION REPORTS ......................................................................................................................... 160 
MEPC SUBMISSIONS AND WORKING PAPERS ........................................................................................... 160 
BCH SESSION REPORTS ............................................................................................................................ 165 
BCH SUBMISSIONS AND WORKING PAPERS .............................................................................................. 165 
SUBMISSIONS AP/WG 2........................................................................................................................... 167 
RESOLUTIONS, CIRCULARS AND OTHER IMO DOCUMENTS........................................................................ 167 
THIRD CONFERENCE ON MARINE POLLUTION (MP/CONF.3)...................................................................... 168 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES/AGREEMENTS............................................................................. 168 
ANNEX 1: ATMOSPHERIC PROCESSES AND IMPACTS OF SOX EMISSIONS ..................................................... 171 
ANNEX 2: PURPOSE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE IMO FROM ITS CONVENTION ................................................ 174 
ANNEX 3. PRESENTED MONETARY COSTS AND BENEFITS 1990-1997 ........................................................... 175 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 1.1. REVISED MARPOL ANNEX VI SULPHUR LIMITS FOR BUNKER FUELS (REG. 14, RES. MEPC.176(58)) ...................... 3 
FIGURE 1.2. EMISSION CONTROL AREAS (FROM: NEUMEIER, 2014, WITH PERMISSION) ........................................................ 3 
FIGURE 2.1. KEY EVENTS OF THE STUDIED PROCESS, 1987-1997 .................................................................................. 15 
FIGURE 3.1. TYPES OF GOODS (DESOMBRE, 2006; OSTROM, ET AL., 1994) .................................................................... 25 
FIGURE 3.2. WILSON’S FOUR TYPES OF POLITICS (ADAPTED FROM WILSON, 1986, 2011) ................................................... 30 
FIGURE 4.1. CHOICES OF RESEARCH APPROACH ......................................................................................................... 33 
FIGURE 7.1. PARTICIPATING GROUP OF ACTORS, MEPC 1988-1997 ........................................................................... 108 
FIGURE 7.2. PARTICIPATING GROUP OF ACTORS, BCH 1991-1994 ............................................................................. 108 
FIGURE 7.3. PARTICIPATING GROUP OF ACTORS, WORKING AND DRAFTING GROUPS 1989-1997 ....................................... 109 
FIGURE 7.4. POLICY CHARACTERISTICS OF SOX EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS BASED ON PERCEIVED DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 122 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
TABLE 4.1. INVESTIGATED MEETINGS AND POLICY-MAKING ARENAS ............................................................................... 37 
TABLE 6.1. ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL MEASURES AND A GLOBAL CAP (BCH 23/7/4) ........... 83 
TABLE 6.2. ESTIMATED COSTS PER CAPPING LEVEL ACCORDING TO OCIMF (ADAPTED FROM BCH 24/7/7, PP. 3-4) ................. 87 
TABLE 6.3. ESTIMATED COSTS/BUNKER PRICE INCREASES FOR DIFFERENT SULPHUR CONTENT REDUCTIONS (MEPC 37/13/21) ... 89 
TABLE 7.1. DIMENSIONS OF SOURCES, CAUSING ACTORS AND IMO REPRESENTATIVES........................................................ 113 
 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Some environmental issues for shipping are regulated globally with uniform standards and 
others by regional approaches with stricter regulations in specific areas. This thesis addresses 
what we can learn from the documents of international negotiations during 1988-1997 that 
resulted in a regional approach to address sulphur oxides (SOx) emissions from ships. The 
following sections present a background to international shipping, SOx emissions, sulphur 
regulations and the problem of a regional approach. This is followed by the aim, research 
questions, objectives and delimitations of this thesis, along with an outline of the structure. 
  
1.1 International Shipping and a Level Playing Field 
Shipping is a truly international industry and an engine of world trade. About 80% of the 
world trade volumes are transported by sea (Stopford, 1997; UNCTAD, 2013). The shipping 
industry is global not only in terms of ship movements but also in its complex global web of 
companies in different countries. An owner in one country could register its ships in a second, 
its crew could be from a third, the charterer from a fourth, and so on. Due to the international 
nature of shipping, it is regulated by an extensive variety of conventions and other 
international agreements. A frequent argument in the development of international maritime 
regulation has been to ensure a ‘level playing field’. As ships sail on international routes, it is 
important to harmonize the diversity of national rules that would otherwise apply to a ship on 
its journey across the waters of many countries. Regional and unilateral
1
 regulation 
complicates ship operations with different rules and certificates in different waters, which in 
turn affects industries dependent on sea transport in a highly globalized world (Stopford, 
1997; Boisson, 1999; Campe, 2009). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the 
responsible international body for measures on safety, security and pollution prevention for 
international shipping. Since its start, the IMO has been advocating the principle of a level 
playing field with universal standards to be implemented and enforced on all ships, 
irrespective of which flag they sail under (IMO, 2014a; MEPC 58/INF.24). Its role is 
officially described as creating a level playing field for shipping by a “fair and effective, 
universally adopted and universally implemented” regulatory framework (IMO, 2014a).  
 
1.2 SOx Emissions from International Shipping and MARPOL Annex VI 
Emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx) are primarily associated with relatively high sulphur 
contents in fossil fuels (Smith et al., 2011). During combustion, the sulphur (S) in the fuel 
reacts with oxygen gas (O2) and forms different oxides of sulphur. The abbreviation SOx is 
often used for sulphur dioxide (SO2) and sulphur trioxide (SO3), but almost all of the sulphur 
is emitted as SO2 (Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts, 2000; Agrawal et al., 2008). Since the 1970s, 
much attention has been given to reducing SOx emissions, primarily in Europe and North 
America. For many years, the attention was directed at an environmental problem known as 
‘acid rain’, i.e. acidification. Today, there is more emphasis on health problems and climate 
impacts associated with the atmospheric formation of particulate matter (PM) (Vestreng et 
al., 2007). SOx emissions further cause significant damage to buildings and structures and 
thus incur significant economic costs (Warfvinge and Bertills, 2000). The impacts and 
atmospheric processes of SOx emissions are briefly described in Annex 1 of this thesis.  
 
                                                  
1 One-sided requirements taken by a single State or union 
2 
 
With absence of exhaust gas cleaning on board, the amount of SOx emissions from ships 
depends solely on the sulphur content of the fuel (Corbett and Fischbeck, 1997). The main 
fuel powering the international fleet is heavy fuel oil (HFO), which is a mix of residues from 
the refinery processes to produce lighter high-quality products. The term residual fuel is thus 
often used. In general, the sulphur content is above 1%
2
 (<5%), though this is dependent on 
the sulphur content of the crude oil, which varies in different regions of the world (Winnes, 
2010; CONCAWE, 1998; Bengtsson et al., 2011). Of the approximate 277 million tonnes 
(mt) of fuels consumed by international shipping in 2007, approximately 213 mt were HFO. 
The remaining 64 mt were distillate fuels (Buhaug et al., 2009); e.g. marine gas oil (MGO)
3
. 
Some refineries produce MGO with sulphur contents below 0.5% (Bengtsson et al., 2011). 
 
Due to the correlation between sulphur content and emissions, increased shipping activity has 
resulted in increased SOx emissions while land-based emissions, primarily in Europe and 
North America, have decreased as result of abatement measures and international 
agreements.
4
 Smith et al. (2011) found that global SO2 emissions fell significantly until the 
beginning of the 21
th
 century but increased between 2002 and 2005. Although China and 
developing countries in general represented a major part of this increase, emissions from 
international shipping have represented a significant contribution with a steady increase. 
Dalsøren et al. (2009) found that shipping contributed 15-25% of the sulphur deposition in 
Northwestern North America and Scandinavia, and 15-20% in Southwestern Europe and 
Northwestern Africa. The total global contribution of shipping to wet deposition
5
 of sulphur 
was found to be 4.5%. Corbett et al. (2007) found that the health impacts from ships’ PM 
emissions were concentrated in the coastal regions along the major trade routes around the 
world. It was estimated that ship emissions caused about 60,000 premature deaths annually.  
 
The MARPOL Convention (MARPOL 73/78)
6
 is the main international convention to prevent 
and minimize marine pollution from ships. It consists of a set of regulations in six annexes. 
Annex VI (Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships) was adopted in 1997 after IMO 
negotiations had been held since 1988. Regulation 14 of Annex VI addresses SOx emissions 
with a global limit on the sulphur content of bunker fuels (referred to as a global cap) as well 
as a stricter limit in particularly sensitive areas, referred to as SOx Emission Control Areas 
(SECAs). The sulphur content was limited to 4.5% globally 1.5% in SECAs. An alternative to 
reduce SOx emissions in SECAs was to use an exhaust gas cleaning system or other on-board 
abatement technologies. It would take until 2005 before Annex VI entered into force. During 
this period, SOx emissions from ships increased due to the increase in shipping activity. 
Awareness of the health effects also increased, primarily in the EU and the USA. A revision 
process was decided on in 2004 and the revised Annex VI was adopted in 2008 (IMO, 2014b, 
c; MP/CONF. 3/34; Svensson, 2011, and references therein).  
 
With the revised Annex VI, the sulphur content of bunker fuels was set to be reduced 
progressively from 2010 to 2020 as illustrated in Figure 1.1. The initial 4.5% global cap was 
first reduced to 3.5% from the 1
st
 of January 2012, and this is set to be followed by 0.5% from 
the 1
st
 of January 2020. However, the latter date is dependent on the results of a review in 
                                                  
2 Percentage by mass, i.e. msulphur /mfuel. 
3 Also, marine diesel oil (MDO) is a blend of HFO and MGO (Bengtsson et al., 2011) 
4 In the EU-27, SOx emissions decreased by 82% between 1990 and 2010 (European Environment Agency, 
2012). The corresponding figure for the US was about 61%. (USEPA, 2014). 
5 See Annex 1. 
6 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 
relating thereto. 
3 
 
2018 on the availability of compliant fuel oil for 2020. If the parties to Annex VI conclude 
from this review that it is not possible for ships to comply by 2020 it can decide to extend the 
date to the 1
st
 of January 2025. For SECAs, the sulphur limit was set to 1.0% from the 1
st
 of 
July 2010 followed by 0.1% from the 1
st
 of January 2015 (Reg. 14, Res. MEPC.176(58)). The 
2008 amendment entered into force on the 1
st
 of July 2010. Since then, the SECA concept has 
expanded to include further pollutants
7
 with the term Emission Control Area (ECA). As 
shown in Figure 1.2, the present ECAs are in the Baltic Sea (effective since 2006), the North 
Sea and the English Channel (effective since 2007), around the coastlines of North America 
(effective since 2012) and a small area in the Caribbean Sea controlled by the US (effective 
from 2014) (IMO, 2014c,d). No application for further ECAs has yet been submitted to the 
IMO (as of April 2014, submitted MEPC documents, Swedish Transport Agency, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Revised MARPOL Annex VI Sulphur Limits for Bunker Fuels (Reg. 14, Res. MEPC.176(58)) 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Emission Control Areas (from: Neumeier, 2014, with permission) 
 
1.3 A Regional Approach: Problems and Puzzling Policy Choices 
The implications of the SECA regulations were heavily debated after the adoption of the 
revised Annex VI, primarily in Europe and increasingly in the US, as the effective date of the 
North American ECA approached. A number of consequence analyses have been conducted 
                                                  
7 The North American ECA and the United States Caribbean Sea ECA include NOx, SOx and PM. PM emissions 
are currently merely regulated as a result of the reduction in sulphur content. 
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by governments and associations. These studies show various implications for the shipping 
industry and sea transport-dependent industries located around SECAs due to the increased 
costs of maritime transport in SECAs against cheaper transport around the world. There has 
been particular emphasis on the implications for short sea shipping, as it forms a significant 
part of the transport logistic chain in the countries surrounding SECAs (EMSA, 2010; 
personal observations 2010-2014). The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA, 2010) 
reviewed seven consequence analyses. All the reviewed studies estimated fuel price increases 
for ships within SECAs in 2015. The required switch from fuels with 1.5% sulphur content – 
of mostly HFO – to MGO with 0.1% sulphur content could result in a fuel price increase in 
the range of 65-85%. Another review of six studies was conducted the same year by Entec 
(2010). This review estimated an 80% fuel cost increase and predicted a significant shift from 
short sea shipping to land transport (so-called modal shift) at 3-50% of freight volumes. The 
review by EMSA (2010) instead concluded that a modal shift would be limited to a few 
specific routes and price scenarios. A year later, the European Commission (2011, p. 70) 
concluded that it was clear that “short sea shipping will experience increased costs and 
competition from road, rail and deep sea shipping”.  
 
A later Swedish study (Trafikanalys, 2013) showed a 50-75% increase in fuel costs from the 
0.1% limit in 2015 compared with the costs of the 1% limit that took effect in July 2010. A 
study on the implications in the UK (AMEC, 2013) also indicated a modal shift representing 
1.3-3.6 million tonnes of freight. As mentioned above, increased fuel prices for shipping 
mean increased transportation costs for sea transport-dependent industries located around 
SECAs compared with cheaper transport around the world. Trafikanalys (2013) highlighted 
an increase in transportation costs per ton for paper of about 10% from the northern parts of 
Sweden to the UK and Benelux, and about 3% for steel transported from central Sweden to 
Denmark. AMEC (2013, p. v) found that “as many as 2,000 full time, part time and contract 
positions are likely to be at risk in the UK and on the continent”. 
 
With regard to environmental and social benefits of the sulphur regulations, Brandt et al. 
(2011) estimated a small decrease in external costs due to the health impacts in Europe 
between 2007 and 2011, but the costs were then expected to increase to 64 billion euro in 
2020 due to increased shipping activity. Mestl et al. (2013) found that today’s global limit of 
3.5% had not yet been effective in reducing the emissions or the global average sulphur 
content. It was speculated that Regulation 14 might have resulted in some environmental 
benefits locally but not globally. Moreover, “no reduction worth mentioning” (Mestl et al., 
2013, p. 6100) could be expected with this cap as long as blending of low-sulphur HFO and 
high-sulphur HFO can occur. Any global reductions would not be shown until the cap goes 
below the global average, i.e. below 2.7% (ibid.). To clarify, this means 2020 or 2025 
depending on the review. Mestl et al. (2013) further expected an increase of SOx emissions 
until then due to the growth of shipping.  
 
Why are SOx emissions from international shipping regulated with SECAs as the main control 
of the emissions? According to Tan, (2006, p. 75), “no analytical account of shipping 
regulation is complete without examining the work of IMO” (Tan, 2006, p. 75). Moreover, 
Birnie et al. (2009, p. 12) emphasized that “understanding of the sources and the lawmaking 
processes” is “crucial to any assessment of the current state of international environmental 
law”. In the previous work of a licentiate thesis, I investigated documents of IMO 
negotiations during 1988-2008. I found that a crucial turning point towards regional SECA 
regulations occurred in 1992 at the 22
nd
 session of the Sub-Committee on Bulk Chemicals 
Handling (BCH). It was a sub-committee to the main committee for environmental issues: the 
5 
 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). The BCH developed a framework for 
regional control of SOx emissions despite the MEPC having agreed on a target to halve the 
emissions globally by the year 2000. This started a first consideration of emission control 
measures within a defined regional concept, and a combination of stricter SECAs and a global 
cap was eventually adopted in 1997. This combined approach was then maintained in the 
revision process (2006-2008). It is therefore central to this thesis to investigate the documents 
of the first process in more depth. 
 
1.4 Aim, Research Questions and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an understanding of why a regional approach was chosen 
to control SOx emissions from international shipping through explanations based on IMO 
documents, focusing on the roles of science and economic interests. 
 
An explanation of the following research questions is central to this aim: 
 
1. Why did the BCH sub-committee change the focus to regional measures for SOx 
emissions when the main committee MEPC had a global reduction target? 
 
2. Why was a combination of stricter SECA limits and a global cap adopted in 1997? 
 
The thesis is based on the premise that explanations provided by a conceptual framework are 
limited by the framework’s basic assumptions (see Section 3.1). This thesis focuses on what 
roles science and economic interests have been given in the policy-making process and how 
these roles could explain the research questions.
8
 Two conceptual lenses, described in Chapter 
3, form the basis for providing such explanations. To achieve the above aim, the following 
have been the main objectives of this thesis: 
 
 Guided by the research questions and respective conceptual lens, to investigate the 
documented scientific and economic arguments – including supportive information 
and reported discussions – from IMO negotiations during 1988-1997. 
 
 To provide two explanations for the research questions by analysing the respective 
empirical results with the corresponding conceptual basis on the role of science and 
economic interests respectively. 
 
1.5 Scope and Delimitations 
The studied policy-making process encompasses the years 1988-1997. The thesis is delimited 
to the work of the IMO (MEPC and the BCH Sub-Committee) and includes the (third) 
diplomatic Conference on Marine Pollution in 1997. The empirical basis was delimited to 
what was reported in the investigated IMO documents. Domestic politics, economic and 
scientific aspects within individual member States and actions of individual actors are not 
within the scope of the research. The thesis is further delimited to discussions on sulphur 
content reductions and thus excludes early discussions on other reduction alternatives (e.g. 
scrubbers). There is also a clear delimitation to the specific SOx emission regulations in 
                                                  
8 My previous work (Svensson, 2011) highlights the importance of, on the one hand, the natural science behind 
the needs for regulation and, on the other, the economic interests affected by such regulation. 
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MARPOL Annex VI, i.e. Regulation 14. Discussions on other interlinked regulations, such as 
Regulations 4, 17 and 18 were excluded from investigation. 
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured in eight chapters. The next chapter provides a background that 
introduces the reader to the IMO and the studied process. It focuses on the functions of the 
IMO, the actors involved, the procedures of adopting and amending conventions and relevant 
earlier research. Chapter 3 then describes the theoretical framework of two conceptual lenses, 
providing the conceptual basis for analysis. Chapter 4 proceeds with presenting the 
methodology of the thesis. 
 
The thesis’s empirical contributions are presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 investigates 
the role of science and Chapter 6 the role of economic interests. Chapter 7 analyses and 
discusses the empirical findings for each conceptual lens and then discusses connections and 
differences between the two explanations. This is followed by discussions on methodological 
and theoretical implications, as well as research contributions. Chapter 8 concludes, presents 
recommendations to policy-makers and stakeholders, and ends the thesis with propositions for 
further research. Annex 1 is recommended as guidance for readers unfamiliar with 
atmospheric processes and impacts of SOx emissions. 
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2 Background 
 
This chapter introduces the purpose, functions and structure of the IMO, followed by a brief 
overview of the actors and interests involved in environmental issues at the IMO. It then 
describes the procedures for adopting and amending IMO conventions and introduces the 
studied process. The chapter ends by highlighting relevant earlier research. 
 
2.1 IMO: A Specialized UN Agency 
Under the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (UN), there are 15 specialized 
agencies that have legal and financial independence and function under specified conditions
9
 
(United Nations 2013; Boisson, 1999). These are generally concerned with international 
standard setting, developing treaties of a technical character (Birnie et al., 2009). The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is such a specialized UN agency. Officially, the 
IMO is described as a “global standard-setting authority” (IMO, 2014a), though the role of the 
IMO should not be viewed as an ‘authority’ but rather as a forum in which States can discuss, 
negotiate and take common decisions on maritime regulation. The convention that established 
the IMO in 1948 (Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948) provides its 
purpose and functions as shown in Annex 3 of this thesis. The IMO’s main function is to 
develop draft conventions that are recommended to States for adoption at international 
diplomatic conferences. An equally important part of the IMO’s work – or an even bigger part 
of its agenda – is to amend existing conventions. The IMO also develops a variety of codes, 
guidelines, resolutions and recommendations that are not legally binding. Although they are 
not binding, conventions can refer to guidelines that need to be taken into account, and several 
codes have become binding after being incorporated into conventions. Some fifty conventions 
and hundreds of codes, guidelines and recommendations have been developed through IMO 
since its start (Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948, article 2a,b; Tan, 
2006; Boisson, 1999; Harrison, 2011). 
 
The IMO has grown significantly since its first meeting in 1959, and today it is a very 
different organization. The changes reflect not only the development of the maritime industry 
but also of the politics over the years. It was initially established for a shipping industry that 
had been dominated by major maritime nations for centuries. Maritime conventions such as 
the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) have their origins in 
the UK’s dominance as a maritime nation, and it is not a coincidence that the headquarters of 
the IMO are located in London. Today, however, the developing countries represent the 
majority of its member States and – with the exception of the Council – the IMO’s bodies are 
open to all members (IMO, 2014e, 1998a; Boisson, 1999; Tan, 2006; Harvey, 2012).  
 
The Assembly is the governing body of the IMO, and its main task concerns the functioning 
of the organization, such as deciding on the rules of procedure and financial arrangements. All 
member States are included, and they meet in regular sessions once every two years, though it 
can also hold additional sessions. The Council is IMO’s executive body under the Assembly 
with the main task of supervising the work of the organization. Except for the reserved right 
of the Assembly to make recommendations on maritime safety and pollution prevention to its 
member States, the Council has the same functions as the Assembly during the time between 
                                                  
9 The conditions are set in Article 63 of the United Nations Charter – the treaty of the United Nations signed on 
June 26, 1945. 
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Assembly sessions. Its other functions include coordinating the activities of the IMO’s bodies 
and commenting on and making recommendations on their reports to the Assembly and the 
member States. The Council consists of representatives from 40 member States that are 
elected by the Assembly for two-year terms and divided into three categories. Category A 
consists of the ten States with the greatest interests in providing international shipping 
services. Category B consists of the ten States with the greatest interests in international 
seaborne trade. Category C consists of the remaining 20 States with special interests in 
maritime transport or navigation and that represent the world’s main geographical areas 
(IMO, 2014f). Hence, shipping and trade interests have particular influence at the IMO 
through the Council where coastal States claiming their rights to protect their environments 
(see Section 2.2) are underrepresented (Campe, 2009). This is a result of strong pressures to 
protect the interests of the traditional maritime nations under the conference establishing the 
IMO in 1948. They were concerned that the users of shipping services would create standards 
in the name of safety that were “over-constricting and over-expensive” (Boisson, 1999, p. 62). 
The solution was restricted membership of the Council and to assign it with significant 
powers. The initial criteria for membership were thus the supply of shipping services and 
interests in international seaborne trade. To increase the democracy of the IMO, the third 
category was introduced and the membership increased (ibid.). 
 
The main work of the IMO is conducted in five committees: Maritime Safety Committee 
(MSC), Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), Legal Committee (LEG), 
Technical Co-operation Committee (TC) and Facilitation Committee (FAL). These are 
assisted by seven sub-committees. In short, the committees are the arenas where decisions 
are made and most political negotiations take place, while the sub-committees are given 
instructions to conduct technical work and report back with proposed actions. This technical 
work is also a policy-making process with negotiations at a detailed technical level, but the 
main policy issues are dealt with by the committees. The MEPC is the main IMO body on 
environmental issues, with consideration of all IMO matters on prevention and control of 
pollution from ships. Its main task is to develop conventions and other instruments for 
adoption and to amend existing instruments. Like the other committees, the MEPC consists of 
all the member States. The MEPC and the MSC are assisted by the seven sub-committees. 
The MSC is IMO’s highest technical body. Its function is to consider all the maritime safety 
matters of the IMO. Besides adopting amendments to conventions, such as SOLAS, it 
develops safety recommendations and guidelines that could be adopted by the Assembly 
(IMO, 2014f; observations from investigated documents; Svensson, 2011).  
 
The structure of the sub-committees has changed over the years. In the studied process of this 
thesis, the Sub-Committee on Bulk Chemicals (BCH) conducted the technical work on many 
environmental issues, including drafting MARPOL Annex VI. The environmental work of 
this sub-committee was replaced by the Sub-Committee on Bulk Liquids and Gases (BLG) 
during 1995-2013, and it was once again replaced by the Sub-Committee on Pollution 
Prevention and Response (PPR) (ibid.). The MEPC and the BCH are the most important IMO 
bodies for this thesis. Some decisions also had to go through formal approvals by the 
Assembly, the Council and the MSC. 
 
The IMO has its headquarters in London with a Secretariat consisting of about 300 technical 
and administrative staff under the secretary-general. This makes IMO the smallest agency in 
the UN System. The Secretariat has six divisions focusing on safety at sea, the marine 
environment, legal affairs and external relations, conferences, technical cooperation and 
administrative affairs (IMO, 2014f; Boisson, 1999). Campe (2009) viewed the Secretariat as a 
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‘broker’ between the member States. Its most important function is to facilitate negotiations 
and discussions. It is service-oriented – serving member States rather than being driven by a 
policy agenda – and provides a policy-making arena for the members, with administrative 
functions such as preparing and holding meetings, collecting documents and pooling technical 
information, distributing submitted documents, briefing the chairmen, providing information 
on legal issues, drafting agendas, writing reports and working papers, providing interpreters, 
etc. Another significant function is to finalize and publish convention texts, guidelines, codes, 
manuals, etc. in several UN languages. The sales of these publications are part of financing 
the IMO (Campe, 2009; IMO, 2014f; Boisson, 1999). 
 
2.2 Actors and Interests of IMO Negotiations 
The member States of the IMO are the actors with decision-making powers. At the present, 
the IMO has 170 member States. In addition, Hong Kong and Macao in China, and the Faroe 
Islands in Denmark are associate members (IMO, 2014g). A basic division between maritime 
States with maritime interests and coastal States with interests in environmental protection is 
central to understanding the regulation of marine pollution from ships, which is characterized 
by a political contest between these States (Tan, 2006). The coastal States are “shoreline 
states that seek to regulate the movement and activities of foreign vessels in or near the waters 
adjacent to their coasts” (Tan, 2006, p. 30). A coastal State is also defined as the State in 
whose waters a vessel sails. Ships in a coastal State’s waters oblige themselves to follow the 
coastal State’s national laws (Stopford, 1997). The coastal States assert the right to 
environmental protection of their coasts and waters and thus seek to protect their waters and 
coasts by strict regulation of ships. Historically, they have been the primary initiators of 
environmental regulation for shipping (in particular Canada and Australia). Today, however, 
many developed countries that were previously large maritime States – e.g. Western European 
countries and the US – have joined the coastal States in prioritizing environmental protection. 
The maritime States traditionally emphasize freedom of navigation for all ships (Tan, 2006). 
For the broad concept of maritime States, I highlight three categories based on the suppliers 
and users of maritime services. These three categories are flag States, States with maritime 
interests and States with interests in maritime trade. 
 
The flag States have the primary legal authority to control merchant shipping and thus 
primary responsibility for the regulation of pollution from ships. A flag State is the country 
that a ship is registered in and whose laws it is bound to follow, i.e. under whose flag it sails. 
A shipowner may choose to register its vessels through either national registers or open 
registers. A national registry virtually treats shipping companies as any other company within 
a country. Shipping companies are thus subject to the country’s financial laws, corporate law 
and working conditions. Open registries are open to all nationalities to register their vessels. If 
costly environmental regulations appear in one country, a shipowner can simply register its 
ships in another, and many countries with open registries have as few regulations and as low 
taxes and registration fees as possible to attract registrations. The term Flag of Convenience 
(FOC) has therefore emerged, i.e. ships registered in these countries sail under flags of 
convenience. The majority of the merchant fleet by tonnage is today registered in open 
registries, with the largest fleets registered in Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands. All 
the funding for the IMO is provided by its member States, calculated in proportion to the size 
of its merchant fleet. The budget is thus largely financed by the major flag States with open 
registries. The top three contributors to the IMO budget for 2012 were thus Panama, Liberia 
and the Marshall Islands (Stopford, 1997; DeSombre, 2006; Tan, 2006; IMO, 2014g). 
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It is important to recognize that flag States only represent States where ships are registered, 
not the shipowners or other maritime industries. Alongside flag States, there are thus States 
with maritime interests. These States include the interests of maritime industries such as 
shipowners, charters, brokers, shipbuilding, etc. These industries are primarily located in 
developed countries, e.g. the US, the UK, Japan, and Western European countries such as 
Norway and Greece (Tan, 2006). There are also States with interests in maritime trade. Tan 
(2006) included these in the above maritime category, but I have chosen to separate them as 
users of maritime services as opposed to suppliers above. Such interests include a dependence 
on seaborne trade and transport. Even inland countries have interests in efficient seaborne 
trade in a globalized world driven by efficient world trade. Here, cargo owners are included in 
this category. Although petroleum interests can be included with oil companies as cargo 
owners, this thesis treats oil interests as a separate category due to the nature of the policy 
issue (including oil-producing/exporting States and bunker-supplying States; see Section 7.2). 
 
A further significant division of the member States is between developed and developing 
countries. In the past, most of the developing countries had few maritime interests and had 
interests in environmental protection like coastal States. Today, developing countries 
represent the majority of open registries and account for a large proportion of the world’s 
tonnage. Of the IMO membership, developing countries are in a majority, but the influence of 
developed countries is significantly greater. According to Tan (2006), the developed maritime 
States’ influence is through participation in the Council and in their leadership and 
participation where the essential policy is conducted, with emphasis on IMO’s various 
committees, sub-committees, working groups, etc. Developing countries often have low 
participation, small delegations and little expertise in technical issues due to lesser resources. 
Since the largest fleets are provided by developing countries, IMO’s budget is also based on 
contributions from developing countries (Tan, 2006; Campe, 2009). 
 
In addition to the member States, 63 inter-governmental organizations and 77 non-
governmental organizations are IMO members. The Inter-Governmental Organizations 
(IGOs) have observer status at the IMO. Many are regional IGOs that act as coordinators of 
their member States at the IMO, e.g. the European Commission, the Helsinki Commission 
(HELCOM), the OSPAR Commission and the League of Arab States. Others include trade 
organizations, e.g. the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), etc. (IMO, 2014g). 
 
The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have consultative status at the IMO. An 
NGO can be defined as “any international organization which is not established by inter-
governmental agreement” (Ahmed and Potter, 2006, p. 8). The level of allowed participation 
by NGOs and the opportunities for influence vary between international organizations. 
According to Peet (1994, p. 4), the IMO has been “more generous with respect to the 
opportunities for NGOs to be active”, and Harrison (2011, p. 157) stated that NGOs “play a 
central role in the work of the IMO”. No decision-making powers are given to NGOs, but 
their consultative status gives the rights to submit documents, to have a representative present 
at sessions of IMO bodies, to receive texts, to speak on any agenda item of interest (subject to 
approval of the IMO body concerned), etc. (IMO, 2014h, Rule 6). They participate in plenary 
sessions, and working and drafting groups, make statements and participate in formal 
discussions, have informal talks with delegates, etc. (Peet, 1994). The Council elects NGOs 
and regularly reviews their consultative status. Most are industry NGOs (INGOs), but the role 
of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) has become more important, in particular at the MEPC. 
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The following are examples of NGOs in IMO meetings (Boisson, 1999; IMO, 2014g; 
Harrison, 2011). 
 
 Shipowners and ship operators  
– e.g. International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), Baltic and International 
Maritime Council (BIMCO), International Association of Independent Tanker 
Owners (INTERTANKO) 
 Shippers and cargo owners 
– including oil industry organizations such as Oil Companies International 
Marine Forum (OCIMF) 
 Industry standards organizations 
– e.g. International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) 
 Classification societies 
– International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) 
 Ports, terminals and port services 
– e.g. International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) 
 Environmental NGOs 
– e.g. Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), Greenpeace and World-Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) 
 Shipbuilders, equipment manufacturers, insurers, maritime navigation services, legal 
associations, etc. 
 
2.3 Adopting and Amending IMO Conventions 
This section introduces the procedures of IMO negotiations. An overview of the working 
arrangements of the MEPC and its sub-committees is first presented. A description of the 
procedures leading up to the adoption of a new convention is then presented. Lastly, 
procedures of entry into force and amendments are addressed. 
 
2.3.1 Working Arrangements 
The following is based on observations from the investigation of IMO documents and from 
participating at BLG 15 in 2011
10
 and MEPC 66 in 2014
11
. 
 
The sessions for the committees or sub-committees are held during a normal working week. 
All decisions are taken in plenary sessions in the main hall of the IMO headquarters, and all 
the participating delegations and observers are represented. Provisional arrangements and a 
provisional agenda are made at the preceding session, and the definitive agenda and 
arrangements are decided on the first day of a session. Each sub-agenda item is considered in 
the plenary along with submissions that need plenary consideration. Working groups and 
drafting groups are then established depending on the stage of consideration and given their 
terms of reference for their work during the week. All the delegations and observers present 
are allowed to participate in these groups. The groups are held in English, however, without 
interpretation. The groups report their finalized work in the plenary, orally and with a written 
report along with action points. The reports are considered in the plenary and decisions are 
                                                  
10 As adviser to the Swedish delegation, observing the 15th session of the Sub-Committee on Bulk Liquids and 
Gases (BLG 15), IMO Headquarters, London, 7-11 February 2011. 
11 As an invited guest, observing the 66th session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 66), 
IMO Headquarters, London, 31 March to 4 April 2014. 
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taken based on the action points and further discussions. Formally, a working group conducts 
the technical consideration of a sub-item before decisions are taken, while drafting groups are 
given instructions to conduct editorial work of already-decided requirements or guidelines in 
a draft text. A drafting group could receive instructions to perform other tasks beyond an 
editorial nature, however. If further work is needed in order to meet the deadlines, work could 
be assigned between the sessions. The intersessional work consists of intersessional 
meetings of a working group and so-called correspondence groups. Both are given their 
instructions by the MEPC (or terms of reference by a sub-committee followed by approval 
and instructions by the committee). An intersessional meeting functions as an extended 
working group meeting but may include more participants. The report of an intersessional 
meeting is submitted to the forthcoming session of the concerned committee/sub-committee. 
A correspondence group is one that considers its matters mainly by e-mail conversation. 
member States and observers send their comments to a lead country, which coordinates the 
work and reports to a forthcoming session or intersessional meeting. 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the policy-decisions are taken by the committees and the sub-
committees are given instructions to conduct technical work. The report of a sub-committee 
ends with a list of proposed decisions to be taken by the committee (action points). The 
MEPC then considers the report and its action points. When all the action points have been 
decided, the report is ‘approved in general’. In addition to this approval, each session of a 
committee or sub-committee ends with consideration of a draft report, paragraph by 
paragraph. The contents of a report thus needs approval at each session before the Secretariat 
can produce a final report. 
 
In addition to the formal policy-making arenas, informal talks represent a significant part of 
policy-making. Much discussion and negotiation occur between the formal working hours of a 
session. With a two-hour lunch break, much can happen that is not accounted for in the 
reports of sessions and groups. In addition, informal groups are formally established. These 
could be named, for example, ‘informal consultations’, ‘informal drafting group’ or ‘informal 
group of experts’. No reports are provided for these informal groups but rather proposals of 
draft texts that have been negotiated in the groups. A further informal step can be taken within 
these informal groups by the chairman of the group proposing “a short break” for the 
participants to ‘consider’ or ‘consult’ on different versions of a draft text for example. This 
could result in what is known as a ‘huddle’, where a new version of a draft text is negotiated 
face to face and then taken to the chairman who circulates it in the informal group for further 
negotiation. It should also be noted that many alignments and negotiations take place long 
before the sessions. For example, a joint submission by several States is a process on its own, 
which this thesis does not take into account. 
 
2.3.2 Adopting IMO Conventions 
The general procedures at the IMO follow the formal procedures under the UN. The IMO 
does not have the mandate to adopt international conventions however. Adoption has to be 
through a diplomatic conference. The preparatory work of adopting a convention at the 
MEPC begins with an initial proposal to include a new item in the work programme. Only 
member States can submit such a proposal. Member NGOs can merely submit background 
information and recommend or advise the member States to take action
12
. A proposal should 
                                                  
12 Note that follow-up action could also be requested from the Assembly, diplomatic conferences, UN 
conferences/bodies and other international or inter-governmental conferences/bodies. 
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include a demonstrated ‘compelling need’ for the proposed measures and an analysis of the 
costs and benefits to the shipping industry, as well as legislative and administrative burdens. 
The committee then discusses and considers the proposal and decides if it should be part of 
the work programme.  The committee also considers priorities and decides on a target date for 
completing the new item (Boisson 1999; IMO, 2014i; MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.2
13
).  
 
If the committee agrees on a proposal for a new convention, it is sent to the Council and, in 
some cases, to the Assembly. After authorization to proceed, the committee begins a detailed 
consideration or assigns a sub-committee to carry out the main technical work. The aim is to 
develop a draft convention on a specific target date. When agreement on a final draft 
convention has been reached by the committee, it is sent to the Council and the Assembly 
with a recommendation to hold a diplomatic conference for adoption. The work of the MEPC 
is now complete. A resolution is then adopted by the Council or the Assembly if agreement is 
met on the draft convention. The resolution calls for a diplomatic conference and invites all 
IMO member States, as well as all member States of the UN. The draft convention is 
circulated for comment before the conference. This is the stage at which the powers of the 
IMO end. The time needed to reach this stage varies but it could take several years (Boisson, 
1999; IMO, 2014i). According to Okamura (1995, p. 183), the IMO process “is by nature a 
slow negotiating process”. Boisson (1999) emphasized that the extent of this work at the IMO 
should not be underestimated and that any excessive haste could result in an inadequately 
prepared draft convention, which could result in failure at the diplomatic conference. The 
preparatory work by the IMO provides the conditions for consensus among governments. 
 
Once the conference is held, it becomes an international body in itself with its own 
arrangements and procedural rules, even if it is held at the IMO headquarters. All 
participating States – not just IMO members – have equal rights at a conference. When 
adopting a new protocol under the MARPOL Convention, however, only the parties to the 
convention can adopt it. The addition of a new annex to a MARPOL requires a protocol to be 
adopted by the parties to the convention.
 14
 NGOs also participate in diplomatic conferences 
within their limits of giving advice and providing background information. The draft 
convention and comments from invited member governments and organizations are 
considered in detail at the conference. The work could be conducted in plenary sessions and 
in established working groups. Unlike the typical procedure of the MEPC, voting takes place 
at diplomatic conferences. A convention is adopted when a majority of the governments – that 
are present and voting – agree (IMO, 2014i; Boisson, 1999; observations from investigated 
IMO documents). With regard to the adoption of Annex VI, each participating party to 
MARPOL 73/78 had the right to vote. In general, decisions were taken by a two-thirds 
majority of representatives for the parties present and voting. Decisions on procedures were 
taken by a simple majority (MP/CONF.3/2).  
 
2.3.3 Entry into Force and Amendments 
The adoption of a convention is merely a first stage of a long process. A convention has to 
become legally binding on to the parties before the standards can take effect. This stage is 
                                                  
13 It is acknowledged that the Guidelines on the Organization and Method of Work of the Maritime Safety 
Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee and Their Subsidiary Bodies (MSC-
MEPC.1/Circ.2) were revised in 2012 and replaced by document MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.2. The cited version 
of the guidelines does reflect the procedures of the studied process more closely however. 
14 The Protocol of 1978 merged with the 1973 Convention and added Annexes I-V. The Protocol of 1997 
subsequently added Annex VI. 
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called entry into force (IMO, 2014i; Boisson, 1999). Generally, a number of States 
representing a specific percentage of the world tonnage (merchant fleet) have to formally 
“express its consent to be bound” (IMO, 2014i) by an IMO convention. There are different 
methods for governments to do so. A convention is often open for signature within 12 months 
of the adoption. For most multilateral treaties, the signature alone is not binding. It has to be 
followed by ratification, acceptance or approval. These three procedures all have the same 
basic meaning: that a State expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty. Ratification is the 
most commonly used. Acceptance and approval have less formal and technical procedures.
15
 
After the period for signature, the convention is open for accession. A State that has not 
signed the convention can become a party by accession, which also has the same legal effect 
as ratification (IMO, 2014i; United Nations, 2014). 
 
When the conditions required for a convention to enter into force are met, it usually takes an 
additional period before it enters into force in order to enable implementation by 
governments. The governments have to ensure that the standards of an international 
convention are applied nationally. As such, the standards are implemented in national law. 
The governments of parties have a responsibility to ensure compliance with the treaty. The 
enforcement of maritime conventions has traditionally been the obligation of the flag State. 
Flag States set their own provisions, and penalties are set for their ships and operators. A 
system of certificates and inspections are used in addition to the national requirements, 
however, such as Port State Control and class certificates by classification societies. With Port 
State Control, ships can be inspected at the port and detained if they do not meet international 
standards (IMO, 2014i; Boisson, 1999; Stopford, 1997). A further account on enforcement is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Traditional procedures of adopting amendments to IMO conventions that had entered into 
force used to be either adoption by a two-thirds majority (of the parties present and voting) at 
the IMO or at least one-third at a diplomatic conference. These procedures were so slow, 
however, that some amendments never entered into force. The tacit acceptance procedure 
was therefore introduced. It sets a specific date for entry into force that applies if no 
objections are received from “a specified number of Parties” before that date (IMO, 2014i). 
The preparatory work on amendments follows, in principle, the work of a new convention.  
 
2.4 Introduction to the Studied Process 
This section briefly introduces this process and Figure 2.1 illustrates key events.
16
 Norway 
raised the issue of air pollution from ships and fuel oil quality at the Second North Sea 
Conference in 1987. The result of this conference was a declaration to initiate actions through 
the IMO. The following year, HELCOM also made a declaration to develop standards on fuel 
oil quality through the IMO. Both declarations were then raised at the 26
th
 session of the 
MEPC in 1988. After a Norwegian proposal, it was agreed to include air pollution from ships 
along with fuel oil quality in the future work programme of the MEPC. It was also agreed to 
deal with the issue of developing improved fuel oil quality standards at MEPC 27, where a 
proposed action plan for fuel oil standards was agreed on, along with the inclusion of air 
pollution and fuel oil quality in the long-term work plan of the MEPC.  
 
                                                  
15 Another option is definitive signature, by which a State can express its consent to be bound directly without 
ratification, acceptance or approval. This is only optional when it is allowed under the treaty. 
16 This description is basically a summary of the ‘procedural’ parts of Chapters 5 and 6, and references therein. 
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Figure 2.1. Key Events of the Studied Process, 1987-1997 
 
The work then entered a preparatory phase to consider emissions of air pollution from ships 
and possible measures. At MEPC 29 in 1990, it was agreed to deal with the issue with high 
priority from the next session onwards. At MEPC 30 in 1991, a target was agreed to halve the 
present level of SO2 emissions from ships by 2000, though no definition on the ‘present level’ 
was agreed. In this context, it should be noted that global sulphur content limits of bunker 
fuels between 0.8% and 1.5% were proposed during these initial years, but nothing was 
agreed on. A strategy for exhaust gases was developed that included a proposed global 
sulphur content limit of 1.5%, but also with an option to have stricter regulations in certain 
areas in need of environmental protection. 
 
The BCH Sub-Committee was instructed to conduct the main work on developing a proposed 
new annex to MARPOL on air pollution from ships. In order to develop such standards, an 
Assembly resolution was needed. A draft resolution was developed that included the target 
levels and dates for the addressed air pollutants, but these were removed from the draft at 
MEPC 31 in 1991. Instead, the following paragraph was added: “Reduce emissions of sulphur 
oxides and nitrogen oxides in exhaust gases” (MEPC 31/21, Annex 14, para. 2.3.2). 
Nonetheless, the target levels and dates were included in a revised action plan of the MEPC.  
 
The work by the BCH sub-committee to draft the new annex on air pollution began at BCH 
21 in 1991. A global 1.5% sulphur content limit was proposed in line with the exhaust gas 
strategy. Already in this session, it drew the attention of the MEPC to “the impracticability of 
completing its work in 1992” (BCH 21/15, para. 11.60) and to recommend that the target date 
be extended to 1994. A correspondence group was then established to prepare a draft annex to 
MARPOL as a submission to BCH 22. The group discussed the question of regional versus 
global regulation. A global approach with a 1.5% sulphur content limit remained in its draft 
regulations however. In 1992, the BCH turned the focus to a regional approach. A group of 
volunteers in the working group developed a proposed regional approach with sulphur limits 
in specific areas where ship emissions contributed to problems with acidification, so-called 
special areas. The concept of “global capping” was also introduced by the group of volunteers 
as part of the regional concept. The intention was not to reduce the emissions but to prevent a 
possible future increase in the sulphur content.  
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As the work by the BCH went on with an extended work period, the majority favoured a 
regional approach and a possible global cap. Different proposals for a global cap were made 
during these years. The figures that gained most support were between 3% and 5%. The 
discussions on special areas focused on criteria and procedures for designation, with 
delineation of such areas being a key issue. The work of the BCH Sub-Committee was 
finalized at BCH 24 in 1994. The discussion on global capping was intense. No consensus 
was reached and a 5% limit was in majority. The draft sent to the MEPC included a 5% global 
cap and a 1.5% limit in SECAs in square brackets.  
 
As the work went on at the MEPC, the majority favoured a 5% global cap. At MEPC 37, the 
draft text of the new annex (now Annex VI) was reviewed with the goal to be finalized, 
though this session had a work overload. A discussion on special areas could thus not take 
place. MEPC 38 was supposed to be the final MEPC session of the process, though one more 
session was needed and adoption at a diplomatic conference was postponed to September 
1997 instead of March 1997 (MEPC 38/20). At the final drafting session in 1997 (MEPC 39), 
it was agreed to maintain the 5% global cap limit in square brackets in the final draft text to 
the international diplomatic conference held in 1997 for adoption of Annex VI.
17
 The 
discussions on SECAs mainly concerned proposed SECA designation of the Baltic Sea Area. 
 
At the Conference, the combined regional solution of SECA regulations with a 1.5% sulphur 
content limit and a global cap of 4.5% was adopted. The 5% global cap limit remained in 
square brackets for the major part of the conference, and it was not until the second to last day 
that agreement was reached on 4.5%. The Baltic Sea Area was designated as a SECA. The 
North Sea Area was not designated, though a need to take actions against acidification in 
Europe was recognized in a conference resolution. It was also agreed in another resolution to 
monitor the average sulphur content in residual fuels. 
 
2.5 Earlier Research 
Studies of international environmental negotiations represent a large and broad field within 
different disciplines that are known under different names, e.g. global environmental politics 
(GEP), international environmental politics and global environmental governance (GEG). Its 
basic foundation is within political science with the focus on the roles of States, international 
institutions, power, norms, ideology, etc. (Dauvergne, 2012).  In particular, there has been a 
traditional dominance of regime theory within the field of international relations (IR), with 
focus on formation and effectiveness of regimes
18 
(Sprinz and Helm, 1999; Langley, 2001; 
Newell, 2008; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011). Nonetheless, the nature of environmental 
problems requires crossing disciplines, which means that “some of the most innovative 
research is occurring outside of political science – in disciplines such as geography, 
environmental studies, economics, sociology, law, history, philosophy, developments studies, 
biology, and human ecology” (Dauvergne, 2012, p. 3). Dimitrov (2012, p. 73) highlighted that 
“the exchange of arguments is the least explored topic in this field of research” (i.e. on 
international environmental negotiations). He investigated argumentation and persuasion 
                                                  
17 Conference of Parties to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto. Also: third Conference on Marine Pollution (MP/CONF.3).  
18 Krasner (1983, p. 2) defined regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.  
The concept of regimes is part of the institutional approach to study GEG, focusing on the roles of institutions. 
Put simply in the context of environmental policy-making, regimes “are certain kinds of institutions that deal 
with environmental issues” (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011, p. 13). 
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techniques by delegates in climate negotiations during 2007-2010 based on participatory 
observations of 12 sessions as a delegate for the EU and Bulgaria, and through document 
analysis of official statements and interviews with participants. Dimitrov’s research focused 
on the actual communication between delegates in negotiations, and he presented his analysis 
of arguments divided into the different groups of actors of climate negotiations. Dimitrov then 
categorized the general arguments and focused his analysis on arguments that successfully 
persuaded other delegates.  
 
Although international institutions have been a main focus in the broad field of global 
environmental politics, the IMO has not been studied as much as others. In particular, the 
focus of the analysis in the IR literature on regimes and institutions has been on the long-
range transboundary air pollution regime, the ozone regime and the climate change regime 
(Zürn, 1998, cited in Dauvergne, 2012). In addition, Dauvergne (2012, p. 14) highlighted 
concerns of some scholars “that the field of GEP is turning into the study of climate change”. 
Questions on how science or economic interests affect policy have been addressed by scholars 
from a diversity of fields (e.g. research highlighted in Chapter 3). No research has been found 
addressing these questions for a specific agenda item at the IMO in a longer international 
environmental policy-making process for shipping. The following highlights research relevant 
to policy-making processes of the IMO and the studied process. 
 
Gaskell (2003) addressed decision-making of the Legal Committee of the IMO by widely 
examining decision-making processes (drafting by the Legal Committee but also diplomatic 
conferences) for several conventions. This examination was based on his participation as 
representative for an environmental NGO
19
 “with varying regularity since about 1985” 
(Gaskell, 2003, p. 137). The paper provides an ‘insider’ perspective on the IMO culture based 
on his observations of negotiation processes and the influences of States, NGOs and 
individuals in relation to progress in drafting conventions. Dirks (2001, 2004) addressed the 
decision-making processes behind the Standards on Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers Convention 1995 (STCW 95). Of relevance to this thesis is his focus on why 
this convention was adopted despite many conflicting interests and previous positions by 
shipowner associations and seafarer unions. (Dirks, 2001) and (Dirks, 2004) both show a 
theory-guided analysis, with testing hypotheses and discussing theories. Notably, Dirks 
(2004) applied two theoretical approaches within IR: rational choice and social 
constructivism.
20
 No methodology was accounted for, however.
21
  
 
With regard to research on environmental policy-making of the IMO, Campe (2009) 
addressed the role of the IMO Secretariat as an international bureaucracy. The work of the 
Secretariat was studied with primary and secondary data, interviews with senior officers at the 
three divisions of the Secretariat. The main focus of Campe (2009) was on the Marine 
Environment Division, and its work was placed in the wider context of the influence of 
international environmental bureaucracies. Her chapter provides insights into the work and 
functions of the Secretariat, and its influence – or lack of it – on environmental issues among 
various interests and actors at the IMO. Peet (1994) studied the influences of NGOs on 
policy-making of the MEPC (as well as under the London Dumping Convention) and how 
government delegations valued the role of NGOs. His analysis was based on a questionnaire 
distributed to delegates at an MEPC session. The paper had particular focus on environmental 
                                                  
19 International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) 
20 Constructivism in IR should not be confused with constructivism in sociology of science (see Section 3.2). 
21 Other than mostly theoretical literature, the references in Dirks (2001, 2004) were focused on secondary 
sources (see Chapter 4 of this thesis) and included one interview. 
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NGOs, was limited to one session of the MEPC and included all agenda items. Peet was also a 
representative of an environmental NGO (FOEI) at the IMO, and the paper provided no 
references or theoretical contribution.  
 
Tan (2006) provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of how environmental decisions 
are made by the IMO and different actors, with general descriptions of the policy-making 
processes behind the existing environmental regulations for shipping up to 2006. Notably, 
Tan’s brief description of the process behind MARPOL Annex VI was the main inspiration 
for my research. Other book chapters, papers and reports for this particular process are 
delimited to somewhat biased authors due to their positions at the IMO (e.g. Okamura, 1995; 
Ninaber, 1997), background descriptions without a purpose of describing the process (e.g. De 
La Rue and Anderson, 2009) and MSc theses on Annex VI in general (e.g. Sikirica, 2008). 
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3 Theoretical Framework  
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis consists of two conceptual lenses: the role of science 
and the role of economic interests. This chapter first describes the reasoning of conceptual 
lenses, followed by the chosen conceptual basis for each lens. 
 
3.1 Allison and Conceptual Lenses 
In 1971, Graham T. Allison gave important lessons on how international events were 
explained by theorists and how they could be explained through his book Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison (1971) started by raising a few central 
questions on the Cuban Missile Crisis that lacked satisfactory answers by previous analyses. 
A basic premise of his work was that satisfactory answers required more than new 
information and analysis. He emphasized greater awareness of what both laymen and analysts 
bring to analyses: that not only the evidence is significant in our judgements of what is 
important or what we accept as adequate explanations, “but also the ‘conceptual lenses’ 
through which we look at the evidence” (Allison, 1971, p. 2). In order to explain an event, one 
cannot describe everything in the world leading to that event. An analyst thus uses a 
conceptual model: 
 
Conceptual models not only fix the mesh of the nets that the analyst drags 
through the material in order to explain a particular action; they also direct him 
to cast his nets in selective ponds, at certain depths, in order to catch the fish he 
is after (Allison, 1971, p. 4). 
 
Allison analysed the Cuban Missile Crisis using three conceptual models and three case 
studies based on each of them. Each model was seen as a ‘conceptual lens’ that provided 
different explanations on the studied event. These lenses were not viewed as simple 
perspectives or approaches. Rather, each consisted of “a cluster of assumptions and categories 
that influence what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his question, where he looks 
for evidence, and what he produces as an answer” (ibid., p. 245). It was shown that the 
models not only provided different answers to the questions asked and different perspectives 
on the event, but even the questions were asked differently. Moreover, they did not only 
provide different explanations for the same event but also different explanations of rather 
different occurrences. 
 
Spectacles magnify one set of factors rather than another and thus not only lead 
analysts to produce different explanations of problems that appear, in their 
summary questions, to be the same, but also influence the character of the 
analyst’s puzzle, the evidence he assumes to be relevant, the concepts he uses in 
examining the evidence, and what he takes to be an explanation (ibid., p. 251). 
 
The above findings and words by Allison should be kept in mind by the reader as we look 
more closely at the conceptual basis of this thesis. It is not the intention with this chapter to 
provide a comprehensive review of relevant theoretical approaches or complete aspects of a 
reviewed theoretical approach. Rather, the theoretical content provides the basis for a way of 
thinking when gathering and analysing the empirical grounds: “a cluster of assumptions and 
categories” (ibid., p. 245), as highlighted above.  
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3.2 Conceptual Lens 1: The Role of Science 
This first lens addresses the role of natural science in international environmental policy-
making, by focusing on Science and Technology Studies (STS), primarily Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge (SSK, constructivism) but also the under-and over-critical models 
(radical relativism). SSK is presented last to show the reasoning of this approach. This section 
begins with a background on the epistemic community approach within International 
Relations (IR) and then focuses on the under- and over-critical model, followed by SSK, 
which both criticizes and accepts parts of the former approaches. 
 
3.2.1 Background: The Epistemic Community Approach 
Peter M. Haas has criticized traditional institutional approaches in IR with regard to 
international environmental regimes. Institutionalists focus their analysis on the institutional 
setting in which decisions are made – where cooperation among States occurs when their self-
interests are favoured by cooperation (Haas, 1997, Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011). According 
to Haas (1997), it is not only State power that drives environmental regimes but also scientific 
understanding of environmental issues which decision-makers are unfamiliar with. In an 
epistemic community approach – based on constructivism22 in IR – consensual knowledge is 
viewed as essential for environmental cooperation (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002), and it is 
carried forward to the policy-makers by so-called epistemic communities. Haas (1992, p. 3) 
defined an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area”. Policy-makers often lack information about pollution 
sources, the extent of their impacts, etc. Epistemic communities function as experts that States 
turn to for advice in situations of uncertainty. As the policy-making process proceeds, the 
decision-makers are informed and bound by the advice they receive. In this regard, Haas 
(1997, p. 201) argued that international negotiations could be viewed “as a process for 
reducing uncertainty’ and “a process of deferring to specialists”. Epistemic communities 
further have the power to influence policy-makers. They can be even institutionalized in an 
international regime and can enable environmental cooperation that goes beyond the interests 
of States (Haas, 1992; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011).    
 
3.2.2 The Under- and Over-Critical Models 
A traditional view of the role of science in policy-making is that science ‘speaks truth to 
power’. This is a realist’s view on the relationship between science and society. In realism, 
the role of science has a traditional positivistic basis, with science separated from policy and 
producing facts free from values and objectively representing reality – the truth. Due to their 
“privileged ability to describe present realities and predict plausible futures” (Jasanoff, 1997, 
p. 230), scientists can influence policy-making. Derived from decades of studies on 
environmental and technological controversies, radical relativism criticizes this traditional 
view. In its view, policy outcomes are always determined by social relations, with the actors’ 
competing interests and values. The framing of policy issues (including scientific research) 
and their solutions are both shaped by interests. Hence, science is incapable of determining 
policy. Jasanoff (1997) described this incapability in the following way: 
 
 
                                                  
22 Constructivism in IR should not be confused with constructivism in sociology of science. Jasanoff (1997) 
instead terms the epistemic community approach as ‘mediated realism’. 
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At best, one side or the other in a policy debate gains temporary advantage by 
claiming access to superior knowledge, but such gains are eventually wiped out 
as the opposing side learns to generate competing and equally authoritative 
scientific claims (Jasanoff, 1997, p. 231). 
 
A famous example of radical relativism is Collingridge and Reeve (1986). Based on their 
observations from analysis of regulatory controversies, they drew a negative conclusion about 
the role of science in influencing policy-making. They argued that the policy environment 
will always be either under-critical or over-critical to science, and that science will have 
negligible impact on the actual decisions in either case (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; 
Jasanoff, 1990, 1997). The under-critical model, Collingridge and Reeve (1986, p. 32) argued, 
is “a limiting case of modesty”, which only arises when consensus in policy is already in 
place. In such a situation, science is only used by the policy-makers to legitimize or 
rationalize political choices already made. Any scientific claim that supports policy is 
received with an un-critical view. Hence, science is easily accepted in the policy-making 
process, but it is impossible for science to influence policy (ibid.). 
 
According to Collingridge and Reeve (1986), the use of science does not enable agreement for 
most of the cases in policy-making. When consensus is not in place, the over-critical model 
holds that the use of science results in endless debates that strengthen disagreements. 
Stakeholders affected by regulation are likely to sponsor research that critically questions the 
basis of the research used behind the policy in order to create doubt about, for example, 
environmental impacts and benefits of proposed policy. They will look for methodological 
weaknesses and show unexpected costs or impacts of the policy. Policy relevance in science 
increases the level of criticism. Existing science and expertise available to policy-makers are 
not sufficient to determine policy, nor does further research reduce uncertainties. Instead, 
uncertainties are only exacerbated by more research. Science in policy results in endless 
technical debates on interpretations of factual claims derived from the policy dispute with 
deeply divided interests and values. Some scientist act out of self-interest or the interests of 
their funding sources, which Collingridge and Reeve labelled ‘advocates’ as they act similarly 
by gathering evidence of their interests to form a technical case and fighting counterclaims. 
Others may be less connected to interests, but in this model, the advocates drive the debate 
(Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Yearley, 2004). During such a debate, “many long-settled 
technical issues are reopened for investigation, and attempts to definitely resolve one issue 
often succeed only in opening up many more technical issues for consideration” (Collingridge 
and Reeve, 1986, p. 145). The over-critical model implies that agreement is instead reached 
when the policy-makers decide to stop contesting (Yearley, 2004). Decisions are simply made 
by compromises between the competing actors, resulting in little use of the science being 
produced for the policy-making process, which is often a “huge body of literature” 
(Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, p. 32).  
 
3.2.3 Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
While realism in STS and the epistemic community approach in IR overemphasize the role of 
science, radical relativism in STS and institutionalism in IR underemphasize it (Lidskog and 
Sundqvist, 2002; Jasanoff, 1997). Yearley (2004) and Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002, 2011) 
instead emphasized a turn to Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) – a constructivist 
approach to STS/sociology of science. In SSK, the role of social conditions is in focus when 
analysing the possibilities or constraints of science to influence and determine policy-making 
(Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011). It is strongly against the thoughts of a linear relationship 
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between science and policy – with science speaking truth to power. Science and policy are co-
produced, meaning that “policy influences the production and stabilization of knowledge and 
that knowledge simultaneously supports and justifies policy” (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011, 
p. 15). Our understanding of nature can solve social issues, but social factors can also change 
our understanding of nature (ibid.). The constructivist approach views scientific ‘facts’ as 
mostly socially constructed: 
 
We regard a particular factual claim as true not because it accurately reflects 
what is out there in nature, but because it has been certified as true by those who 
are considered competent to pass upon the truth and falsity of that kind of claim 
(Jasanoff, 1990, p. 13).  
 
This construction does not only occur within the scientific community but also extends within 
society, such as through media, politics and the public. Science becomes valid by the 
authoritative status of the scientific community in society. To enhance their authority, 
scientists use different strategies to define its boundaries to society (e.g. politics, law or 
religion). In fact, in SSK, there are no essential boundaries between science and policy. Such 
boundaries are established socially by the scientists themselves and the ones using science by 
a process known as boundary work. Actors such as scientists, policy-makers and traditional 
philosophers of science have – and still do – defined norms and principles on how science 
should be conducted in order to distinguish between what is science and what is not (Jasanoff, 
1990; Sundqvist et al., 2002). Nonetheless, science depends on human interactions and is 
affected by economics, ideology, culture and political interests, and a socially constructed 
scientific claim only retains its authoritative status if it is not over-scrutinized on its basic 
premises by actors with different views than those shared by the scientific community. It 
follows that scientific claims could lose their factual status by deconstruction. In particular, 
this occurs in the policy-making arena with its competing interest and organizational cultures. 
Definitions on what is and is not science are negotiated:  
 
Labelling an issue as either “science” or “policy” implicitly entails an 
allocation of power – the power to speak or be heard on the issues in question – 
and interest groups will fight over these labels (Jasanoff, 1996, p. 18).  
 
This deconstruction occurs in similar ways, as described by radical relativism. In fact, SSK 
accepts the existence of both under-critical and over-critical policy environments. Science 
could either be accepted or deconstructed in critical policy environments (Jasanoff, 1996; 
Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). It is merely the conclusions of the over-critical model that there 
is no closure but constant disagreement that is rejected. According to Jasanoff (1997), radical 
relativism fails to take into account the amount of empirical data that has shown eventual 
closure of conflicts in policy-making based on science, such as for environmental issues. In 
SSK, closure could occur both in policy environments where science is accepted by socially 
favourable conditions and in critical policy environments by reconstruction. As scientific 
weaknesses are revealed to the policy-makers by deconstruction, this can make them proclaim 
rights to interpret science themselves. The authority of interpreting uncertain science could be 
partially moved to the policy-makers. It follows that deconstructed factual claims could retain 
their factual status in policy-making by reconstruction conducted by policy-makers. The 
policy-makers do their own readings and make their own interpretations of available scientific 
evidence, resolving uncertainties politically (Jasanoff, 1987).  
 
With the SSK approach, science can only shape environmental policy with socially favourable 
conditions (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011). It has to gain epistemological and moral authority, 
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and scientific claims have to be consistent with the legitimizing reasons for political action 
(Jasanoff, 1997). The outcome often strongly depends on how decision-making authority is 
allocated, e.g. among political, scientific or legal actors/institutions (Jasanoff, 1987). In other 
words, the institutional setting where policy-making occurs – with cultures, procedures, rules 
of decision-making, etc. – is important. The setting could be an international institution, such 
as the IMO, and science could face either an uncritical (science-accepting) or critical (science-
critical) policy environment. The authority could also be allocated to epistemic communities. 
SSK thus accepts – and actually emphasizes – the importance of epistemic communities. Yet, 
the epistemic community approach fails to explain how such communities can overcome 
resistance and determine the outcome in critical policy environments (Jasanoff, 1996, 1997; 
Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). Epistemic communities can be formed from shared political 
interests of a State, self-interests of the scientists, etc., but the image that represents them is as 
knowledge-based alliances. It is not knowledge that unites policy-makers in environmental 
policy-making through epistemic communities but shared beliefs of policy that allow 
knowledge to be used when it is seen as relevant to policy. The success of epistemic 
communities in policy-making depends on social conditions, for example policy environments 
being either uncritical or critical. The focus of SSK is thus not on the power of consensual 
knowledge to influence policy, but on the social conditions that make epistemic communities 
able to influence (Jasanoff, 1996, 1997).  
 
According to Jasanoff (1997, p. 232), science can be influential in policy if it : (1) “converge 
with prevailing cultural ideas about responsibility and fault”, (2) ”support politically accepted 
forms of discourse and reasoning”, and (3) is “ratified by communities that have established, 
within well-defined boundaries, a privileged right to formulate policy”. However, issues in 
international environmental policy-making that cross cultural and political boundaries 
between States function differently. Jasanoff (1997) stressed that epistemic communities are 
needed to produce science that is meaningful to policy. This knowledge production occurs in 
both micro- and macro-political settings with communities consisting of laboratories, interest 
groups, political institutions, social movements, States, etc. In addition, science can influence 
policy if (4) “convergent economic interests of business and government support it, allowing 
science to play the role of a visible consensus builder” (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002, p. 86) 
and (5) “if it is part of a general technological culture, where technocratic solutions of 
political problems are supported” (ibid.). To sum up, not only favourable conditions are 
needed for science to be influential but science itself also needs to be adapted (ibid.). 
 
The following should be at the centre when analysing international environmental policy-
making, according to Jasanoff (1996): 
 
 How issues are framed as scientific, and who is framing them 
 Rejected or disfavoured policy approaches and problem definitions  
 Who are recognized with authoritative knowledge, as well as why   
 Rejected or disregarded alternative knowledge or belief  
 
This thesis adopts the view of the concept of framing from Lidskog and Sundqvist (2011) as a 
process of the policy-makers to simplify and package unstable and complex phenomena into a 
format of an ‘issue’ suitable for political action. Effective and legitimate solutions to a 
problem depend on how the problem is framed. Lidskog and Sundqvist (2011) thus argued 
that framing processes must be analysed, but also in order to understand conflicts and 
communications between groups. Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) presented a few questions on 
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framing and definitions of problems for analysis of climate change policies. The following are 
here of relevance (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998, p. 6): 
 
How do environmental problems come to be construed as global and universal 
rather than private, particularistic, local, or national? 
 
How are conflicts about the scale or means of intervention understood, managed 
or resolved?  
 
To what extent is science itself counted upon to address these problems, and 
what distinctive issues of science policy and politics are raised by such 
characterizations? 
 
In addition, Lidskog and Sundqvist (2011, p. 11-12) highlighted the following questions: 
 
... [W]hat actors have the power to identify environmental issues, construct their 
spatiality, and thereby propose the kinds of measures and cooperation that are 
important to agree on? And what institutions limit and enable these actors’ 
maneuvering room?  
 
Jasanoff (1996) concluded that one way to begin to address these questions is to view the 
knowledge claims of epistemic communities sceptically and, at the same time, focus on the 
normative foundations of international negotiations. Values and power are always present in 
negotiations, whether expressed politically or scientifically. 
 
To end this section, a research area that is very close to this thesis is briefly highlighted. 
Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002) analysed the development of the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution  (LRTAP) as a case study of using the SSK approach to the role 
of science within environmental regimes. LRTAP is “one of the most science-based regimes 
that exists today” (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002, p. 86). Their conclusions included that 
further research should apply SSK to detailed studies of different environmental regimes. 
Such research could investigate the explanatory power of SSK and analyse the research 
dependency of different environmental regimes. By several studies and authors in different 
fields, Lidskog and Sundqvist (2011) explored SSK further, both empirically and theoretically 
through cross-fertilization with IR. They stressed that knowledge is essential in policy-
making, but that science only speaks to power under certain conditions. These conditions have 
to be studied by social scientists.  
 
3.3 Conceptual Lens 2: The Role of Economic Interests 
The second lens addresses the role of economic interests in international environmental 
policy-making by focusing on how different characteristics of an issue determine collective 
action among actors with different self-interests. The conceptual basis is collective action 
within public choice theory – with a particular focus on the concept of ‘issue structure’ – and 
Wilson’s theory of politics – focusing on how the perceived distributions of costs and benefits 
affect the policy-making process. Public choice is sort of a mix between the fields of 
economics and political science. It has been described as using “economic tools to deal with 
the traditional problems of political science” (Tullock, 2008[2014]). Just like economic 
decisions, political decisions are choices between costs and benefits. This not only concerns 
financial costs and benefits but also in general “between whatever has to be sacrificed and 
whatever is gained as a result” (Butler, 2012, pp. 22-23). One big difference between 
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economic choices in markets and public choices is that the actors that benefit from a decision 
are not necessarily the same ones that bear the cost.  
 
Public choice focuses on how collective decision-making is affected by the motivations of 
individuals, who are driven by their self-interests. Public choice has its roots in rational 
choice, which is a classic approach to explaining international negotiations. It is a basic 
foundation of both economic theory (primarily neoclassical) and international relations 
(realism, liberalism and neoliberalism), of which the most prominent uses are within regime 
theory and game theory (Dauvergne, 2012; Enevoldsen, 2001). The basic unit of analysis is 
the individual, but this does not mean that theories of rational choice only apply to 
individuals. A macro-theory on social relations should be founded on a micro-theory of 
individual behaviour (Enevoldsen, 2001). Political studies using rational choice aim to explain 
political strategies as well as economic and political outcomes “by showing how these 
strategies result from the self-defined interests of actors” (Katzenstein, 1984, p. 34, quoted in 
Enevoldsen, 2001, p. 75). It has been common in IR to view States as rational actors (Allison, 
1971; Haas, 2003; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994; Wiener, 1999; DeSombre, 2007), as this 
conceptual lens does, which also includes NGOs. A rational actor is typically described as a 
utility maximizer that weighs the costs and benefits in a choice between alternatives and 
choses the alternative that maximizes its own utility. The utility is defined by its fixed 
preferences – its self-interests. This is one of several assumptions on how rational actors 
behave (see, for example, Enevoldsen, 2001). How do these rational actors act when decisions 
are needed collectively, and in what situations do States act merely out of self-interest or out 
of their shared collective interests? This is what collective action is about. The next section 
describes different characteristics of environmental issues as conditions of collective action.  
 
3.3.1 Issue Structure and Collective Action 
Four types of environmental goods are often distinguished by public choice theorists. These 
are private goods, common-pool resources, club goods and public goods. As seen in Figure 
3.1, they share two attributes: excludability and rivalry. Excludability means that it is possible 
to exclude individuals from the benefits or consumption of a good. Rivalry (or subtractability) 
means that one individual’s use of a good affects another individual’s ability to use it or 
diminishes the good’s value for another (DeSombre, 2006, 2007; Ostrom, et al., 1994; Haas, 
2003). DeSombre (2007) emphasized that the ways these two characteristics combine give 
structure to an international environmental issue; hence the term issue structure. Most 
environmental issues are often characterized as either common goods or common-pool 
resources. The following subsections address collective action in relation to rivalry and 
excludability of environmental issues. 
 
  Excludable? 
  Yes No 
Rival? 
Yes Private Goods 
Common-pool Resources 
(CPRs) 
No 
Club Goods/ 
Toll Goods 
Public Goods 
 
Figure 3.1. Types of Goods (DeSombre, 2006; Ostrom, et al., 1994) 
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3.3.1.1 Non-excludability and Public Goods 
Public goods are neither rival nor excludable. A typical description of a public good is the air 
we breathe. It is not possible to exclude individuals from breathing the air, and one 
individual’s consumption of air does not affect another’s. Collective action is traditionally 
associated with public goods and common-pool resources. Common for both is when an 
individual actor cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of the good, it “has little 
incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of that good” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 6). In his 
famous contribution to collective action, Olson (1971[1965]) argued that “unless the number 
of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special 
device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals 
will not act to achieve their common or group interests (Olson, 1971[1965], p. 2, his 
emphasis). With non-excludability, an actor – such as a State – will benefit from free-riding. 
Put in terms of environmental cooperation, a State that contributes to an environmental 
degradation of a public good has no incentives for costly environmental measures since it is 
more beneficial to let others bear the costs and to benefit from their actions. 
 
In international environmental cooperation between States, the negotiation positions are 
affected by the ability of exclusion. If a particular State has not been part of protecting a good 
from environmental harm, but it cannot be excluded from using the protected good, it will 
benefit from free-riding. A rational State will always put its self-interests first and will thus 
free-ride in environmental cooperation. If many States realize that they do not have to 
contribute to environmental protection in order to enjoy the benefits or access to the resource, 
the protection of the resource will fail. In a strict interpretation of collective action, 
environmental cooperation should not be possible, especially not globally. Compared with 
national collective action, the global collective interest of environmental protection is more 
diffuse. Widespread free-riding and strong opposition by industry interests would be expected 
(Wiener, 1999; DeSombre, 2007). International environmental cooperation does occur 
however. An explanation within traditional collective action concerned with public goods 
would be that enough actors with enough resources willing to protect the good could provide 
protection despite the impossibility of exclusion (DeSombre, 2007), but environmental issues 
are rarely public goods. 
 
3.3.1.2 Rivalry and Common-pool Resources 
Many environmental issues look like public goods at first sight, but, according to DeSombre 
(2007), almost all environmental issues have a rival nature that does not fit into this category. 
A more appropriate category is common-pool resources (CPRs). CPRs are non-excludable but 
rival, which means that one individual’s consumption of a good affects another’s. Taking the 
ozone layer as an example, it could be characterized as a public good if not harmed by human 
activities. No one could be excluded from using the service provided by the ozone layer in 
terms of UV radiation protection, and an individual’s use of this service does not affect 
another’s. However, polluting the air with CFCs depletes the ozone layer and reduces the 
ability of others to benefit from its protection (DeSombre, 2007; Vedung and Klefbom, 2002). 
Vedung and Klefbom (2002) expressed this situation as using the ozone layer as a garbage 
dump, which changes it from being perceived as a public good to a CPR.  
 
Environmental problems are often considered as problems of CPRs, illustrated with the 
metaphor ‘the tragedy of the commons’. Hardin (1968) visualized a pasture open for use by 
anyone – a common – with rational herders who each strives to maximize its utility by 
keeping as many cattle as possible on the commons. Each also weighs the benefits of adding 
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an extra animal to the herd against the costs of overgrazing (Hardin 1968; Ostrom, 1990). 
Since the herder obtains direct benefits from an additional animal and the costs of overgrazing 
are shared by all the herders, the rational herder’s conclusion is to add one more animal, and 
then one more, etc. However, this conclusion is drawn by every herder (Hardin 1968). 
 
... Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit–in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination 
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244). 
 
The metaphor of the tragedy of the commons has been applied to many environmental 
problems, primarily connected to resource use and depletion such as fisheries, but also to 
international negotiations (Ostrom, 1990). The rivalry of environmental issues is the primary 
connection. It can make environmental protection difficult and influence the negotiating 
power of States reluctant to cooperate. As mentioned above, public goods can be protected 
given enough actors with enough resources. This is more difficult with CPRs. Similarly to the 
tragedy of the commons metaphor, the rivalry of CPRs results in the ability of one State to 
‘destroy’ the good despite the will of other States to protect it. Taking the ozone layer as an 
example, its use as a sink by one State is beneficial to itself but affects others’ use of it, as a 
sink also destroys the benefits of the good: protection from UV radiation. Actors that threaten 
or are willing to destroy a resource can force concessions from the actors that want to protect 
it. Hence, rivalry is a source of power for certain States in international negotiations 
(DeSombre, 2007; Vedung and Klefbom, 2002). 
 
3.3.1.3 Creating Excludability 
How can environmental problems be solved in a situation of rational self-interested States 
with threats of free-riding? Traditional arguments have centred on either privatization or 
governmental control. Privatization transforms a public good or a CPR into a private good; 
hence it becomes excludable. Government regulation could also control the good and make it 
excludable. Hardin’s solution to the tragedy of the commons was “mutual coercion, mutually 
agreed upon by the majority of the people affected” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1247).23 This does not 
apply to international environmental policy-making, where sovereign States rule in anarchy 
without a supra-national body to enforce regulation. There is no body with coercive power, 
and there may not be a political will to establish the necessary coercive power. According to 
Lyon (2009, p. 47), “the entire field of environmental governance can be conceived as a study 
in what happens when the conditions for ‘perfect coercion’ fail”. Global environmental 
collective action instead depends on voluntary commitments by States.  
 
DeSombre (2007) mentioned one case in which an international issue was actually 
transformed into a private good: the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS 1982). EEZs provide 
excludability of a set of ocean resources by coastal States being in control of them within 200 
nautical miles (nm) of their coastline.
24
 Nonetheless, as fish move further out at sea, it did not 
result in successful resource protection for fish. It nevertheless shows that it is possible to 
                                                  
23 Ostrom (1990) challenged this and showed that CPRs could be effectively managed by social mechanisms 
without governments or privatization, though this is difficult to apply at the international level (Haas, 2003). 
24 In a way, the territories of States are private goods (DeSombre, 2012). 
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change the issue structure.
25
 As reasoned above, public goods and CPRs have to become 
excludable. According to DeSombre (2006, pp. 63-64) “sovereignty is in a way the power of 
exclusion, and the globalization of economic activity has removed this power of exclusion”. 
DeSombre (2006, 2007, 2012) argued that exclusion can be brought back through the power 
of international regulation to transform public goods and CPRs into club goods. It comes 
about through the building of a structure in which those that do not cooperate are excluded 
from the benefits of cooperation. The formation of organizations with a club character has 
proven to be the solution to prevent free-riding in environmental regulations for shipping. 
However, such ‘clubs’ are connected to enforcement solutions to free-riding problems 
associated with flag of convenience (FOC) (ibid.). Since compliance and enforcement are not 
within the scope of this thesis, let us instead focus on issue-specific characteristics.  
 
3.3.2 Transboundary Acid Rain: A Directional Problem 
The categorization of issues dependent on the variables of excludability or rivalry does not fit 
well with reality in which the variables “are more likely to form a sort of a spectrum” 
(DeSombre, 2007, p. 21). The level of excludability and rivalry depends on the characteristics 
of a specific environmental problem. According to DeSombre (2007), factors such as who 
causes and suffers from environmental harm need to be addressed because they greatly affect 
negotiations. In a ‘true’ CPR problem, all users both contribute to environmental harm and 
suffer from it.
26
 This provides incentives for all involved to cooperate. According to 
DeSombre (2007), transboundary acid rain has a fundamentally different structure to other 
atmospheric pollution problems. It fits the description of a CPR problem since it is both rival 
and non-excludable yet differs in that States do not suffer from the problem or contribute to it 
equally. Transboundary air pollution means that States sort of send out emissions from their 
territories in a direction and distance dependent on wind currents etc. Some States could be 
net polluters and others net recipients. The level of impacts further depends on geographical 
and geological characteristics such as soil formation etc. The nature of the problem thus has a 
directional character. The term directional problem was used by DeSombre (2007).  
 
DeSombre stressed that this character has “enormous impacts for political efforts to address 
the problem” (ibid., p. 214). According to Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994)  27,, States that were 
‘victims’ of pollution would seek international cooperation in two ways: (1) to provide 
protection from pollution from other countries, and (2) to seek harmonized international 
policy and thus avoid competitive disadvantages of their own policies. At the same time, the 
States that contribute to pollution but are not victims would oppose regulation due to the 
abatement costs and lack of benefits. The directional problem means that policy-making 
becomes more difficult as it provides little incentive for the polluters that do not suffer from 
the problem to cooperate, while those that are worst affected by pollution are dependent on 
the actions of the polluters. Those States that aim to resist regulation based on their self-
interests are thus in a position of great power in international negotiations. According 
DeSombre (2007), directional problems provide the greatest influence of self-interests of 
individual States on international environmental policy-making.  
 
                                                  
25 Other examples of privatization involve creating a sort of private property; e.g. cap-and-trade for CO2 
emissions and individual transferable quota systems for fisheries. 
26 Such a true problem, however, is rare in reality (DeSombre, 2007). 
27 Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) was based on an interest-based approach in IR that DeSombre (2007) implicitly 
connected to collective action. 
29 
 
DeSombre (2007) highlighted that international cooperation on a directional problem could be 
overcome by issue linkage,
28
 which basically means that a State agrees on an issue as it links 
the issue with other States’ actions on other issue(s). For environmental issues, it could be 
more beneficial to negotiate a multi-issue treaty than each issue separately. States with 
different priorities on different issues could thus “trade off their positions and agree to 
something they might not want in return for a different regulation that is important to them” 
(ibid. 23). DeSombre highlighted UNCLOS 1982 as a typical example of a multi-issue treaty 
attempting to address almost all issues of the oceans. For further explanation, I argue that this 
emphasis on who suffers from and who contributes to pollution connects the famous 
categorization of goods with another categorization described below. 
 
3.3.3 Wilson’s Theory of Politics  
This last section deals with how the perceived distributions of costs and benefits from 
regulation affect the policy-making process. It is based on the work of the American political 
scientist James Q. Wilson. His ‘theory of politics’ was initially presented as a categorization 
of the politics of different policy issues in Wilson (1973) and further developed into a theory 
in a concluding chapter of empirical studies in Wilson (1980).
29
 Although the theory is rare in 
IR, there are a few Scandinavian studies that have applied and adapted it for environmental 
issues: Hovik (1997) and Winter (1994, cited in Vedung and Klefbom, 2002) on local 
implementation of environmental regulations, followed by Vedung and Klefbom (2002) on 
explaining national and local implementation of the Montreal Protocol in Sweden. The latter 
briefly connected collective action, game theory and Wilson’s theory to the international 
developments of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances. I follow their initiated approach and 
assume that Wilson’s theory is applicable to international environmental policy-making. 
Wilson (1980, 1986) stressed the importance of two aspects of costs and benefits in politics: 
(1) the perception of costs and benefits, and (2) the legitimacy for a particular actor to benefit 
or to bear the burden. For domestic politics, Wilson described it as “a process of raising and 
settling disputes over who will benefit or pay for a program and who ought to benefit or pay” 
(Wilson, 1986, p. 429). The ways costs and benefits are perceived by the actors affected by a 
proposed policy determine how the politics are played out.
30
  
 
Wilson’s theory (Wilson, 1973, 1980) is “a way of classifying and explaining the politics of 
different policy issues” (Wilson, 1986, p. 430). As shown in Figure 3.2, it is based on the 
categorization of four types of policy issues in two dimensions: perceived costs and perceived 
benefits. The costs and benefits of a policy could be either widely distributed to many actors 
or narrowly concentrated to a few (Wilson, 1973).
 31
 Wilson (1980) noted that there are many 
intermediate cases, but the four policy issues are what “can be distinguished by considering 
all combination of the dichotomous cases” (Wilson 1980, p. 367). The parentheses in Figure 
3.6 show the names of his four types of politics. They emerged in Wilson (1980) as 
identification of the responses in American politics to the four types of policy issues. Many 
such responses are not relevant to the international application in this thesis since they are 
mostly about reaching majority coalitions, forming organizations with the sole purpose of 
                                                  
28 There are many other theories that belong to normative theory to explain the solution of environmental 
problems, which are not part of this lens; e.g. side-payments, sanctions, marked-based measures, etc. 
29 It was then faithfully published over the years in his textbook ‘American Government: Institutions and 
Policies’ with its fifteen editions and additional brief versions. 
30 Costs and benefits include both monetary and non-monetary values. This lens focuses on monetary values. 
31 The categorization was generalized from considering cases with also intermediate combinations. 
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influencing politicians, government agencies, elections, etc. It is here focused on the main 
lessons of how the ability to agree on a policy – such as a regulation – is heavily influenced 
by the question of whether the perceived costs and benefits are shared by many or 
concentrated to a few. 
 
  Perceived Costs 
  Distributed Concentrated 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 
b
en
ef
it
s 
 
Distributed 
 
1 
(Majoritarian Politics) 
3 
(Entrepreneurial Politics) 
 
Concentrated 
 
2 
(Client Politics)  
4 
(Interest-Group Politics) 
 
Figure 3.2. Wilson’s Four Types of Politics (adapted from Wilson, 1986, 2011) 
 
1. Distributed benefits and distributed costs 
Wilson’s theory holds that policies are easily adopted if the costs and benefits are spread over 
a large number of actors. For such policy issues, significant benefits will be yielded without 
significant interventions. There are no incentives to mobilize against the policy since no 
disproportionate share of the benefits or costs is expected to be obtained or avoided, 
respectively, by a specific group of actors (e.g. industry) (Wilson, 1973, 1980).  
  
2. Concentrated benefits and distributed costs 
In a situation in which a proposed policy will benefit a specific group of actors and the burden 
of the costs is widely distributed, it will naturally be supported by the benefitting group and as 
in general. No opposition should be expected and the benefitting group of actors will be able 
to mobilize effective support. The only way for an actor that opposes the policy to gain 
support is to dramatize and question the motives of those that support the policy. The issue 
has to be portrayed in moral and ethical terms; e.g. why the costs should be put on all for the 
benefits of an industry – a selfish industry letting others pay (ibid.). 
 
3. Distributed benefits and concentrated costs 
This is the situation in which it is most difficult to reach a collective decision (Vedung and 
Klefbom, 2002). When the benefits of a proposed policy are widely distributed, but a specific 
group of actors bears the costs, that group has a strong incentive to mobilize against the 
policy. It could be expected that such policies would not, or only in rare cases, be adopted, but 
Wilson found that they were. One explanation is the occurrence of a dramatic crisis (such as 
an environmental disaster), which could put the previously favoured opponents at a hopeless 
disadvantage. Another is the above strategy to emphasize moral aspects (Wilson 1973, 1980). 
 
4. Concentrated benefits and concentrated costs 
A proposed policy that would benefit a well-defined group but impose costs on another well-
defined group will generate “continuing organized conflict” (Wilson, 1973, p. 335). Both the 
benefitting group and the group that bears the costs have strong incentives to mobilize for and 
against the policy respectively (Wilson, 1980). According to Wilson, “revisions and 
amendments and interpretations are endlessly contested and sometimes efforts are made to 
repeal the initial policy” (Wilson, 1973, p. 335).  
 
According to Hovik (1997) and Winter (1994, cited in Vedung and Klefbom, 2002), most 
environmental issues belong to Wilson’s third category. The benefits are for everyone or at 
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least diffuse, while the costs are concentrated to specific actors: the polluters. Put in the 
context of international environmental policy-making, we can thus expect agreements to be 
difficult due to strong opposition from a concentrated group of interested parties that are 
affected by the policy: the ones who will bear the cost burden. At the same time, it would be 
difficult to mobilize in support of stricter environmental policy. However, Hovik (1997) 
argued that environmental issues could be placed in all four categories, and that category 1 is 
of particular interest. Her argument was that many environmental problems are public goods.
 
32
. It is important here not to forget the above lessons that CPR is a more appropriate category 
for most environmental problems, and that transboundary rain is a directional problem.  
 
The perceived distribution of costs and benefits could further change during a policy-making 
process. As an example, greenhouse gases could be placed in category 1 as the emission 
sources are widely distributed and have impacts on all; hence a policy to reduce emissions 
would benefit all. However, if a climate policy targets a specific activity or a concentrated 
group of actors, it could be placed in category 3. A policy compromise between different 
interests on an environmental issue could also be found through efforts to change the issue 
from concentrated costs to widely distributed costs, which would place it in a different 
category. Such changes would conflict with the polluter pays principle, however, which could 
raise arguments of justice (Vedung and Klefbom, 2002; Hovik, 1997). 
 
 
                                                  
32 This connection was made by Wilson (1973). He noted that since public goods are non-excludable, they 
provide widely distributed benefits. He also stressed that all widely distributed benefits are not public goods. 
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4 Methodology  
 
This chapter describes the methodology and working procedure of the thesis. It describes the 
research approach and methods used for data collection and analysis within the two 
conceptual lenses. It also shows the motivations for the choice of approach and methods. 
 
4.1 Research Approach 
The research approach
33
 of this thesis involved a number of choices as shown in Figure 4.1. 
The following subsections address these choices. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Choices of Research Approach 
 
4.1.1 From Descriptive to Explanatory and Interpretive  
The first step of this research was in the work of a licentiate thesis (Svensson, 2011), which 
was a descriptive study. Descriptive research in social science is not guided by theory and 
focuses on the key questions of when, where, how and by whom (Esaiasson et al., 2012). The 
licentiate thesis showed the policy-making process behind today’s sulphur regulations for 
shipping as described in available IMO documents along with supplemental literature and 
personal communications. It was an explorative study that allowed for further study of the 
questions that arose, along with particular emphasis on the need to view the process from 
more than one conceptual lens. The most puzzling question was why a regional approach was 
chosen and adopted. With the keyword why, the present research aims to provide an 
understanding of this policy choice and decision. To reach an understanding of a social 
phenomenon, this thesis’ analytical approach is inspired by the critical hermeneutic reasoning 
of Ricoeur (2008[1991]) that understanding is not decoupled from explanations, but rather 
understanding is reached through explanations and vice versa in a dialectic relationship. 
                                                  
33 This word has different meanings in different methodological literature. Some methodological choices are 
called research design, research strategy or research approach (e.g. Bryman, 2012, and Esaiasson et al., 2012). 
By research approach, I include the choices between descriptive and explanatory, between inductive, deductive 
and theory consuming, and between different frameworks for collecting and analysing data. 
Licentiate thesis: 
descriptive & explorative 
Continued research: 
explanatory & 
interpretive 
Theory testing 
(Deduction) 
'Theory consuming' 
Case study design 
Qualitative historical 
analysis: 
hermeneutic approach 
Theory developing 
(Induction) 
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Although a deeper discussion on hermeneutics is not in place here, distinctions and 
relationships between explanation and understanding are important to this thesis. Let us turn 
to the words of to Ricoeur, (2008[1991]) to gain insight into the intentions of providing 
explanations in order to understand.  
 
... explanation alone is methodical. Understanding is instead the nonmethodical 
moment that, in the sciences of interpretation, combines with the methodical 
moment of explanation. This moment precedes, accompanies, concludes, and 
thus envelops explanation. Explanation, in turn, develops understanding 
analytically (Ricoeur, (2008[1991], p. 139). 
 
The methodology is thus explanatory. Through the use of two conceptual lenses, this thesis 
aims to provide an understanding by presenting two explanations. Different conceptual lenses 
provide meaning to empirical data connected to the phenomenon that is to be explained 
(Esaiasson et al., 2012; Allison, 1971; Gilje and Grimen, 2007).  
 
4.1.2 ‘Theory Consuming’ 
Explanatory research is commonly divided into deductive and inductive approaches, in other 
words: theory testing and theory developing. The hypothetical-deductive approach is 
traditional in natural science and positivism. Hypotheses are set, empirical data are collected 
and the hypotheses are tested against the empirical data. An inductive study uses empirical 
data to generate or develop new theory. Data are collected, and assumptions or hypotheses are 
made and then tested against data. New data are then gathered and, if this confirms a set of 
hypotheses, a new theory is generated (Bryman, 2012; Esaiasson et al., 2012; Gilje and 
Grimen, 2007). This thesis instead uses a ‘theory-consuming’ approach following Esaiasson et 
al. (2012). This approach is used for case studies and puts the case at the centre. It is similar to 
theory testing (deduction), but different theories are used as explanations of a case and not to 
test a theory. It is this middle approach to explanatory studies on which this thesis embarks.
34
 
 
4.1.3 Qualitative Historical Analysis 
With the chosen theory-consuming approach, this thesis studies a ‘case’ defined by 
“boundaries around places and time periods” (Ragin 1992, p. 5). It does not embark on the 
case study approach/design, however, e.g. as described by Yin (2009). A case study focuses 
on the complexity and nature of a studied phenomenon, i.e. the case itself rather than 
generalization to other social phenomena. It involves providing an intensive and detailed 
analysis of the case, often with a holistic approach (Bryman, 2012; Yin, 2009; Thomas, 2011). 
According to Czarniawska (1997), Robert K. Yin has since its first publication in 1984 
monopolized his positivistic approach for case studies. His approach requires the use of 
multiple sources of data and treats documents as one of several required sources in a 
triangulating manner (Yin, 2009). Documents are the very core of this thesis’ objectives. I 
follow Atkinson and Coffey (2011) in that documents should be regarded as data in their own 
right. Yin’s approach further limits case studies to only study contemporary phenomena, 
though, as expressed by Czarniawska (2014, pp. 21-22) “the most famous case studies are 
historical”. The research approach of this thesis has a particular emphasis on how to study 
events in the past by investigating documents, with inspiration from the use of qualitative 
historical analysis in IR.  
                                                  
34 The theory-consuming approach should not be confused with ‘abduction’. Dubois and Gadde (2002) stressed 
that abduction is closer to induction than deduction, and should be viewed as theory developing. 
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Instead of contemporary ‘cases’, studies in IR often focus on historical periods, like the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, 1971) or a policy-making process resulting in a decision or 
decisions. Thies (2002) turned to historiography to provide some insights into such studies. 
By the phrase ‘qualitative historical analysis’, Thies meant “a methodological approach that 
employs qualitative instead of quantitative measurement and the use of primary historical 
documents or historians’ interpretations thereof in service of theory development and testing” 
(Thies, 2002, p. 352). It was not a new approach in IR but rather a label for studies that have 
traditionally analysed historical events. 
 
A lesson from historiography is that historical ‘facts’ found by historians are interpretations of 
a phenomenon made by historians. Objectivity, as advocated by natural scientists in a 
positivistic epistemology, does not exist. From historical research, we find that “data are 
‘made’ rather than collected” (Thies, 2002, p. 354). Thies clarified that “the fact we find are 
dependent upon the facts we seek based upon our implicit or explicit theoretical orientation” 
(ibid., p. 353). According to Levy (2001, p. 51) it is “the conventional wisdom in both history 
and political science that all empirical observations are filtered through a priori mental 
frameworks, that all facts are ‘theory laden’”. Levy (1997) elaborated on the differences of 
using theory in history and political science and concluded the following: 
 
The difference between the disciplines is not that one is theoretical while the 
other is not, but rather that they use theory in different ways. Political scientists 
build general theories and test them, whereas historians use theory–or a set of 
theories–primarily to structure their interpretations of particular events (Levy, 
1997, p. 32). 
 
This puts a reminder of the lessons of Allison (1971) in place, and thus the approach of this 
thesis. The conceptual lenses guided what to investigate. They were used to interpret the event 
and to search for explanations. Like historians, the policy-making process was examined by a 
broad interpretation from different angles. The next section describes the data collection and 
analysis made within each lens. 
 
4.2 Data Gathering and Analysis 
Archival research was conducted on IMO reports of sessions and submitted documents by the 
participants containing their arguments and supportive information. According to Thies 
(2002), the selection of historical sources is a crucial step in the research process. The 
historical sources become your ‘evidence’. He made a clear division between primary and 
secondary sources. Primary sources are “the original source material on an event, including 
all evidence contemporary to the event” (Thies, 2002, p. 356), while secondary sources 
include “everything that has been written about the event subsequent to that time” (ibid.). 
Diplomatic notes or reports written during a meeting or shortly after (such as UN documents) 
are generally considered primary sources. This division is not to be confused with primary 
and secondary data, which are commonly referred to in social science. While interviews and 
observations are commonly referred to as primary data, documents are referred to as 
secondary data. Both primary and secondary sources are secondary data.  
 
The empirical basis of this thesis is entirely drawn from primary sources in the form of 
available documents during IMO negotiations from 1988 to 1997. These were gathered from 
archives of the Swedish Transport Agency (STA). The documents were delimited to what was 
reported and submitted to the MEPC and the BCH during the process, as well as to what 
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could be found from the archives of the STA. No documentation of the MEPC and BCH 
meetings before 1998 has been digitalized at the IMO, and the STA did not start to digitalize 
IMO documents until 2002. The sources were thus based on prints from the archive at the 
International Secretariat of the STA in Norrköping. The previous work of the licentiate thesis 
(Svensson, 2011) provided the benefit of having much of the necessary material already 
sorted into relevant agenda items and submissions. In the work of the licentiate thesis, three 
days were devoted to summarily reading the session reports of MEPC 26-39 and BCH 21-24 
in Norrköping. This provided an overview of which parts of the reports and which 
submissions needed to be copied. The obtained copies were later supplemented with several 
additional documents. The result was a descriptive thesis that provided a guide for the 
continued work. It was soon realized that more documents were needed for the continued 
work however. I had to dig further into documents with scientific and economic contents as 
well as with a stronger focus on regional choice and thus more on the issue of special areas 
(the licentiate thesis focused on the global cap).  
 
The archival procedure of the present research started by investigating the already attained 
documents. The session reports of the MEPC and the BCH were read to gain an overview of 
the discussion, policy choices and decisions. Here, the experience from the work of the 
licentiate thesis was central. I focused instantly on relevant agenda items considering the 
matter of air pollution and the sulphur issue. The already attained and reviewed reports of the 
licentiate work had limited the bulk of the pages. The agenda items were usually clear of their 
names, such as ‘Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships’, but the relevant information could 
be found in the agenda items in reports by the sub-committees or ‘Any other Business’. In the 
relevant agenda item, the work of the licentiate thesis had provided me with already marked 
sections of the reported sulphur discussions. The subject of these discussions was frequently 
assigned to a working group for further consideration (and later on informal groups and 
drafting groups). The reports of these groups were also read and, lastly, a brief reading of the 
already attained submissions. At the same time, a database of relevant submissions was 
compiled in Microsoft Excel. This resulted in an initial overview of the process and insight 
into the necessary documents for the scientific and economic arguments. Table 4.1 lists the 
investigated meetings and policy-making arenas in which the IMO considerations and 
discussions took place during 1988-1997.
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At this stage, it was a question of which submissions should be obtained and investigated 
further. How could the significant documents for the policy development and the final 
outcome be sorted out? The list of documents
36
 provided for each session was reviewed with 
the focus on the relevant agenda items. Every document that had something to do with SOx 
emissions – also fuel oil quality in the early stages of the process – was listed in the database 
and marked as initially relevant. Possible relevance to each lens was also marked based on the 
information provided in the session reports or reports of groups and on briefly reading already 
attained documents. This resulted in a need to review a large number of documents, but not all 
were relevant for inclusion as an empirical basis of the analysis. Three more days at the 
archive were devoted to gathering and copying the necessary material. In total, the database 
listed 235 documents (158 MEPC documents and 77 BCH documents) of which 18 were 
session reports and the remaining submissions and working documents. In the end, 150 of 
these 235 documents were used as references in this thesis.  
 
                                                  
35 No official report was produced for the conference in 1997. The investigation of this last ‘meeting’ was based 
on the records of decisions of the plenary, working group reports and submissions. 
36 Provided in the reports but for some sessions separate (‘INF’) documents needed to be attained. 
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Table 4.1. Investigated Meetings and Policy-making Arenas 
Body Policy-making Arena Sessions/Meetings Period 
MEPC Plenary MEPC 26-39 1988-1997 
 Working Group on Fuel Oil Quality MEPC 27 March 1989 
 Working Group on Prevention of Air 
Pollution from Ships 
MEPC 30 November 1990 
MEPC 39 March 1997 
 Drafting Group (on a draft Assembly 
resolution) 
MEPC 31 July 1991 
 Drafting Group (on Annex VI) MEPC 38-39 1996-1997 
BCH Plenary BCH 21-24 1991-1994 
 BCH Working Group on Air Pollution 
from Ships 
BCH 22-23 1992-1993 
1st intersessional meeting  July 1993 
2nd intersessional meeting February to 
March 1994 
 BCH Correspondence Group on Air 
Pollution from Ships 
Between BCH 21 and BCH 22 September 1991 
to June 1992 
BCH Correspondence Group on Regional 
Control Options 
Between BCH 22 and BCH 23 September 1992 
to June 1993 
BCH Correspondence Group on the 
Regional Approach 
Between BCH 23 and the 2nd 
intersessional meeting 
September 1993 
to January 1994 
BCH Drafting Group (on criteria for 
special area designation)  
BCH 24 September 1994 
Diplomatic 
Conference 
Plenary Third MARPOL Conference September 1997 
Conference Working Group 2 Third MARPOL Conference September 1997 
Informal Informal Working Group MEPC 29 March 1990 
Informal Drafting Group MEPC 38 July 1996 
Two Groups of Experts (global cap and 
special areas) 
MEPC 38 July 1996 
 
The examination of the gathered documents followed the chronological order in line with the 
historical aspects of explaining an event. According to Thies (2002, p. 357), “an accurate 
chronology is crucial because the sequence of events tells us how the actors were responding 
to each other and the situation”. The examination was also theory-guided. Each conceptual 
lens provided a guide on which content to include as an empirical basis for the analysis. For 
each lens, scientific or economic arguments, supportive information and discussions were 
examined and non-relevant contents sorted out. The research questions and the conceptual 
lenses formed the basis when the empirical study was conducted. Questions were asked and 
documents searched and analysed based on these questions and guided by the conceptual 
lenses. Interpretation is the keyword for describing the analysis of each document. Here, the 
historical aspects were significant. According to Larson (2001, p. 343) “we need to 
understand the purpose of a document and the events leading up to it in order to interpret its 
meaning correctly”. The basic formula was “who said what to whom under what 
circumstances and with what purpose” (ibid.).  
 
However, reports of meetings represent subjective and selective views of the actual meetings. 
Public minutes tend to illustrate a meeting in a way that was publicly acceptable at a given 
time and social context. It is important to recognize that the studied IMO reports were written 
by individuals at the Secretariat, but of most importance is that these were written after 
consideration and approval by the committee/sub-committee, which allowed the participants 
to reformulate, delete or add text in the initial draft report. It has to be recognized that there 
are interests behind including or highlighting some things and not others. Of the investigated 
documents, the most interest-based sources were the submissions, which I viewed and treated 
as ‘party pleadings’ in a political debate as a basis for analysis (Denscombe, 1998; Esaiasson 
et al., 2012). In a way, argument analysis was used in its simplest form. Bergström and 
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Boréus (2012) described methods to conduct argument analysis as document analysis but also 
recognized the huge amount of work and time required. It was thus argued that it is often 
enough to search for the most important or common arguments in a debate or to focus on 
specific type of arguments. In this context, the analysis of documents focused on the scientific 
and economic arguments, along with supportive information and discussions, as well as with 
guidance from the conceptual lens. 
 
The empirical investigations were then presented as a narrative for each lens with evidence 
investigated and presented in chronological order. The empirical findings were then analysed 
with explanations sought for each research question through the two conceptual lenses. 
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5 Investigating the Role of ‘Science’ 
 
This chapter investigates the reported scientific arguments, supportive information and 
discussions.  With the term ‘science’ it is here meant as scientific arguments and scientific 
claims that were reported or treated as ‘science’ or ‘scientific’. Guided by the first conceptual 
lens (Section 3.2), this chapter has a particular focus on how different actors framed the 
problem and policy issue, with supportive information to arguments being centred on 
environmental impacts and contribution from shipping.  
 
5.1 Background on Prior Framing 
Since the experience with environmental impacts of SOx emissions from land-based sources 
constitute a background for the issue making its way to the IMO, I begin with a background in 
the search for the preceding framing. 
 
5.1.1 A Transboundary Problem Framed in Two Contexts 
Following the work of Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002, 2011), the origin of the international 
work of reducing land-based air pollution is put into two contexts: a special East-West 
geopolitical climate and scientific findings from decades of research on acidification of lakes 
in Sweden and Norway. Swedish researchers had been monitoring freshwater acidity since the 
1940s, showing significant falls in pH between the 1950s and the 1960s. The contemporary 
understanding of these findings began in 1968 when the Swedish soil scientist Svante Odén 
published an article (Odén, 1967, cited in Sundqvist, 2011) in the Swedish newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter. Odén argued that SO2 was being transported long distances and that precipitation 
over Scandinavia had become more acidic, primarily due to SO2 emissions from industries in 
the UK and Central Europe. Hence, other countries could be the primary cause of acidified 
lakes in Scandinavia, which in turn caused fish deaths
37
 (Underdal and Hanf, 2000; Lidskog 
and Sundqvist, 2002; Sundqvist, 2011). Evidence of transboundary
38
 acid rain was found by 
observations from soot and sulphur measurements that started in 1966 along the Swedish 
coast. Pollution episodes were found that could only be explained by long-range transport due 
to specific weather conditions. Moreover, other studies of rainwater chemistry showed 
significant increases in acidity over Northwestern Europe and parts of Central Europe from 
the period of the Second World War to the 1960s. This was not limited to concentrated areas 
with large emission sources, indicating a wider distribution and a large geographical scale 
over much of the European continent (Pleijel and Grennfelt, 2007). According to Odén, there 
was a “more or less permanent mass of polluted air over Central Europe, including central and 
southern Sweden” (Odén, 1967, quoted in Sundqvist, 2011, p. 203, his translation). Odén’s 
initial framing of the issue was thus not as a local problem as previously thought, but as a 
large-scale regional problem (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002).  
 
Odén’s decision to publish in a Swedish newspaper meant that new findings were first 
presented to the Swedish public. Acidification discussions thus instantly spread outside the 
scientific community, and Swedish politicians quickly engaged (Sundqvist, 2011). It met with 
difficulties being internationally accepted however. Long-range transport of air pollutants was 
a highly controversial idea among researchers, politicians, industry in Europe. Nevertheless, 
                                                  
37 Acidification and fish deaths in Scandinavia had previously been linked (Lövblad et al., 2004). 
38 Something that crosses national or other political borders. See long-range transboundary air pollution below. 
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scientific evidence of long-range transport of air pollutants accumulated, and it soon pushed 
the issue to the international arena. A programme under the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) to measure long-range transport of air pollutants in 
Europe was initiated in 1970. Eleven countries in Northern and Western Europe participated 
and formed a network of measurement stations to monitor sulphur concentrations in 
precipitation and in the air (Pleijel and Grennfelt, 2007; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011). In 
1972, a Swedish case study and background document were presented at the first UN 
environmental conference in Stockholm (United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment). The report concluded that other European countries were strongly interrelated 
with the harmful effects caused by the deposition of sulphuric acid in Sweden, as it was 
transported on average more than 1000 km before being deposited. Emphasis was put on 
international agreements, legislation and control (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
Swedish Ministry of Agriculture, 1971). At the conference, however, delegates from other 
European States and developing States did not fully support the Scandinavian initiative. 
General acceptance of the transboundary nature of air pollution was still not in place. 
Nevertheless, the conference declared that States had “the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972, Principle 21).  
 
Although the Soviet Union and allied States boycotted the Stockholm Conference due to the 
Cold War conflict, it was the Soviet Union, together with Norway, that later pushed the issue 
to negotiations within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). 
Following the work of Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002, 2011), the turn towards cooperation on 
the issue of air pollution could be explained by a deadlock in the Cold War, in which a less 
controversial issue was searched for by the politicians to enable cooperation that could 
mitigate the East-West conflict. The environmental field was first chosen for cooperation by 
the Soviet Union in 1975, and soon the choice was made to cooperate on the specific issue of 
air pollution. Thus, the start of an international agreement on air pollution “was not much 
about science, but more about world politics” (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002, p. 87). 
Nevertheless, science enabled cooperation. The 1976 International Conference on Effects of 
Acid Precipitation in Norway has been considered the time and place when transboundary air 
pollution became accepted as a scientific fact (Sundqvist, 2011). One year later, the final 
report of the OECD programme was published. It concluded that sulphur compounds travel 
several hundred kilometres or more in the atmosphere and that “air quality in any European 
country is measurably affected by emissions from other European countries” (OECD, 1977, 
quoted in Lövblad et al., 2004, p. 9). Moreover, individual national measures would only have 
limited success in reaching substantial reductions of sulphur deposition in a country.  
 
The OECD report formed the basis for evolving the OECD measuring programme into the 
European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP). It was made independent of the 
OECD and formed the first inter-governmental initiative to deal with air pollution with over 
25 participating countries in Europe. It had the purpose to provide information to 
governments on the extent of long-range transport and depositions of air pollutants (Lövblad 
et al., 2004; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002). Together with pressures from the Soviet Union 
and Norway, the forming of EMEP paved the way for UNECE negotiations towards adoption 
of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) in 1979 by 34 
countries and the EC Commission (Lövblad et al., 2004; Sliggers and Kakebeeke, 2004). The 
term long-range transboundary air pollution was defined by the following: 
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… air pollution whose physical origin is situated wholly or in part within the 
area under the national jurisdiction of one State and which has adverse effects 
in the area under the jurisdiction of another State at such a distance that it is not 
generally possible to distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources 
or groups of sources (LRTAP 1979, Article 1b). 
 
EMEP was integrated as an important part of LRTAP with functions as information 
production, distribution and exchange, and as an arena to develop emission reduction 
scenarios and emission control agreements. In fact, the very first protocol to the convention 
was about maintaining financing of EMEP to guarantee its continuation and development. 
EMEP then evolved into a European research community bound to the LRTAP regime 
(Lövblad et al., 2004; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002, 2011).  
 
Although a framework convention was now in place and SO2 emissions in Western Europe 
had declined with the 1973 oil crisis, emissions in the Eastern European countries increased 
with industrial growth and the exploitation of brown coal with high sulphur content. The 
reports of dead forest trees in the 1980s caught the awareness of the general public and 
politicians
39
 (Lövblad et al., 2004). Pleijel and Grennfelt (2007, p. 27) described the 1980s as 
“a golden age of environmental policy” in the sense of an environmentally friendly public 
opinion and willingness of policy-makers to invest to meet the opinion, as well as increased 
environmental efforts of the commercial sector. Newspapers and election propaganda were 
filled with pictures of lakes without fish, dying forests and suffering animals. Record-high 
levels of air pollutants in East and West Germany in the winters of 1985 and 1986 brought 
more awareness of transboundary air pollution. This paved the way for the Sulphur Protocol 
to LRTAP (Lövblad et al., 2004). The protocol, in which 21 parties undertook binding 
agreements to reduce emissions of SO2 by 30% between 1980 and 1993, was adopted in 1985 
(Sliggers and Kakebeeke, 2004). We have approached the time period when the North Sea 
States and the Baltic Sea States framed air pollution from ships as an issue for the IMO.  
 
5.1.2 Prior Framing for Ship Emissions 
With the preceding (primarily European) attention to land-based air pollution described 
above, questions arose over the contribution of shipping, which resulted in two regional 
initiatives to take action through the IMO. At the Second International Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea held in London 1987, the issue of air pollution from ships and 
regulating the sulphur content of bunker fuels was raised by Norway. The North Sea States 
declared that they would initiate actions at the IMO and ISO for improved fuel oil standards 
that would reduce atmospheric and marine pollution (the London Declaration, 1987, para. 31). 
The following year, at the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), the Baltic Sea States declared 
that they would promote the international development of “environmentally sound standards 
of marine fuels” (Declaration on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area, 1988, p. 5). Pressures for the IMO to deal with air pollution had thus appeared from 
both the North Sea States (NSS) and the Baltic Sea States (BSS). The ministers’ framing 
concerned the quality of marine fuel oil, which in the case of the NSS comprised both marine 
and atmospheric pollution. The NSS and BSS represented States affected by acid deposition 
from transboundary air pollution. The Norwegian initiative should be viewed in light of a 
study that indicated that emissions from domestic shipping contributed to about 14% of the 
Norwegian SOx emissions (and about 40% for NOx). In addition, the work in EMEP had 
                                                  
39 Note that a connection between transboundary air pollution and forest dieback due to acidification has not 
been scientifically proven (Pleijel and Grennfelt, 2007). 
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showed big discrepancies between models and measurements in coastal areas. Hence, 
attention was drawn towards ship emissions as an explanation (MEPC 29/18). With this prior 
framing in mind, let us approach the issue of SOx emissions from ships at the IMO. 
 
5.2 1988-1989 
5.2.1 MEPC 26, September 1988 
Although both of the above declarations of the NSS and the BSS were considered at MEPC 
26 (MEPC 26/24; 26/INF.19), the real turn towards IMO addressing air pollution was made 
by a Norwegian proposal to include air pollution from ships in the future work programme of 
the MEPC (MEPC 26/22; 26/INF.3O). The proposal framed the problem in IMO’s mandates 
to protect coastal States and the marine environment from pollution: “Discharges of pollutants 
to the air from ships affect both marine environment, the coastal States, and the ozone layer 
[…]” (MEPC 26/22). A brief overview of air pollution from ships was presented. On SOx 
emissions, it mostly focused on the quality of fuel, with high sulphur contents in bunker fuels 
as the source. It only mentioned acidification with regard to NOx emissions. No actual 
problem definition of SOx emissions was thus found except an estimated contribution to the 
total emissions. One notable aspect of this first estimation is that it assumed that the average 
sulphur content of HFO at the time was about 4-6%. It thus used a 5% sulphur content to 
calculate an estimated contribution of global SO2 emissions from ships to 10% of total global 
emissions (MEPC 26/INF.3O). No discussion on emission levels was reported however. In 
fact, the report of MEPC 26 does not mention any discussion but merely that the Committee 
agreed to include air pollution from ships in the future work programme of the MEPC after 
“positive expressions of support” by several delegations (MEPC 26/25, para. 24.4). It was 
also agreed that the issue of improving quality standards for HFO – as declared by both the 
NSS and the BSS – should be dealt with at MEPC 27 (MEPC 26/25). SOx emissions from 
ships were thus framed in two separate policy issues: air pollution and fuel oil quality. 
 
5.2.2 MEPC 27, March 1989 
The submissions on air pollution at MEPC 27 were dominated by Norway and the BSS, 
which preferred a global solution to SOx emissions from ships. Norway (MEPC 27/6/2) 
highlighted a trend of decreasing quality of bunker fuels and increased sulphur content (often 
about 4-6%). It was estimated that annual global SO2 emissions from ships were about 10 
million tonnes (mt), which was considered to add to the huge negative consequences of acid 
rain. A different framing was then presented: “This problem is global, but in particular serious 
in the North Sea area with its high density of ship traffic” (MEPC 27/6/2, p. 2.). Hence, 
Norway framed the problem as global, but there was a regional aspect of it that was not due to 
sensitive environments or geology but to high volumes of ship traffic. No scientific 
information or further arguments to support this framing were given however. An upper limit 
of 1% sulphur content in bunker fuels
40
 was considered desirable “from an environmental 
point of view” (ibid. p. 1), though desired emission reductions would require evaluation in a 
study by the IMO. The BSS (MEPC 27/6/3) presented scientific arguments with supportive 
information to their view on air pollution in general, with background information on 
emission formations and reduction methods. No specific figures were presented on SOx 
emissions, however. The BSS had the view that reductions of SOx emissions should be given 
                                                  
40 Note that reduction options were not limited to reducing the sulphur content. On-board reduction technology 
such as scrubbers was also considered here and further on. It is not within the scope of the thesis however. 
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priority (together with NOx and dust/particles). It was stated that SO2 emissions had a direct 
relation of the sulphur content in the fuel, which was a factor that should be considered when 
developing standards. No connection was made between particles and sulphur specifically, 
but interconnections with other pollutants and health impacts from particles were recognized.  
 
Contrary to Norway’s estimated 10 mt, an informal meeting between oil industry 
representatives and the environmental division at the IMO (MEPC 27/6/7) had estimated 2 mt 
emissions from shipping (not specified if S or SO2), with a comparison of 23.7 m tonnes from 
OECD Europe and non-OECD Europe (USSR/Eastern Europe). Contrary to Norwegian 
estimations, the meeting also assumed a global sulphur content average of 2%, though this 
could not be verified. No discussion on this meeting was found in the session report. Despite 
the first reported objections – with lack of information and clarity of the issue being raised by 
the delegations of Kuwait, Mexico and Venezuela – the MEPC considered SOx emissions one 
of the main items for consideration when analysing environmental problems caused by fuel 
oil quality, and a proposed action plan for fuel oil standards was agreed on. It was further 
agreed to include air pollution and fuel oil quality in the long-term work plan of the MEPC. 
No scientific arguments were reported given however (MEPC 27/16; 27/WP.3).  
 
5.3 1990-1991 
 
5.3.1 MEPC 29, March 1990 
At MEPC 29
41
, air pollution from ships, including fuel oil quality, was an agenda item for the 
first time. The issue of air pollution from ships became clearly framed towards high priority 
global action by the committee, recognizing that air pollution from ships “constitutes a 
significant problem of a global nature which requires international action by the 
Organization” (MEPC 29/22, para. 18.2, emphasis added). Based on this recognition, it was 
agreed to deal with the issue as a high priority. However, the reported discussions did not 
include anything that could be related to this framing, and no specific framing on SOx was 
found. So, let us look at the submissions. MEPC 29 was the session at which scientific 
arguments, supported by studies and references therein, first emerged. Norway submitted two 
studies. The first (MEPC 29/18) was a report prepared by the Norwegian Marine Technology 
Research Institute A/S (Marintek) and the second (MEPC 29/18/6) a study by Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV). Despite different methodology, the two independent studies resulted in 
similar figures on the estimated global contribution of ship emissions to total emissions. 
Marintek calculated emissions from bunker consumption for ships in international trades and 
the given emission factors, while DNV used average sulphur contents for HFO and MDO and 
their respective annual fuel consumption. Notably, the average sulphur content for HFO was 
found to be 2.82%, and >4.5% was very rare, which is a direct contradiction to Norway’s 
earlier estimate. Marintek estimated that global SO2 emissions from international shipping 
were 6.5 and 4.5 mt for 1980 and 1986 respectively. This represented about 4% of the total 
global emissions. The total emissions were based on emissions in OECD for 1980, which 
implies estimations of unknown methods for the rest of the world. DNV arrived at the figure 
5.82 million tons
42
 between 1988 and 1989, which represented 5.3% of total global emissions. 
DNV also based the total emissions on OECD data for 1985 (MEPC 29/18; 29/18/6).  
 
                                                  
41 MEPC 28 was held as an extraordinary session without relevance to this thesis. 
42 5.82 tons = 5.28 tonnes. 
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Marintek further charted ship emissions on maps for international trade routes and made a 
detailed case study on the North Sea and the English Channel with EMEP maps
43
.While 
emissions over open seas were found to be distributed over many routes, emissions were more 
concentrated in the most trafficked coastlines. Particularly high emissions were found in and 
between the English Channel and the Strait of Gibraltar, in the South China Sea, the Strait of 
Malacca, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. About 4% of the total global emissions from ships 
were emitted in the North Sea and the English Channel, which is equal to the emissions in 
countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands. Since the emissions were 
high in areas with high traffic, it was concluded that the local contribution was considerable. 
Much uncertainty and a need for further studies were highlighted. Estimated ship emissions 
were considered too low, e.g. due to domestic shipping not being included (MEPC 29/18). 
 
It is also of relevance that Norway framed SOx emissions as regional, and it was stated that 
the Marintek report could be used in further discussions on whether air pollutions from ships 
required international regulations (MEPC 29/18). It also stated that the studies had convinced 
Norway that air pollution from ships was a significant problem that could be reduced (MEPC 
29/18/4). It also concluded that the relative contribution to global emissions was likely to 
increase, with a growing number of States regulating most of the land-based sources. It was 
proposed that the MEPC should recognize SO2 as a significant problem, and that the next step 
for the MEPC was to discuss reduction targets and requirements. The BSS (MEPC 29/18/1) 
showed some notable framing and views of scientific support. It emphasized that there were 
“already facts available to support in general the need to introduce requirements” (MEPC 
29/18/1, p. 1) on sulphur contents and that only the limits needed consideration. No such 
scientific support was presented in the submission however. It framed acid rain as a issue 
identified worldwide with impacts on the environment and, in the very end, humans. These 
consequences strongly highlighted a need for action. Acidification from SOx emissions was 
actually framed as a global problem as well as serious and increasing. The link between 
sulphur content and emissions was highlighted, and it was considered that fuel oil quality 
aspects should be given priority in IMO’s work on air pollution. From an environmental 
aspect, in combination with economic reasons, it suggested a sulphur content limit near 0.8% 
for HFO. There were no scientific arguments or support given for this limit (ibid., Annex). In 
addition, parts of the framing of the issue by Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) 
(MEPC 29/18/2) have similarities with that of the committee: “Air-pollution from ships is an 
issue of considerable environmental concern and requires international regulations to protect 
the marine and global environment” (MEPC 29/18/2, p. 3, emphasis added). No supportive 
information was presented for this framing however.  
 
The above submissions argued for action and mainly focused on strict sulphur content 
regulations, though one opponent was found. A submission by Kuwait questioned whether a 
reduced sulphur content of marine fuels would result in the required environmental protection 
and stressed that it needed to be exclusively proven (for reasons of economic and technical 
implications) (MEPC 29/18/5). In addition, a UK report had concluded there was little data on 
emissions and that fuel oil qualities and environmental impacts needed to be clear before 
action (MEPC 29/18/6). 
 
                                                  
43 EMEP used grid maps (at the time 150 x 150 km) of its area where it charted national inventories on 
emissions, depositions, critical loads, etc. 
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5.3.2 MEPC 30, November 1990 
Not many scientific arguments were reported on the discussions at MEPC 30. The NSS and 
the Commission of the EEC (MEPC 30/14/2) proposed a reduction in the present global level 
of SO2 emissions by 50% at the latest in the year 2000. Fuel oil standards for HFO should be 
developed with a maximum sulphur content of 1.5%. However, a second measure was 
proposed: “to jointly develop regional measures” (MEPC 30/14/2, p. 1) for ships sailing in 
areas where SO2 emissions were likely to affect the air quality adversely. Such areas could be 
inland waters, harbours and territorial waters, and “near coastal zones” (ibid.). The sulphur 
content for such areas was proposed at less than 1%. Except for the premise “if deemed 
necessary” (ibid.) and the above focus on adverse air quality impacts, no scientific arguments 
were given. The BSS (MEPC 30/14/6) had the same proposals, though it clarified that a 50% 
reduction could be achieved using a maximum sulphur content of 1.5% (a regional sulphur 
content was not specified). The BSS further used the term special areas for areas where 
stricter air quality standards were desirable (MEPC 30/14/6). As with the NSS, no scientific 
support was given for these proposals. 
 
A note by the Secretariat (MEPC 30/INF.17) contained conclusions and draft 
recommendations from an EMEP workshop on emissions from ships held in June 1990. It 
was concluded that the contribution from shipping to the deposition of air pollutants in coastal 
areas within the ECE region was significant. Earlier inconsistencies between the results of 
models and measurements could now be partially explained by ship emissions through 
preliminary interpretations of model calculations that included ship emissions. The total 
contribution of emissions from the English Channel and the North Sea could be equal to or 
exceed the contribution from some small countries. Moreover, it was concluded that different 
calculation methods for SOx emissions that used oil consumption as a basis had showed rather 
similar results and could be used as a basis for assessments. The workshop also highlighted 
that a reduction method for a specific pollutant could lead to adverse effects and increase 
other pollutants, such as CO2 (MEPC 30/INF.17). In this context, the UK (MEPC 30/14/7) 
highlighted that desulphurization of HFO could result in additional environmental impacts. It 
further stressed that quantitative data were lacking on actual ship emissions in operations, and 
highlighted a first phase of a research programme by Lloyd’s Register to address emissions 
from ships on the open sea under steady state conditions (MEPC 30/14/8). 
 
The global proposal by the NSS (MEPC 30/14/2) was agreed by the Committee. A target 
level of 50% of the present emission level of SO2 was thus agreed to be achieved universally 
by the target date of 2000. Agreement on which year the ‘present level’ would be based was 
not reached, however, but the working group showed a tendency to agree on 1990, as 
proposed by the Netherlands. The Japanese delegation reserved its position and expressed that 
any decision on targets “should not be taken before and unless clear scientific justification for 
setting such targets would be gained” (MEPC 30/WP.11, para. 8). The agreed global target 
did not mean, however, that universal regulation was the only method to reach the target. A 
strategy for exhaust gas was considered in the working group, and the Committee based it 
primarily on the NSS recommendations to develop quality standards of 1.5% sulphur content 
globally and regional measures with 1.5% in certain areas. Several Member States 
emphasized that more information was needed, and full account was taken of the views 
presented by the Netherlands (MEPC 30/WP.3), which proposed collecting information, 
assessing target dates, etc.  
 
Lastly, at MEPC 30, the framing of the issue had now arrived at the point at which it was 
formulated in a draft Assembly resolution that requested that the MEPC prepare a draft annex 
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to MARPOL on air pollution from ships. It recognized “the urgent necessity of establishment 
of a policy on prevention of air pollution from ships, and development of reduction objectives 
and measures to achieve the objectives for control of emissions of all the elements of air 
pollution” (MEPC 30/24, Annex 13; Resolution A.719(17), 326). The agreed target levels and 
dates for the considered pollutants – including the target for SOx – were included as desired 
objectives. It further requested the MEPC collect and assess information on emissions to 
establish reference levels and develop requirements for reducing emissions (ibid.). 
 
5.3.3 MEPC 31, July 1991 
The target levels and dates were removed from the draft Assembly resolution at MEPC 31.
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No scientific arguments were given for this removal (MEPC 31/21; MSC 59/2/7).
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Nevertheless, a Norwegian proposal (MEPC 31/13/2) elaborating on the reference levels and 
years stated that the methods used for estimating global emissions from ships (by using 
statistics on fuel consumption and ship movements) were not accurate enough for establishing 
reference levels and years. An approach to NOx emissions was suggested that would mean a 
reference level without using reference years. It was not proposed for SOx emissions, but 
Norway intended to further develop its ideas and to provide documentation for discussion on 
target dates and levels at BCH 21. Hence, it seems that not only the reference years and levels 
needed further consideration but also the target levels and years. The committee noted that 
available documents could be regarded as a basis to decide on reference levels and years, 
though it was recognized that further consideration was needed at the BCH (MEPC 31/21). 
Before moving on to BCH 21, let us look at a Swedish submission (MEPC 31/13/4). The 
earlier proposal to use 0.8% sulphur content was now considered a long-term target, and a 
first step would be a standard of 1.5%. This would effectively decrease the contribution of 
ship emissions to “the global acidification” (MEPC 31/13/4, p. 3). No scientific support for 
this argument was given however.  
 
5.3.4 BCH 21, September 1991 
At BCH 21, few scientific aspects were reported. Although reference levels and years were 
included in the instructions for BCH 21, no such discussion was found. The BCH noted that 
the scope of application needed further consideration, i.e. global or restricted to certain areas. 
Let us investigate the submissions for scientific arguments behind this note. The International 
Association of Classification Societies (IACS) (BCH 21/11/4) particularly highlighted the 
lack of and need for data as a basis for reduction decisions. It considered it “clearly 
unrealistic” (BCH 21/11/4, p. 1) to set target levels without access to a reference base with 
data on emission levels (and available technology). There was further a need to define present 
levels and years, and they should be supported by sufficient data. Regarding the exhaust gas 
strategy, it was stressed that the scale of the problem should be quantified as a useful basis for 
action, and that data on local, regional or global significance of ship emissions in relation to 
other sources were lacking. Moreover, IACS found that the proposed measures for SOx 
appeared to be directed towards specific regions. It was stressed that “by limiting emission 
restrictions to coastal regions, the bulk of SO2 emissions from ships are likely to remain 
unchecked” (ibid., p. 3). 
 
                                                  
44 The target levels and dates were kept, however, at the MEPC in its revised action plan (MEPC 31/21). 
45Amendments were first made at the 59th session of the MSC after a proposal by the US. 
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A communication (BCH 21/11/5) from the International Energy Agency (IEA) of the OECD 
stressed that scientific knowledge of the contribution of SOx emissions from ships was highly 
uncertain. In particular, it was unclear whether SO2 emitted out at sea actually affected 
concentrations on land. It was considered possible that local sulphur content restrictions in 
coastal waters and in port could provide “a vast majority” of the desired reductions of on-
shore concentrations (BCH 21/11/5, p. 1). No supportive scientific information was presented, 
though it expressed that no decisions were to be taken before the results of listed ongoing 
studies. Almost all of the ongoing studies were conducted by oil industry organizations, e.g. 
the Oil Companies’ European Organization for Environmental and Health Protection 
(CONCAWE)
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 and the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation 
Association (IPIECA). The BCH noted the IEA submission as well as other ongoing studies 
and requested that members submit further information to the next session “in order to 
facilitate co-operation between Members” (BCH 21/15, para. 11.23). 
 
Furthermore, Japan’s submission (BCH 21/11/6, Annex, p. 1) had the heading “realities of 
SO2 emissions in the world”, under which it first framed the issue of acidification as “a major 
international environmental issue in specific areas” (ibid.). It then cited Norway’s study 
(MEPC 29/18) to highlight that emissions were not significant globally but specific to 
countries and areas. It was concluded that a reduction target should include a thorough 
examination of the location of problems. It framed the issue as a necessary problem to be 
dealt with globally and, especially, a problem for coastal areas with serious damage. It thus 
proposed to treat the issue separately. 
 
5.4 1992: Towards a Regional Approach 
 
5.4.1 MEPC 32, March 1992 
At MEPC 32, two submissions were discussed. The first (MEPC 32/12/1) was from the Oil 
Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF). It included an interim report with the first 
results of the study by CONCAWE mentioned above. The study assessed the contribution of 
ship emissions to the overall sulphur burdens in Scandinavia and Northwestern Europe based 
on EMEP data for 1988. The results indicated that the contribution was less than 2%, which 
was reported as minimal by both CONCAWE and OCIMF. The study concluded that 
reductions of land-based sources provided “a much more significant means to reduce overall 
sulphur burdens than reductions in ships” (MEPC 32/12/1, p. 2). OCIMF further expressed 
the view that global measures could not be justified by environmental benefits. The report 
noted, however, that ship emissions could make important local contributions, which would 
be further assessed. No discussion was found in the session report other than that the 
delegation of Germany expressed that it could not share the view of minimal contribution 
(MEPC 32/20). The reader should be aware, however, that the CONCAWE study will 
reappear in different forms and discussions as we move further in the process. The second 
submission (MEPC 32/12/2) was from the International Association of Independent Tanker 
Owners (INTERTANKO). It framed the problem as international and as requiring 
international regulation. However, it highlighted that quantities of SOx emissions were 
unknown, and thus the ‘present level’. A long-term research activity was required in order to 
determine worldwide quantities. INTERTANKO was concerned that reduction levels would 
                                                  
46 The abbreviation stands for Conservation of Clean Air and Water in Europe. 
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be set without this knowledge. It considered that data gathering on the present level should be 
given the highest priority, and that a percentage reduction should be established thereafter.  
 
5.4.2 BCH Correspondence Group on Air Pollution from Ships 
Although the above developments had discussions on regional versus global regulation, the 
Correspondence Group on Air Pollution from Ships was the first policy-making arena in 
which such discussion was explicitly reported. From the report, I found that the way different 
actors framed the problem was a significant factor in how they viewed the scope of actions. 
‘Some members’ preferred the regional solution, as the problem of acid deposition was 
restricted to coastal areas, while the “fairly well documented” (BCH 22/7/3, p. 3) long-range 
transport of SOx made ‘some members’ prefer a global solution that had mandatory 
regulations even far out at sea. The global reduction target of the MEPC was a significant 
factor that BCH 22 should consider for this policy choice. The global approach was 
considered to be the only option for achieving the target of reducing emissions by 50% before 
the year 2000. It was reported that “a slight majority” (ibid., p. 4) favoured a global approach. 
The regional option implied a need for the MEPC to change the target. A related aspect of the 
global preference is that the group had in its instructions to develop controllable regulations, 
and that control of different regulations in different areas was considered difficult or even 
impossible. According to the report, this instruction suggested global, unified regulations and 
no special areas. The developed initial draft annex to MARPOL thus showed a 1.5% global 
sulphur content limit (though in square brackets since there was no consensus). 
 
5.4.3 A Regional Approach at BCH 22, September 1992 
We have now arrived at BCH 22 when a framework for regional control – termed ‘a regional 
approach’ or ‘the regional concept’ – was developed with sulphur limits in specific areas and 
a supplemental global cap. Other than a discussion on the necessity of action, the relevant 
reported discussions did not include scientific aspects. Nevertheless, reasoning on the 
‘regional concept’ for control of SOx emissions was given by a ‘group of volunteers’ who 
developed a proposed regional approach (BCH 22/WP.4, Annex). to prepare a framework on 
the regional concept. The only scientific argument given for choosing a regional approach 
was the protection of areas affected by acidic emissions.
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 It specifically defined the approach 
as control of emissions within coastal zones and special areas. Coastal zones could be 
identified by working out the distance from the shore at which environmental effects do not 
occur. Special areas could be identified as areas with unacceptable deposition effects. It was 
stressed that a substantial amount of data was needed for identification and to ensure that 
regional control did not result in environmental harm on the open sea. It was further stated 
that regional control “does not preclude possibilities of measures of a global level” (BCH 
22/WP.4, Annex 2, p. 2). The concept of global ‘capping’ was then introduced as an “element 
included in the regional concept” (BCH 22/WP.4, p. 4). Regional control was considered the 
leading principle, and a global cap would merely be a supplement. The general idea was to 
form a worldwide barrier (or ceiling) of possible rising sulphur levels in bunker fuel as a 
result of increasingly stringent standards for land-based fuels. It was suggested to “cap” (or 
limit) the sulphur content in bunker fuels to 3.5% (presented in square brackets). In the 
working group, the delegation of the Bahamas expressed that a relatively high cap of 3.5% 
                                                  
47 Another reason was problems with undeveloped on-board exhaust gas cleaning and problems with marine 
pollution from these systems. How this was a reason for regional control was not clarified. 
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must be considered for any meaningful effect on global SO2 emissions levels. The working 
group could not proceed with further discussion (BCH 22/WP.4; 22/14). 
 
A striking observation of BCH 22 is that the scientific arguments were dominated by support 
for three views: (1) no global measures with preferred regional measures, (2) no measures at 
all or local measures at most, or (3) postponing action. Scientific arguments for global 
measures were absent. The only scientific content found that could have been used as an 
argument for global measures concerned the long-range transboundary nature of SOx 
emissions highlighted in a Norwegian submission (BCH 22/INF.16). It did not show the 
global contribution or argue for global measures, and much information could be interpreted 
as both a regional/local contribution and a large-scale contribution.
48
 Nevertheless, it 
highlighted that with a typical offshore wind of 10 m/s, SO2 was found to be transported 700-
1500 km before deposition, which was not the case in the arguments of the three views. The 
scientific arguments and supportive information for the three views are addressed in the 
following subsections.   
 
5.4.3.1 Arguments for Regional Measures Instead of Global  
The arguments for regional measures instead of global ones were characterized by three 
themes: the contribution of ship emissions, the concept of critical loads, and the negative 
environmental aspects of global control. 
 
Contribution of Ship Emissions  
OCIMF submitted three documents on the agenda item. The study by CONCAWE was in 
focus. It had been conducted in three parts: (1) the Northern European situation, (2) the 
regional European situation, and (3) the local European situation. The first part was 
summarized in the earlier interim report (MEPC 32/12/1), and the other two were in focus at 
this session. However, OCIMF highlighted the first repeatedly in two submissions (BCH 
22/7/9; 7/12). BCH 22/7/9 highlighted the minimal contribution in Europe and that if it was 
not proven otherwise, it was unnecessary with global measures. Regional measures were not 
considered unnecessary in this particular submission, however, and it saw the concept of 
special areas as a prominent alternative.  
 
The first submission (of eight) by Japan (BCH 22/7/4) presented contemporary views, as it 
awaited the results of its studies and investigations. One of the views was that the issue of SOx 
emissions should be treated separately as a global problem and an additional problem in 
specific areas – note its view at BCH 21.This was motivated by economic arguments, but 
when investigating the subsequent submissions (BCH 22/INF.10-14; 22/7/8), scientific 
arguments were used to support this view. In fact, the same view was presented (BCH 22/7/8) 
as a conclusion of Japan’s review of SO2 emission data. A similar study to the Norwegian 
Marintek study (MEPC 29/18) was presented (in BCH 22/INF.10). It had estimated SO2 
emissions from ships and divided the total figure per international route. Only Northern 
Europe was presented on a map. As in previous studies, different years were used for different 
data (e.g. bunker volumes for 1991 and trade volumes for 1986), and OECD data were used 
for land-based emissions, which implies estimated emissions in non-OECD countries. It was 
found that emissions from ships represented about 4.5% of the total global SO2 emissions. 
The comparison thus confirmed the Norwegian conclusion of a contribution about 4%. This 
                                                  
48 80% of the emissions in the Ekofisk area (mid-North Sea) would be deposited on land. A larger percentage 
would be deposited on acidified areas if the sources were closer to Norway, and a new study by Marintek had 
found that 65% of the emissions from international shipping occurred within 12 nm of land (BCH 22/INF.16). 
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was considered “extremely small” (BCH 22/7/8, p. 2), though SO2 emissions from ships were 
“especially a problem for special areas” (ibid.) with serious damage and high traffic. 
 
One way of designating special areas, according to Japan, was to focus on areas and routes 
where emissions were high, by calculating emissions and contributions to total emissions in 
specific areas. The results of such calculations were presented for four areas in the world. As 
before, land-based emissions were estimated from OECD data. Emissions from ships were 
found to be especially high in Northern Europe (672,000 tons; 5.2% of the total), followed by 
North and Central America (503,000 tons; 1.9%). By contribution to the total emissions, 
however, Southern Europe and the Middle East were the highest (237,000 tons; 5.5%). East 
and Southeast Asia had the smallest emissions and contribution (200,000 tons; 1.1%) (BCH 
22/INF.13). Northern Europe was highlighted and high emissions in the Strait of Dover, the 
English Channel and Scandinavia were mentioned (BCH 22/7/8). In addition, Japan submitted 
information on the present state of air pollution in its own territory. It highlighted that damage 
caused by acid rain was severe in Europe and North America and then stated that there was no 
evidence of significant impacts in Japan despite considerably high acidity in the rainwater. It 
further highlighted decreasing SO2 concentrations due to successful measures on land-based 
sources in Japan (BCH 22/INF.14). 
 
Critical Loads 
The concept of critical loads was introduced at BCH 22 by the UK (BCH 22/7). It was 
defined by the UK as “the quantity of a substance falling on a given area over a given period 
which a specified part of the local environment can tolerate without adverse effects occurring” 
(BCH 22/7, p. 1)
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. A conference within LRTAP had agreed to the use of critical loads as 
guidelines for the level of abatement of air pollution, e.g. by developing maps that showed 
critical loads and deposition ratios for different pollutants. The UK stressed that the effects of 
acid rain had great geographical variations depending on factors such as local geology. A 
critical loads analysis could be conducted to determine whether ship emissions were absorbed 
in the open sea, which in such a case would make emission reduction unnecessary on the open 
sea and necessary close to the shore or in ‘special areas’. It was realized that analyses of 
critical loads for every coastal zone in the world were problematic, and thus an initial policy 
solution was proposed to introduce requirements within a certain distance of the coast, with 
the possibility of excluding certain areas depending on a future analysis.  
 
Negative Environmental Aspects of Global Emission Control 
Potential additional environmental impacts of global measures were highlighted by OCIMF 
(BCH 22/7/9) and the Netherlands (BCH 22/INF.7) as an aspect that needed to be taken into 
account. This mainly concerned increased energy consumption, and in turn increased CO2 
emissions, due to energy intensive desulphurization processes at the refineries.  
 
5.4.3.2 Arguments for Local or No Measures 
This session did not only represent different views on local, regional and global measures but 
also on the very necessity of action. This resulted in an agreement by the BCH to request the 
MEPC to consider the necessity of measures. Before this agreement, three groups of members 
(of the working group) had given the following arguments (BCH 22/14; 22/WP.4):  
 
                                                  
49 A commonly used definition of critical loads is “a quantitative estimate of an exposure to one or more 
pollutants below which significant harmful effects on specified sensitive elements of the environment do not 
occur according to present knowledge” (Grennfelt and Nilsson, 1988, p. 9). 
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 Shipping’s contribution to total global emissions was too small to take action.  
 The necessity for action was clear. The contribution would increase in the future while 
land-based emissions would be reduced.  
 The developments had been too fast and further studies were needed on emissions. 
 
This section investigates the scientific arguments and supportive information for both local 
measures and questioning the need for action. A common theme for these arguments was the 
contribution of ship emissions but with four different scientific arguments to show an 
insignificant contribution: (1) emission versus deposition, (2) lack of empirical evidence, (3) 
dilution at sea, and (4) the use of distillate fuels in coastal waters. Before investigating these 
arguments, the Norwegian submission (BCH 22/INF.16) should be noted despite its lack of 
arguments. It highlighted a calculation made by the Norwegian Metrologic Institute for an 
EMEP report. It had found that SO2 emissions from international shipping represented only 
2.5% of the total emissions in Europe. However, the EMEP report noted that the figure was 
probably too low due to, among other things, the lack of data for emissions in the heavily 
trafficked Mediterranean Sea.
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No Significant Regional Contribution: Emissions versus Deposition 
OCIMF (BCH 22/7/11) provided scientific counterarguments to the Norwegian submission 
(MEPC 29/18). The criticism concerned analysing the contribution of ship emissions by 
focusing on emissions and not depositions. It was considered necessary to analyse the 
contribution of ships to the total deposition of sulphur on land. It specifically targeted 
Norway’s finding of a 14% ship emission contribution to the national emissions in Norway51 
and stressed that it was essential to include all contributing sources to a country’s sulphur 
burden (depositions). In such an analysis, the emissions from other countries were the largest 
contributors and the national emissions were very small: 5% in Norway according to OCIMF. 
The ship emission contribution was even less, with EMEP data indicating only a 2% 
contribution in Norway. It did not specify, however, whether this concerned national or 
international shipping (Norway’s figure was for national shipping). With the second part of 
the CONCAWE study, OCIMF (BCH 22/7/12) further highlighted a minimal regional 
European contribution. The ship emission contribution to sulphur depositions was assessed 
using EMEP data provided in grid squares of 150 km
2
 (150 km x 150 km) for four countries. 
Again, Norway was highlighted. The results showed that a significant proportion of Norway’s 
land area was “virtually unaffected by ship sulphur emissions” (BCH 22/7/12, Annex, p. 2). 
While Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) had a high sulphur burden, the 
contribution from ships was small. It was concluded that the contrition was minimal even at a 
regional European level.  
 
Lack of Empirical Evidence to Support Measures 
Liberia’s submission (BCH 22/7/7) strongly based its views on the CONCAWE study and 
OCIMF’s previous conclusions (BCH 22/7/7, p. 1): 
 
The drafting work on the Annex was initiated when it was believed that ships 
were a significant source of air pollution. Evidence now submitted by the Oil 
Companies International Marine Forum indicates that, in fact, in the case of SO2 
such ship-based pollution is small relative to that from all other sources. 
                                                  
50 It also assessed the distribution of ship emissions along the Norwegian continental shelf (using EMEP grids of 
50 x 50 km2). It was found that the SO2 emissions from international shipping were more than twice those from 
national shipping in Norway (BCH 22/INF.16). 
51 Earlier unknown study described in MEPC 29/18 
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According to Liberia, there was lack of empirical evidence of such high emission levels from 
ships that the environment would be significantly improved if emissions were removed. It 
could not support regulations if OCIMF’s conclusion of a minimal contribution was correct. 
Shipping was not considered a dangerous threat to the atmosphere. It acknowledged a 
contribution in isolated local areas, and thus saw local solutions where it could be proven. 
 
No Significant Local Contribution: Emissions Are Diluted at Sea 
The third part of the CONCAWE study assessed the local contribution (BCH 22/7/12). It had 
modelled emission dispersion on three ship sizes burning bunker fuel with 3.3% sulphur 
content. A model by the US Department of the Interior (the Offshore and Coastal Dispersion 
model) was used to calculate dispersion and the distance where maximum 1-hour 
concentrations occurred (at sea level). It merely focused on dispersion and did not include 
deposition or atmospheric reactions. Nonetheless, the conclusion highlighted by OCIMF was 
that “the emissions from a given vessel have an insignificant contribution to local sulphur 
burdens” (BCH 22/7/12, Annex, p. 2, emphasis added). It was found that dilution from the 
smallest modelled ship occurred at a distance of 5 km and at up to 20 km for larger vessels. 
Despite an insignificant contribution, OCIMF concluded that ship emissions could be a local 
problem under heavy traffic and adverse dispersion conditions, and that further studies were 
needed before considering legislation on local problems. In addition, Japan (BCH 22/INF.13) 
made a similar calculation on a hypothetical ship and route but without arguments for local 
measures only. It was part of a second proposed option to designate special areas, focusing on 
coastal zones where ships affected land areas a specific distance from the shore. For that 
purpose, Japan suggested using the Pasquill method to estimate dispersion and calculate SO2 
concentrations for a specific distance from the source. It was found that the maximum 
concentration (Cmax) was at a distance of 1.5 km, with half of Cmax at 4.3 km and a tenth of 
Cmax at 15 km (BCH 22/INF.13).  
 
No Significant Local Contribution Due to Distillates 
ICS, Liberia and OCIMF (BCH 22/7/6; 7/7; 7/ 9) had the view that regulations should only 
apply to main engines and not to auxiliary engines, which were stated to be responsible for 
only 10% of air pollution from ships. In addition to these arguments, the information provided 
by Norway (BCH 22/INF.16) included a conclusion that shipping could not be considered an 
important contributor to local pollution. Ships near shore mainly used distillates with low 
sulphur content, which implied relatively small emissions. It was further noted that emissions 
in port areas only constituted a small part of the total emissions from ships and that the 10% 
figure was used by Norway in its calculations despite a previous estimation of 15%. 
 
5.4.3.3 Arguments for Postponing Action: Lack of Research 
Several submissions stressed the importance of research and the need for sufficient 
information before taking decisions. Liberia (BCH 22/7/6) emphasized that air pollution from 
ships needed to be understood far better before the BCH could recommend a draft text. It 
further saw an urgent need to explain the big differences between the CONCAWE study and 
earlier findings. ICS (BCH 22/7/6) and OCIMF (BCH 22/7/9) both expressed that the 
development had been too fast with insufficient research. OCIMF believed that well-founded 
studies should guide environmental regulations, and had the view that no decisions on SOx 
emissions should be taken until ongoing research had been completed. ICS saw a need for the 
IMO to instantly assess known and ongoing research in order to compare emissions against 
land-based sources and to evaluate environmental impacts. 
 
53 
 
5.4.4 MEPC 33, October 1992 
At MEPC 33, the reopened question on the necessity of action was considered. It was recalled 
that a strategy to deal with air pollution had been developed based on “substantial information 
and data” (MEPC 33/20, para. 12.4) and that the Assembly resolution requested the 
committee develop regulations and a new annex to MARPOL. Several delegations expressed 
that the necessity had already been justified at previous sessions and that there was no further 
need to discuss this issue. The committee thus agreed that the BCH would continue its work 
(MEPC 33/20). The committee further considered a submission by the US (MEPC 33/INF.17) 
without reported discussion. It provided a bibliography of papers and reports related to air 
pollution from ships compiled by the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 
(SNAME). On a closer look at this bibliography, I found 171 papers and reports covering 
1971-1992 with several published in scientific journals or conference proceedings. However, 
most were reports of governmental agencies, industry, conferences and meetings, as well as 
many earlier submitted IMO documents. The titles of several studies did not clearly show that 
they addressed ship emissions, and studies on specific pollutants focused on NOx. The only 
inclusion of sulphur emissions in titles were in IMO documents. 
 
5.5 1993-1994 
5.5.1 MEPC 34, July 1993 
No discussion was reported at MEPC 34, though some submitted documents were noted and 
referred to the BCH for consideration (MEPC 34/23). OCIMF (MEPC 34/3/1) submitted a 
study undertaken by IPIECA (prepared for OCIMF for its submission). It highlighted that SOx 
emissions had historically been identified as responsible for regional acidification and poor 
local air quality, and the IMO had taken the first global initiative. Based on bunker testing on 
delivery at 100 ports around the world, the average sulphur content for 1990 was found to be 
2.9%. Contrary to earlier discussions at the MEPC, IPIECA concluded that increased stringent 
land-based regulation was unlikely to have big effects on the sulphur content of marine fuels. 
Based on different scenarios, the global average could either remain at the 1990 level or in the 
worst case increase to 3.12%. IPIECA thus questioned if any environmental benefits would be 
achieved with a 3.5% cap. It estimated a 5% emission reduction at most. Given that only 25% 
of the emissions reach land
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, it concluded that the reduction benefits over land would be 
“imperceptibly small in all situations” (MEPC 34/3/1, Annex, p. 3). OCIMF further added 
that the net reduction in SOx pollution in Northern Europe and Scandinavia with a global cap 
of 3.5% was estimated to be 0.1%. In addition, only a 1% reduction would be gained from a 
1.5% sulphur content limit
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. IPIECA recognized the potential benefits of a regional reduction 
in areas with clearly identified sensitivity and potential benefits however. OCIMF thus 
supported regional or local controls. 
 
Sweden (MEPC 34/INF.20) distributed an extensive report (Alexandersson et al., 1993) 
conducted by the consultant Mariterm AB. It intended to calculate emissions from ships in the 
area closest to Sweden. Movements of merchant ships over 300 GT were mapped within an 
area delimited to a line between Helsinki and Tallinn in the east and Skaw and Kristiansand in 
the west. It used official statistics, arrivals and departures in several ports and a survey sent to 
ferry operators. For SOx, the sulphur content and fuel consumption were used to calculate 
                                                  
52 The minimal contribution found in the CONCAWE study was explained by about 75% of the emissions from 
ships not reaching land. Data for other regions were seemingly not available, and it was stated that there was no 
reason to expect higher contributions elsewhere due to the high ratio of land to sea masses in Europe. 
53 This was according to OCIMF estimates in BCH 22/7/12, though no such figures were found. 
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emissions. The results showed that in total, approximately 84,700 tons of SO2 were emitted in 
the area in 1987. Emissions were divided into different categories of ship traffic, though the 
delimitations were many, which affected the results. As an example, ferries had the largest 
emissions while international shipping had rather low emissions, but this was due to the 
inclusion of only traffic to and from Swedish ports in the international category. The 
investigated year was 1987, when the sulphur content of fuels in ferries was about 2%. Since 
then the ferry lines have switched to fuels with 0.1-0.6% sulphur as a gesture of 
environmental goodwill. This made the authors exclude SOx emissions from a further study 
on emission distribution. Nevertheless, it concluded that deposition in the sea was not a 
problem since oceans were not exposed to acidification. Besides expressing the importance of 
evaluating where most emissions were located, the following was concluded (ibid., p. 14): 
 
If a controlled sulphur content is introduced only within certain areas, it will 
almost certainly lead to the passing of high sulphur fuels to uncontrolled 
markets. Therefore, it will not cause the total discharge of sulphur oxides to 
diminish. 
 
France (MEPC 34/INF.21) submitted results of an attempt to evaluate maritime emissions in 
the western Mediterranean Sea. The studied area comprised the Strait of Gibraltar to Sicily 
and Cap Bon, Tunisia. Previous studies were based on ship traffic, fuel consumption and 
emission factors, though they focused on ships operating under steady state conditions of the 
high seas. Emissions in and near ports were thus excluded, and there were more delimitations; 
e.g. ships that did not stop in any port in the area were excluded, all routes had the same 
length to ports – which reshaped the area as a circle – and all ports had similar traffic 
structures. The results indicated 227,841 tons of SO2 emissions from ships in the area, which 
was about 20% of the total emissions in France and slightly below the emissions from all the 
French industries. Given the big delimitations, it was emphasized that the results had to be 
taken with caution, and that they were more than likely to be well below the actual emissions. 
 
OCIMF distributed the full report of the CONCAWE study (CONCAWE, 1993) and once 
again summarized it (MEPC 34/INF.36). Some relevant details and previously unmentioned 
parts of CONCAWE (1993) are here highlighted. On the details, the first part of the study (the 
Northern European situation) consisted almost solely of graphs on existing data sets from 
EMEP for 1988, and it had used the same data as the Marintek study in MEPC 29/18. 
Domestic shipping was not included, but it was considered not to affect the results 
significantly due to the main use of distillates. On the regional European situation, the report 
revealed two case studies on the Norwegian coastline and the Baltic Sea Area that added data 
on national shipping to the assessments of the report. The result was one-third higher total 
ship emissions in Norwegian waters, though it was still considered an insignificant 
contribution. For the Baltic Sea, the emissions increased by 50%, which meant that the 
sulphur burden from ship emissions would proportionally increase in this area. It did not 
evaluate whether this was significant but instead focused specifically on Finland, followed by 
the conclusion that the contribution was still insignificant (6.3% of the total deposition). On 
the local European situation, emission data were assessed at a more detailed local level for the 
Dover-Calais area and Marseille Harbour area. Emission concentrations were found to be high 
along the Straits and exceeded the background concentrations in the English Channel. For the 
Marseille harbour area, emissions were low compared with inland emissions (11%). Since it 
was the third largest port in Europe, it was considered a good example of the situation in 
many highly industrialized coastal areas. It thus concluded that reducing ship emissions would 
have little impact on the total emissions in such areas.  
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5.5.2 1st Intersessional Meeting of the BCH Working Group, July 1993 
No specific discussion on SOx emissions was found in the report of the First Intersessional 
Meeting of the BCH Working Group on Air Pollution (BCH 23/7/7).
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 Nevertheless, the US 
delegation emphasized “the outstanding need” for evaluating the target levels in studies (BCH 
23/7/7, para. 13.1). It was stressed that the objectives stipulated at MEPC 31 “have not yet 
been supported by an estimation of environmental benefits to be realized through achievement 
of a given target level” (ibid.). It thus urged for such studies to be conducted within the 
timeframe of the work plan.  
 
5.5.3 BCH Correspondence Group on Regional Control Options 
The report of the Correspondence Group on Regional Control Options for NOx and SO2 (BCH 
23/7/4) provides a scientific reasoning behind choosing a regional approach, the concept of 
global capping and the use of a combined approach. To begin with, it argued that a global 
sulphur content reduction would be the easiest way to achieve an emission reduction at first 
sight, though at second sight it raised doubts about the necessity of a worldwide reduction. Air 
pollution from ships was framed as a regional problem, and a stringent global standard was 
considered ‘overkill’. Early in the report, it was stated that the apparent lack of support for a 
global solution was a main reason for developing a regional concept. No other scientific 
explanation for this lack of support was given than the above regional framing and doubts on 
necessity. Scientific arguments were merely used as justifications for the chosen regional 
approach. The concept of critical loads was one such justification. It was stated that there 
were no intentions of applying the critical loads concept to shipping, and that a regional 
approach could conflict the critical loads concept due to uniform sulphur limits in all 
designated areas. The justification was instead that it would be impossible to prevent 
exceedance of critical loads in certain coastal regions with only land-based measures. The 
regional approach was considered to result in major reductions in the most sensitive areas, 
which were neither considered achievable nor necessary, with far-reaching global measures. 
 
It would be applied in areas where there was “a clear need to protect the environment from 
quantities or concentrations of pollutants which cause long or short term adverse effects” 
(ibid. p. 7). Concerns of countries would not be sufficient justification to designate an area. 
Guidelines would be developed in similar ways as for the concept of ‘special areas’ under 
MARPOL, but adapted to air pollution. Such criteria of scientific relevance could include:  
 
 Adverse impacts on air quality and/or acidification 
 Contribution of such high levels that land-based measures cannot achieve emission 
reduction levels below a target level (e.g. a critical load level) 
 Adverse impacts on water quality 
 Emission distribution as a basis for delineation of the area 
 
It was acknowledged that the regional approach would not preclude global measures, e.g. a 
global cap of 3% sulphur content. Although the global limit was open for discussion, it was 
stated in a note that a cap of 3% would “not lead to any reductions of sulphur oxides worth 
mentioning” (ibid., p. 6). As stated at BCH 22, the point of capping was not to reduce global 
emissions but to prevent a possible increase in the sulphur content. It was also stated that 
another reason for a global cap was the introduction of a regulation that could be reviewed if 
necessary. This integrated approach would “provide for a generally applicable protective 
                                                  
54No other documents were found in the archives of the Swedish Transport Agency either (see Chapter 4). 
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measure, although of a moderate nature, associated with gradual measures for a higher level 
or protection of certain regions” (ibid.). It was stated, however, that combining the regional 
concept with a cap of 3-3.5% implied that regional reductions would have to be very high in 
order to reach the target level of a 50% reduction by the year 2000. In fact, it was 
acknowledged that the reduction target may not be reached in either quantity or time by this 
approach. It would “nevertheless still achieve some of benefits for the environment that the 
proponents of the reduction targets and dates had in mind” (ibid.). With a regional approach, 
it was considered necessary to reconsider the target.
55
 Nevertheless, it emphasized that 
reference years should still be established, and that the choice of reference year should take 
into account that emissions were increasing. With an early reference year, the actual reduction 
had to be greater than for a later reference year.  
 
A justification for measures in general inclu ded emission reductions of other pollutants due 
to the emissions of PM, PAHs and heavy metals being interlinked to the sulphur content. It 
also included a clear reference to the precautionary principle of the Rio Declaration
56
, which 
was considered to be of particular importance as the extent of the ship emission contribution 
to transboundary air pollution was not clear and its consequences were not fully investigated. 
It was concluded that a lack of scientific certainty was no reason for postponement of 
measures, though further research was required due to the doubts expressed on the necessity 
of action. It highlighted fields such as distribution modelling, emission factors, air quality and 
interrelations of pollutants. There was also a need to compile ongoing research. The group 
was unable to be conclusive on some of the basic questions, which could serve as a basis for 
discussions at BCH 23. These included the question of whether a global cap should be 
introduced and whether regional measures would be sufficient for the desired emission 
reduction. The proposed Regulation 13 included a 3% global sulphur cap and a 1.5% limit in 
certain sensitive areas, though both figures were placed in square brackets (BCH 23/7/4). 
 
5.5.4 BCH 23, September 1993 
At BCH 23, the outcome of the correspondence group was the foundation for the working 
group. In the discussions, both OCIMF and Norway presented studies on acidification from 
shipping, though it was not specified which (BCH 23/WP.3). OCIMF’s submission (BCH 
23/7/5) did not present a study, but it gave positive comments on the work of the 
correspondence group and strongly supported compiling research. Based on “the best 
available authoritative scientific information” (BCH 23/7/5, p. 3), it could not accept that 
there were threats of serious or irreversible damage, as prescribed by the precautionary 
approach. Norway’s submission (BCH 23/INF.18) agreed with OCIMF’s view at BCH 22 
(BCH 22/7/11) with regard to the significance of deposition when considering acidification. It 
highlighted that undetermined origins constituted the largest contribution to SO2 deposition in 
Norway, which could have been underestimated ship emissions. It then showed tables and 
graphs of estimated emissions and depositions. It noted that worldwide figures for the ship 
emission contribution did not exist. Nevertheless, EMEP calculations had been made in 
1991
57
 on the contribution of international shipping to depositions in Europe. It showed that 
about 25% of the emissions from international shipping were deposited on land, but the 
                                                  
55 The target was further viewed as provisional. 
56
 “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according 
to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (Rio 
Declaration, Principle 15). 
57Norwegian Meteorological Centre (1991), cited BCH 23/INF.18. 
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remaining emissions did not all deposit over sea. About 32% of the emissions were 
transported out of the geographical area covered by the EMEP model, which was highlighted. 
It was further found that the contribution to the total deposition over land was merely 0.6%. 
Note that this is much less than the approximate 2% in CONCAWE (1993). This low figure 
was explained by a low contribution of ship emissions to total emissions in Europe (1.4%), 
which was considered likely to be a great underestimation by both EMEP and Norway (e.g. 
due to no included data for the heavily trafficked Mediterranean Sea). Norway further showed 
chartered distribution of sulphur deposition on EMEP maps.
58
 It was found that high amounts 
of emissions were distributed and deposited outside the area covered by each map: only 30-
45% was deposited within the mapped area. According to Norway, this clearly indicated that 
SOx emissions from ships were widely distributed and implied that they were deposited far 
away from their source. It was thus considered unsuitable with a local or regional approach.  
 
Other submissions contributed further to the scientific discussions (including MEPC 34/3/1; 
34/INF.36). The UK (BCH 23/7/1) summarized the results of the second phase of the marine 
exhaust emissions research programme by Lloyd’s Register.59 Ships’ impact on local air 
quality around the port of Vlissingen in the Netherlands had been studied. This was an area 
with likely impacts on local air quality due to high levels of ship traffic, few industrial 
sources, etc. It was found that SO2 emissions from ships represented about 20% of the 
industrial sources within the area. Nevertheless, the industrial sources were 15 times higher 
when considering the relative area of estuary to land mass. Dispersion modelling further 
showed the highest emissions in port. It was concluded that ship emissions made a relatively 
minor contribution to the average SO2 concentrations in the area. Saudi Arabia (BCH 23/7/6) 
had reviewed European pollution reports from 1985 to 1990 and found that the contribution 
from ship emissions to the total SO2 pollution was 2%. A global regulation was thus not 
‘approved’ by Saudi Arabia, but it recognized that certain areas required measures. It further 
expressed a local framing of the problem as well as a solution, by referring to the results of 
dispersion modelling (e.g. CONCAWE, 1993). Lastly, the US (BCH 23/7/8) emphasized 
caution until the full extent of the impacts of air pollution from ships was known. Reference 
was made to the Assembly resolution on the necessity to collect and assess information, in 
particular in relation to establishing reference levels. It was stressed that not all the required 
information had been compiled and that it was necessary to obtain. The US further framed the 
problem as regional based on the available information, though the transportation of SOx over 
oceans needed to be better understood.  
 
There was little support for a global approach in the working group, which thus left it behind 
and focused on either regional measures alone or in conjunction with a global cap. The 
opinion on whether global capping should be used was evenly divided within the group, and 
the BCH was unable to draft requirements for SOx emissions. The delegations that were in 
favour of a global cap had the following scientific arguments (BCH 23/WP.3; 23/14): 
 
 Avoidance of a future increase in sulphur content in fuel oil 
 It could be a first step in a step-by-step approach to achieve the target level. 
 Only regional measures could result in high-sulphur fuel being distributed to other 
areas. Emissions could thus be exported to areas outside regulated areas. 
 SO2 emissions are transported long distances and affect wide areas. 
                                                  
58 Calculations conducted by Barrat and Berge (1993), cited in BCH 23/INF.18. 
59 The reports were also handed out during the session in limited copies. 
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 Global measures could be justified by the precautionary principle and the acidification 
status at the time. 
 
The delegations that did not support a global cap had the following scientific arguments: 
 
 The environmental benefits gained from global capping were negligible. 
 The regional approach would deal with acidification caused by ships in designated 
areas, which meant there were no environmental reasons for global capping. 
 Presented figures showed no indication of an increase in the sulphur content. 
 
As a compromise, the delegations of the US and the Netherlands suggested that the sulphur 
content of fuel oil be monitored, and if a threshold value of 3.2% sulphur content was 
exceeded, a 3.5% global cap would be applied (BCH 23/WP.3). In plenary, the Swedish 
delegation raised some concerns. It highlighted and questioned the numerous elements 
favouring a global cap not having been treated equally to the less environmentally justified 
arguments against it. According to Sweden, it had been impossible to reach consensus due to 
this situation. On the MEPC targets, it felt that “many efforts had been made to turn the 
development away from the objectives to be achieved stipulated by the MEPC” (BCH 23/14, 
para. 7.62.5). In addition, the delegation of Egypt stressed the need for further data on air 
pollution levels before any decision (stated in connection with economic arguments) (ibid.). 
 
The working group continued its work after its report to the plenary. It was realized that the 
definition of special areas could not be restricted to the special area concept of MARPOL. 
Since air pollution affects surrounding land areas it had to be included in addition to sea areas. 
The geographical delineation would have to include a set of criteria in guidelines, including 
transportation and distribution of pollutants, meteorological conditions, etc. A uniform 
standard for all special areas with sulphur contents of 0.5-2% was discussed, with 1.5% in 
majority. There was no reported scientific argument on the basis of these limits, however, nor 
on why the specific scientific criteria should be used. Moreover, the group exchanged views 
on its research on the initiative of the US delegation. The result was an agreement to submit 
information to the Secretariat on current and ongoing research (BCH 24/7/1). 
 
5.5.5 BCH Correspondence Group on the Regional Approach  
The report of the Correspondence Group on the Regional Approach for Controlling SOx 
Emissions (AP/WG 2/3) described a polarization of views on global capping. The views were 
divided between proposal (A) [3.5%] global cap and (B) “delayed trigger method”, which 
meant that the global average sulphur content should be monitored and if it exceeded 3.2% 
after two years, a 3.5% global cap should be applied. Other members favoured not including a 
global cap at all. No scientific arguments were found on these options in the report. The 
question of delineation of special areas also had a polarization of views with either 12-15 
miles or 200 miles from the coast, or the view that further research was needed before 
decisions were taken. Since the views were not reported, the following focuses on the 
scientific contents of the draft text of the regional approach.
60
  
 
A special area was defined as a sea area that controls SOx emissions from ships for reasons of 
environmental conditions in sea and/or land areas. A proposal to designate a special area 
                                                  
60 The views were presented in J-papers during the second intersessional meeting; AP/WG 2/J/2; 2/J/3. These 
documents were not provided in the archives of the STA. 
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should contain a background document addressing oceanography, ecological characteristics, 
scientific significance, environmental pressures (including those derived from ship emissions) 
and measures (including land-based sources). The document should further include a review 
of how the proposal takes into account criteria for designation, developed by the IMO. Such 
criteria would include ecological conditions – including terrestrial ecosystems, threatened 
species, sensitive or rare ecosystems, adverse impacts on water quality, human health, etc. – 
atmospheric conditions – including adverse impacts on air quality and/or acidification – and 
ship traffic in the area. Additional scientific factors that could strengthen the arguments for a 
special area would include pollution of such a high contribution that land-based measures 
could not achieve a reduction target on their own, with measures already being taken to 
reduce land-based sources, factors causing enhanced effects, etc. The determining factors of 
the location and extent of a special area (delineation) were almost the same as the above 
criteria. On the measures to be applied, an emission limit of 6.0 g SOx/kWh was proposed, 
corresponding to the use of a 1.5% sulphur content limit (both figures had square brackets). 
 
5.5.6 2nd Intersessional Meeting of the BCH Working Group, February-March 1994 
The second intersessional meeting was based on the discussions on formulating draft SOx 
regulations in the report of the correspondence group and a few submissions with scientific 
arguments and information (BCH 24/7/6). OCIMF (AP/WG 2/2) presented historical data on 
the worldwide sulphur contents of HFO and Intermediate Fuel Oil (IFO). It was based on a 
sample analysis by DNV. The weighted mean sulphur content for both had increased from 
2.69% to 2.96% between 1983 and 1993 (from 2.76% to 3.07% for HFO and from 2.62% to 
2.8% for IFO). OCIMF concluded that this was a very small and gradual increase, and it once 
again stated that there was little or no noticeable benefit from a global cap. In addition, this 
argument would be strengthened if it were eventually accepted that emissions were 
significantly diluted a relatively short distance from the ship. To assist the working group on 
the delineation of special areas, OCIMF (AP/WG 2/1) submitted an interim report of another 
CONCAWE study. The full report, CONCAWE (1994), was handed out during MEPC 36 and 
summarized by OCIMF at both BCH 24 and MEPC 36. To avoid being repetitive, the full 
report is reviewed briefly here. 
 
CONCAWE (1993) had highlighted the need for further work on local impacts, which was 
considered vital for the special area concept. CONCAWE (1994) thus aimed to provide data 
for assistance in designating special areas. It still focused on Europe, but this time in detail on 
the English Channel and the southern North Sea (including the Strait of Dover). Taken 
together, this was one of the world’s most trafficked sea areas with large ports such as 
Rotterdam and Antwerp (CONCAWE, 1994; AP/WG 2/1). The report was based on two 
studies: an emission inventory (Meech, 1993, cited in CONCAWE 1994) and a deposition/air 
quality modelling study (Lowles et al., 1994, cited in CONCAWE 1994). According to 
CONCAWE (1994, p. 2), taken together, it was “the most detailed analysis of its type”. The 
emissions were mapped for about 280 shipping routes as well as for about 80 port areas, of 
which the largest 11 ports were represented in more detail to evaluate their possible impacts 
on local air quality. The inventory was based on ship movements, fuel types, sulphur contents, 
fuel consumption and ship-specific parameters.
61
 The study on dispersion and deposition 
modelling was conducted by the Imperial College Centre for Environmental Technology 
(ICCET) using the UK ASAM model. This model used 20 km
2
 grids for the UK and 25 km
2
 
                                                  
61 Notably, sulphur content data (obtained from DNV) consisted of the delivery of fuels to each port in the area 
(on average ~3% sulphur content for all fuel grades). It thus seems that the study assumed that the inventoried 
ships all obtained their bunker supplies within the studied area. 
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grids for Continental land areas. It was used as a basis for the second sulphur protocol to 
LRTAP and was considered suitable for European coastal areas. In addition, 1 km
2
 grids were 
used for detailed assessments of the major ports. 
 
CONCAWE (1994) strongly underlined that in-port emissions were clearly the significant 
source of ship emissions in the studied area. About 100 kilotonnes (kt) of sulphur (not SO2) 
were found to be emitted per year in the area – compared with a large coal plant of 2000 MW 
in the UK – and of this, about 26% was emitted within ports. Of the in-port emissions, 50% 
was from the largest ports. On the dispersion modelling, the emissions were found to be 
higher through the Dover Straits due to ferry movements, and this traffic caused a high 
deposition on the Kent and Normandy coastlines. This was considered a relative low 
contribution to the overall deposition from EMEP data however. Contributions over 10% 
were only found in nine (of 315) grid squares on land. Overall, less than 5% of the total 
deposition could be attributed to ships sailing outside territorial waters. According to 
CONCAWE (1994), the results indicated that even in this area with high traffic, ship 
emissions did not significantly contribute to deposition. Reducing the emissions in only four 
ports would result in greater environmental benefits than controlling all the emissions in the 
area (CONCAWE, 1994; AP/WG 2/1). 
 
On special areas, the BSS (BCH 24/7/4) proposed that special areas would require criteria in 
guidelines, but that detailed scientific evidence did not need to be presented to the IMO for 
granting special area status. The submission further proposed that the paragraph with 6.0 g 
SOx/kWh (within square brackets) should be deleted as the validity of such a value could be 
questioned and that it was difficult to verify. A 1.5% sulphur content limit should be the 
regulation. Many delegations and observers opposed the above proposal of no need for 
detailed scientific evidence. They emphasized that presenting clear scientific evidence was of 
paramount importance, and reference was given to Assembly Resolutions A.500 (XII) and 
A.777(18). Resolution A.500(XII) set objectives for the IMO in the 1980s. It recommended 
that the committees “entertain proposals for new conventions or amendments to existing 
conventions only on the basis of clear and well-documented demonstration of compelling 
need” (Resolution A.500(XII), para. 3). Resolution A.777(18) on the work methods and 
organization not only invited the attention of committees to this recommendation but also 
encouraged solutions aimed at informed decisions. The many delegations against the BSS 
proposals expressed that that criteria and procedures should be based on the work of the 
correspondence group, formulated as guidelines. Only the IMO should designate special areas 
after being provided with clear scientific evidence and considering it thoroughly against the 
criteria. The delegation of Norway could not agree with this.  
 
The same emission limit and sulphur content limit for special areas as of the correspondence 
group were agreed in general (in square brackets), though the proposal by the BSS was added 
to the draft text. The delegation of Germany, however, stated that acceptance of a maximum 
sulphur content limit depends on the delineation of the area. The BSS submission also 
included a proposal to designate the Baltic Sea Area as a special area in the new annex to 
MARPOL, though no scientific arguments were given. It was considered by the group and 
placed in square brackets in the draft regulation. An understanding was expressed by many 
delegations that clear scientific evidence could be provided by the BSS before adoption.  
 
The issue of global capping was discussed intensively but without reported scientific 
arguments and without agreement. The Bahamas proposed 5% for proposal A and Spain 
proposed a compromise global cap of 4%. Reported support of members suggests that 
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proposal A and the compromise solution was in majority.
 62
 The delegation of Japan stated 
that the earlier proposed 3.5% had been a compromise of different proposals, including lower 
figures. It thus had the view that if the BCH and the MEPC considered a figure higher than 
3.5%, it should also consider lower figures. The later drafted global cap had all three figures 
in square brackets combined with proposal B, which it would only apply after monitoring of 
the sulphur content had showed exceedance of a threshold value of [3.2%] or [3.7%]. No 
scientific arguments for the 3.7% value were found (BCH 24/7/6). 
 
5.5.7 MEPC 35, March 1994 
The BSS proposal to declare the Baltic Sea Area a special area was further discussed at 
MEPC 35. Although several supported designation, others had the view that designating the 
Baltic Sea Area a special area would require a review of the supporting evidence and relevant 
data in relation to the guidelines, which were still under development. The UK, in particular, 
stressed that it was premature with regard to its ongoing research, which could affect the 
conditions for special areas and the development of the new annex in general (MEPC 35/21). 
The delegation of Sweden saw the environmental conditions of the Baltic Sea as enough to 
justify immediate actions, and it announced that the BSS already had criteria and measures 
but only for its own ships (ibid.). 
 
5.5.8 BCH 24, September 1994 
BCH 24 was the target session for the BCH to finalize its task. With regard to special areas, 
not much discussion was reported but rather lists of amended paragraphs. This was also the 
case for a second report of the correspondence group on the regional approach (BCH 24/7/9), 
which had been given additional work on criteria and procedures after the second 
intersessional meeting (BCH 24/15; 24/WP.7; 24/7/9). The discussion on global capping was 
intense but made no progress. There was no support for proposal B, and the 5% limit was in 
majority. A compromise of 4.5% was supported by a majority of delegations, though no 
consensus could be reached. A revised draft text thus included 5% in square brackets. No 
scientific arguments were reported, though discussed global limits were submitted as formal 
proposals with some scientific arguments (BCH 24/15; 24/WP.2; 24/WP.7).  
 
A 4% global cap was proposed by Spain (BCH 24/7/8), which summarized studies on ship 
emission contribution to sulphur burdens. The listed studies focused on CONCAWE studies 
and OCIMF submissions, with a Norwegian study as the exception. Its policy was no global 
cap and a preference for special areas, but it saw a 4% cap as a compromise solution (BCH 
24/7/8). A 5% global cap was proposed by Singapore (BCH 24/7/14). It stressed the 
importance of controlling sources that made more serious contributions than shipping, and 
highlighted that a study on the port of Singapore had showed that land-based sources 
constituted 96.3% of the total SOx emissions. The study had also showed that a reduction of 
the sulphur content from 4.5% to 1.5% would only result in a 0.1% improvement in the air 
quality. Singapore also highlighted a 2% ship emission contribution to total European 
emissions with the formulation: “according to EMEP” (BCH 24/7/14, p. 2, abbreviated). The 
submission also stressed the importance of ensuring that reduction methods do not result in 
increased emissions of other pollutants, e.g. increased CO2 emissions from refineries. 
Singapore’s position of 5% sulphur content was further clarified by referring to Assembly 
Resolutions A.500(XII), A.777(18) and A.719(17 ) (on air pollution) on the necessity of 
                                                  
62 See details in Svensson (2011). 
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information, a compelling need, etc. It also explained that there were only marginal 
environmental benefits of a 3.5% or 4% global cap. It felt no need at present to control the 
sulphur content, though a 5% cap was accepted if the BCH felt it was necessary to prevent a 
future increase of the sulphur content. 
 
A special heading in the session report was devoted to a presentation by OCIMF of 
CONCAWE (1994), which had been completed (and summarized in BCH 24/7/13, OCIMF). 
After this presentations, the delegation of Japan presented the results of a study carried out on 
Tokyo Bay in response to the findings presented by CONCAWE. According to the session 
report, it was concluded that it was not sufficient with emission control only in port areas. No 
submission or reference was found on this study (BCH 24/15). 
 
5.5.9 MEPC 36, October-November 1994 
Not much was reported on the discussions at MEPC 36. The focus was on the outcome of 
BCH 24 and the draft text, which the committee could not endorse at the time. Several 
delegations had expressed their views on global capping, which was briefly highlighted. Two 
scientific arguments were given. The first was that the global average sulphur content at the 
time was about 3% and a capping of 5% would have “very little effect, if any” (MEPC 36/22, 
para. 9.5.3). The second was that the 50% reduction target could not be reached with the 
proposed requirements (MEPC 36/22). The reported scientific arguments supported stricter 
reduction limits and not the opposite as seen at BCH 24. 
  
The UK and the Netherlands presented the results of the third phase of the Marine Exhaust 
Emissions Research Programme by Lloyd’s Register. The UK had submitted main findings 
(MEPC 36/9/6) along with methodological details (MEPC 36/INF.16) together with the 
Netherlands. The UK submission began with a background that argued that the results of 
dispersion models could be one of the factors on which agreement on special areas was 
dependent. Since not a single model could apply to all situations, and numerous assumptions 
and variables influence the results, discussions on dispersion models were considered 
difficult. According to the UK, the determination of critical loads is based on, for example 
buffering capacity, and that successful steps had been taken for objective identifications. 
Nevertheless, the UK meant that the attempts of the BCH to develop special area criteria and 
procedures have shown a very subjective agreement on how to protect special areas.  
 
The study had quantified emissions from ships for 1990 in the North-eastern Atlantic and 
developed SOx emission reduction scenarios. The study area included the North Sea, the 
Norwegian Sea, the Irish Sea and the English Channel, which represented a significant 
proportion of the world trade with both heavily trafficked shipping lanes and open sea. Data 
on ship movements were obtained from Lloyd’s Register, and included domestic merchant 
ships. Annual emission estimates for 50 km
2
 grid squares were based on extrapolated figures 
from two study periods of ship movements, along with ship-specific data and emission factors 
(MEPC 36/INF.16). Total SO2 emissions from ships in the area were found to be between 
1.16 and 1.33 mt. Two reduction scenarios were then examined: reductions within 350 km of 
land – representing a 200-mile coastal zone – and reductions in the whole area. Both scenarios 
examined reduction benefits of 2% and 1.5% sulphur contents compared with 2.7% for 1990. 
The results showed that reducing the sulphur content to 1.5% within a 200 nm coastal zone 
would merely result in a 29% reduction from 1990, while the same sulphur content used in the 
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whole study area would result in a 44% reduction. The corresponding figures for a 2% 
sulphur content were 17% and 26% respectively (MEPC 36/INF.16; 36/9/6).
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The UK concluded that only a marginal reduction would be gained by using LSF in territorial 
waters (12 nm) and that reductions gained using a 200 nm zone “would still be substantially 
below the 50% reduction target” (MEPC 36/9/6, p. 3). The findings further indicated that the 
target could not be achieved with a sulphur content of 1.5%, “even if it were to be applied on 
a global basis” (ibid.). It was noted, however, that the North Atlantic was one of the areas 
with the densest traffic. The results should thus be regarded as a worst-case scenario but could 
be extrapolated to a global context to facilitate decision-making. According to the UK, the 
best way forward was to examine these scenarios and to agree on an appropriate strategy. This 
was proposed due to doubts of progress: “Resolution of the debate on acceptable levels of 
deposition or special area designation appears unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable 
future” (ibid.). The UK requested that the MEPC would decide on whether: (1) the 50% 
reduction target should be re-evaluated, (2) the reduction scenarios were feasible/acceptable, 
(3) further scenarios should be investigated before taking decisions, or (4) to stick to the 
previous proposals and draft texts.
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5.6 1995-1996 
 
5.6.1 MEPC 37, September 1995 
At MEPC 37, the draft text of the new annex (now Annex VI) was reviewed with the goal to 
be finalized, though this session had a work overload. A discussion on special areas could 
thus not take place. On global capping, the 5% figure was in majority and thus remained in 
square brackets. A large number of delegations had expressed their views on global capping, 
though no discussion was reported. Nevertheless, there were plenty of submissions with 
scientific arguments and information, and some statements given.   
 
OCIMF 
OCIMF’s first submission (MEPC 37/13/4) presented its previous positions and arguments 
for a special area approach with a 1.5% limit
65
 and then focused on the size of such areas. In 
this context, it highlighted its many submissions of CONCAWE papers, and that they were 
submitted to provide the policy-makers with scientific studies. It stressed that the “weight of 
evidence” (MEPC 37/13/4, p.1) had shown that significant impacts of sulphur deposition from 
ship emissions on land only occurred from ships operating close to shore or in large ports. 
Large special areas were thus not needed. OCIMF’s framing was now expressed as a proven 
local problem, and it could only support special areas if they were limited to ports or port 
approaches where significant local impacts could be proven. It further did not support any 
global cap since no limit below the existing 5% ISO standard could be justified based on the 
available and submitted data (not only scientific data).  
 
                                                  
63 Emissions from auxiliary engines were excluded from these scenarios.  
64
 Of further relevance to this session, the draft text of the second sulphur protocol to LRTAP was contained in a 
Secretariat note (MEPC 36/INF.5). Also, OCIMF once again submitted a summary of CONCAWE (1994) as 
well as the full report. No discussion was reported (MEPC 36/22). 
65 It is worth mentioning that it emphasized that the initial proposals of a 1.5% global sulphur content did not 
take into account “the fact that the sea and many land areas are able to absorb and neutralise quantities of sulphur 
dioxide without upsetting the ecological balance” (MEPC 37/13/4, p.1). 
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In its second submission (MEPC 37/13/5), OCIMF summarized work conducted by ICCET 
on behalf of CONCAWE. Due to the lack of references, I found it impossible to distinguish 
what information and which views originated from which of ICCET, CONCAWE and 
OCIMF.
66
 A difference between focusing on retained sulphur in the atmosphere and 
deposition was stressed. A recent DNV report
67
 had argued for significant impact on land 
from a great distance of the source as it was found that about 50% of the emitted sulphur was 
retained in the atmosphere at 500 km from the source. DNV thus argued that this was a reason 
for establishing large special areas. This approach was criticized in OCIMF’s submission 
since it did not take into account that the plume becomes more diluted with increased distance 
from the source, which meant a decrease in deposition per unit area. ICCET used its model to 
demonstrate this. Two wind directions were analysed for a hypothetical ship emitting about 
100 kt sulphur annually (corresponding emissions for around 100 ships for reasons of 
simplicity). It was found that around 75% of the emitted sulphur was retained in the 
atmosphere at 50 km downwind, which was consistent with DNV’s results. Nevertheless, 
deposition rates for both wind directions fell by a factor of 600 from 1 to 20 km (~12 nm) 
from the source, and by 2000 from 1 km to 50 km (~30 nm). Hence, the highest deposition 
rate was close to the source. It was concluded that this shows a very small contribution to the 
deposition from ships sailing outside territorial waters (12 nm), which was consistent with the 
results in CONCAWE (1994). 
 
The Bahamas, Liberia and Panama 
The delegation of the Bahamas presented a joint submission with Liberia and Panama (MEPC 
37/13/3). It contained many references to both CONCAWE and OCIMF, and it argued that 
most member States had now understood that the problem is not SOx emissions but sulphur 
deposition. Given the figures of CONCAWE (1993) – labelled as EMEP data – most also 
recognized that it was not possible to address “local acid rain problems” (MEPC 37/13/3, p. 1) 
by a global sulphur content limit. A modest solution of 4% would not reduce emissions, and a 
future increase in sulphur content in marine fuels was considered too small for “any 
measurable global environmental harm” in the coming 10-20 years (ibid., p. 2). This argument 
was based on figures from DNV (no reference was reported) showing that the average sulphur 
content had only increased 10% in ten years. With regard to the precautionary approach, there 
were not considered to be any threats of serious or irreversible damage. According to the three 
countries, the available information did not support large special areas such as the whole of 
the Baltic or North Seas. A simple analysis of EMEP data showed that shipping in the North 
and Baltic Seas contributed to the total deposition in the surrounding countries by only 1% 
and 0.3% respectively (no data for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia).  
 
It was stated that two studies confirmed the findings in CONCAWE (1994) that the 
contribution from ships was limited to ports or very close to shore: phase 2 of the Lloyd’s 
programme and the study on Tokyo Bay presented by Japan at BCH 24. According to the 
three countries, the Japanese study had showed that 11-31% of the measured SOx pollution in 
six ports was derived from ships. Over 90% of this was derived from in-port emissions in four 
of the ports, and 53% and 23% for the other two ports, mainly due to ship traffic moving 
between the ports in the 10 km wide entrance to Tokyo Bay. In addition, rapid decreases of 
SOx concentrations with increased distance from the centres of the ports were observed by the 
three countries. It was stated that any decisions on the delineation of special areas should take 
these findings into account. The three countries also underlined that there was similar 
                                                  
66 Notably, the submission first recognized the long-range transport of SO2 emissions, which is the first time in 
the investigated OCIMF submissions. 
67 No. 94-3179, cited in MEPC 37/13/5 
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confusion on the difference between retained sulphur and deposited sulphur as between 
emissions and depositions. The findings of ICCET were highlighted, and they basically 
repeated the reasoning of OCIMF. It was concluded that these new findings, as well as the 
earlier ones, confirmed that special areas should only be restricted to selected ports or certain 
areas close to shore where impacts could be proven. 
 
Norway 
Norway (MEPC 37/13/6) used the UK study in MEPC 36/9/6 as an argument that a 5% cap 
would send the wrong signal to a concerned public. Given the highlighted results and that the 
ministers at the fourth North Sea Conference had declared a need for a global cap resulting in 
a true reduction of the sulphur content, its proposed figure on the global cap of a maximum of 
3.8% could be argued to be symbolic and a compromise (MEPC 37/13/6/Add.1). The 
ministers had also declared that the North Sea should be designated a special area. The 
Norwegian submissions thus further concerned such a proposal (MEPC 37/13/6/Add.1) along 
with a background document (MEPC 37/INF.19) presenting arguments for designation. The 
background document (prepared for the 4
th
 North Sea Conference) was based on the draft 
procedures criteria for designation, and Norway considered that these criteria had been 
fulfilled. The document did not include any evaluation against the criteria however. 
According to the document, the most sensitive areas as well as exceedance of critical loads 
were found in the countries surrounding the North Sea, in particular Scandinavia. The above 
DNV report
68
 had showed that the annual SO2 emissions from ships totalled 270,000 tonnes, 
which was more than the national emissions in Denmark and the Netherlands, and more than 
twice the Swedish emissions. This figure was compared with the CONCAWE (1994) figure 
of 206,600 tonnes for only the English Channel and parts of the Southern North Sea, which 
implied an underestimation for the whole North Sea by DNV.  
 
The conclusions by CONCAWE (1993) on dispersion and dilution were criticized, and 
counterarguments to the above OCIMF submission were given. It was recognized that the 
concentration of SO2 quickly decreases with distance, as shown in CONCAWE (1993). 
Nevertheless, it was stressed that the total amount of sulphur in the atmosphere and the total 
deposited were the significant factors to consider when studying acidification, and not only 
the concentration of SO2 closely surrounding the source.
69
 It was explained that the significant 
decrease in SO2 concentration is not the result of immediate deposition but primarily diffusion 
of the plume over larger volumes taken together with oxidations forming other sulphur 
compounds by chemical reactions in the atmosphere. It was mentioned that these oxidized 
compounds were the main contributors to acidification at the deposition stage. An EMEP 
report
70
 strengthened these arguments, showing that 82% of the total sulphur emitted in the 
North Sea was transported out of the area and mainly towards land areas in an eastward 
direction. This meant that only 18% was deposited in the North Sea. CONCAWE (1994) was 
further criticized. It had only mapped some of the deposited SO2 from the ship emissions. 
Most of these emissions were considered to be transported out of the studied area and to 
contribute to deposition in sensitive areas. For these areas it was not sufficient only to reduce 
local emission sources, and it was stressed that “this understanding is the main fundament for 
the sulphur protocol” (MEPC 37/INF.19, Annex, p. 3). 
 
The contribution of ship emissions in the North Sea to the total depositions on land was only 
1-4%, but there were big variations (e.g. 10% or more along the coast of the Netherlands) and 
                                                  
68 No. 94-3179, cited in MEPC 37/INF.19 
69 The results on retained sulphur of the DNV report were also highlighted. 
70 EMEP/MSC-W Report 1/94, cited in MEPC 37/INF.19 
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the contribution was highest in very sensitive areas. Due to high reductions of land-based 
sources, the relative contribution from ship emissions would at least be doubled by 2010 
compared with 1990. The contribution in Norway would be doubled to 10% and in the 
Netherlands almost tripled to 27%, and shipping would even become the main contributor in 
some areas.
71
 If a 50% emission reduction was achieved with the North Sea as a special area, 
the relative contribution would almost go back to the levels of 1990. A graph showed that the 
relative contribution for a selection of sensitive areas would still be higher than for 1990, 
though this was not specifically mentioned in the report. 
 
The Baltic Sea States 
The BSS also submitted their background document for special area designation of the Baltic 
Sea (MEPC 37/13/7). Before presenting the document, the submission stated that the BSS had 
been advocating a global solution due to the global nature of air pollution. In the context of 
the lack of support for a global approach and the emergence of the special area approach, they 
had decided to designate the Baltic Sea Area as such a special area. The document was long 
and described the Baltic Sea and its environmental sensitivity, the surrounding countries, the 
acidification in the area, the emission sources and depositions, and the efforts by HELCOM. It 
also included a thorough assessment against the draft criteria for designation and annexed 
detailed information. Sweden was used as an example to demonstrate the environmental 
situation, mostly due to the availability of data and its long experience of acidification and 
because it had the most severe environmental conditions in the area. The Baltic Sea Area was 
described as one of the most heavily trafficked waters in the world. Notably, acidification was 
neither included in a list of the most serious threats to the marine environment nor in the 
description of sources of pollution loads, which focused on nitrogen loads.
72
 It was 
highlighted that Sweden, Finland and parts of northern Russia had the most sensitive 
ecosystems in Europe and that critical loads were exceeded in large areas of Central Europe 
and in most parts of Sweden and Finland. In Sweden, about 20% of lakes had been seriously 
damaged with about 10-20% of species lost, and 20% of its forests had shown significant 
changes in vegetation.  
 
It was stressed that the reductions in emissions by the LRTAP sulphur protocols were far from 
sufficient: emissions would have to be reduced by 75-80% during 1990-2005 to avoid 
deterioration in several areas around Europe. Emissions from ships in the Baltic Sea Area 
affected all surrounding countries. Another study by Mariterm AB
73
 had estimated that 
approximately 56,800 tonnes of SO2 were emitted in the Baltic Sea Area in 1992. The 
proportion of ship emissions had increased and accounted for about 20% of the total 
emissions in Sweden, with an expected increase to 25% in the year 2000. With regard to 
deposition in Sweden, the contribution was estimated at 5-10%, and 15-20% in the areas 
worst affected by acidification. In the next ten years, the contribution by ships to the total 
deposition in coastal areas could exceed 25%. The assessment against the draft criteria was 
generally a repetition of facts divided into the categories of the criteria, together with 
arguments that action was needed. As an example, the category of ecological conditions only 
included the Swedish situation to show the need to protect the terrestrial ecosystems and 
freshwater quality. According to the BSS, the criteria for designation had been fulfilled. 
 
 
 
                                                  
71 The reference for these figures was DNV Report No. 94-3437 (cited in MEPC 37/INF.19) 
72 It was noted, however, that the leakage of nitrogen compounds from land increases with acidification. 
73 Mariterm AB (1994). Effects of bilateral agreements and other measures on exhaust emissions from ships. 
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The UK (and the Netherlands) 
The UK (MEPC 37/13/9) proposed a 4.5% global cap together with a future 4.0% cap based 
on ‘evidence’ that the average sulphur content measured over two years had exceeded 3.7%. 
The monitoring of the sulphur content was to be based on guidelines developed by the IMO. 
On special areas, the UK (MEPC 37/13/10) highlighted the results of the research programme, 
in particular that the 50% reduction target could not be reached and that a limit within 
territorial waters would only provide marginal reductions. It also highlighted the conclusion 
of CONCAWE (1994) that significant impacts only occurred from ships close to land or in 
heavily congested port areas however. According to the UK, both studies had contributed 
significantly to a better understanding of impacts from ship emissions. The following proposal 
was then presented (MEPC 37/13/10, pp. 1-2):  
 
Where a land or port area is to be designated a special area, that special area 
shall not normally extend beyond 12 miles [or the territorial limit] from any 
coastal States coastline. 
 
Where precise data, such as prevailing wind direction, vessel trading patterns or 
other scientific evidence can be produced to show that the relevant country’s 
SOx situations can be substantially improved by the imposition of a larger 
special area then that special area may be extended to a maximum of 200 miles 
from a coastal States coastline. 
  
The only argument for this proposal was that awaiting further research would delay the 
finalization of Annex VI. The Netherlands (MEPC 37/13/11) had a similar proposal: it should 
be possible to designate a special area of 12 nm without a scientific proven necessity, while 
decisions on larger areas should have to be evaluated against stricter scientific criteria. This 
proposal also included a review of the requirements and criteria five years after its entry into 
force. No scientific arguments were given for this proposal however.
74
  
 
A Group of States 
A group of States consisting of Austria, Bahrain, India, Mexico, Singapore, Salomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and Venezuela submitted their joint views (MEPC 37/13/21). Their positions and the 
content were very similar to Singapore’s submission at BCH 24 (BCH 24/7/14) with 
highlighted results of studies showing minimal contributions, only local impacts, etc. There 
were references to Assembly Resolutions A.777(18), A.500(XII) and A.719(17) , and it was 
felt that global capping was not warranted until there was sufficient evidence that ship 
emissions were responsible for major atmospheric pollution. The majority support for a 5% 
global cap indicated no scientific justification for a stringent limit according to the group. A 
5% cap was also considered to set a ceiling for a future increase of the sulphur content.  
 
Germany 
Germany (MEPC 37/13/26) highlighted the significance of taking trade patterns into account 
in the delineation of special areas to avoid negative environmental impacts from changed 
patterns. Only setting distance criteria would not solve this problem, and regional solutions 
such as the Baltic and North Sea Areas were considered more effective. Germany also 
expressed that the average sulphur content at the time did not justify a 5% cap.  
 
                                                  
74 The Netherlands and the UK further submitted (MEPC 37/INF.23) a large overview report of all three phases 
of the research programme in limited distributed prints. 
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5.6.2 MEPC 38, July 1996 
MEPC 38 was supposed to be the final MEPC session of the process, though one more 
session was needed, and the adoption at a diplomatic conference was postponed to September 
1997 instead of March 1997 (MEPC 38/20). The draft criteria and procedures for special areas 
(now named SECAs) were revised (by a group of unreported experts) into a draft with no 
further relevant discussion for this chapter. No scientific arguments were reported. In the 
discussions on delineation, however, it was reported that the scientific evidence on the 
transportation of SOx emissions from ships had led to different interpretations among the 
policy-makers. The view that the width of a special area should not extend beyond twelve nm 
from shore was repeated by some members, while others promoted large and clearly defined 
areas. No further information on these interpretations was given. The need for SOx-specific 
criteria and procedures was further questioned by some delegations due to the existing 
guidelines for designating special areas, though other delegations responded that the existing 
guidelines were limited to protecting unique marine environments and not harming terrestrial 
and marine ecosystems from air pollution.
75
 Regarding designating the Baltic Sea Area, a 
number of delegations had the view that such a decision should be taken after agreement on 
the criteria and procedures and after time to evaluate the information provided by the BSS. It 
was noted that most of the criteria had been addressed by the provided information, but that it 
needed to be supplemented with information on the magnitude of the ship contribution to 
acidification in the area (MEPC 38/20; MEPC 38/WP.12). 
 
The discussions on global capping were first locked in the members’ previous positions, but 
new proposals emerged that broke the deadlock. These were to have a high global cap of 4.5-
5% at first, and then at least some lower values in the long term. The first proposals were 
from an informal drafting group of unreported members (MEPC 38/WP.4) and by the 
delegation of the Netherlands (MEPC 38/WP.5).
76
 Neither of these proposals had any 
reported scientific arguments and no agreement was in sight. Nevertheless, they led to a new 
compromise proposal by a group of experts (unreported expertise) (MEPC 38/WP.11; 39/6): 
 
 An initial [4.5%] global cap 
 Regular monitoring of the global average sulphur content with a reference value 
determined by the IMO 
 A [4.0%] global cap [twelve] months after evidence had showed exceedance of the 
reference value by [0.2%]
77
 
 
This proposal was not discussed and a 5% global cap was once again left in square brackets. 
Nevertheless, the views were evenly divided between a 5% cap and a lower figure 
(unspecified). Hence, the 5% majority had been broken.
78
 Let us look at the submissions in 
search of an insight into this change of positions. Several actors repeated their positions and 
arguments. The following represents additional arguments and actors. 
  
In the early discussion on the global cap, the chairman of the executive body to LRTAP 
stressed the importance of the Annex resulting in a true reduction of air pollution problems 
caused by ships. The chairman participated in the session due to concerns of the Executive 
Body over air pollution from growing shipping traffic. It searched for harmonized approached 
                                                  
75 Note that the SECA concept was introduced at this session. 
76 See Svensson (2011) 
77 The informal drafting group had an additional reduction step to 3%. See Svensson, 2011. 
78 It should be noted that the Chairman of BCH 24 recalled (at MEPC 38) that agreement was almost reached on 
4.5%. It was stated that agreement on a common value at the conference was a realistic expectation. 
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with the IMO that would achieve the emission reduction targets of the ECE. A submission by 
Norway (MEPC 38/9/2) presented a written communication from the chairman addressed to 
the secretary-general of the IMO. A significant reduction of land-based emissions was 
highlighted, and it was stressed that without measures on shipping, its relative contribution 
would be at least doubled by 2010. In this context, it referred to MEPC 37/INF.19 on a 
possible main contribution to critical loads in some areas. It was also underlined that the 
patterns of transportation and deposition were the same for ships as for land-based sources 
and that much sulphur still remained in the air after long distances. Given that the second 
sulphur protocol provided typical values of the sulphur content in refinery products and that it 
anticipated future bunker fuels with sulphur contents of 1% in coastal/sensitive areas and 2% 
globally, the sulphur limits in the draft Annex VI were considered too high (MEPC 38/9/2).  
 
FOEI (MEPC 38/9/6) had the view that a global cap of 0.5-1% was the only solution that 
would result in a true reduction due to the average sulphur content of 2.8% at the time. It was 
recognized, however, that agreeing on such a cap would take some time, and a cap was 
proposed just below the average but with a timetable for further steps of reduction. 
Preliminary special areas could be established but then be replaced with a strict global limit. 
This would fulfil a true reduction target and protect vulnerable areas. It further viewed it 
necessary to consider the possibility that the bunker fuel industry would blend low-sulphur 
fuel oil (LSFO) with the then illegal high-sulphur fuel oil (HSFO), which would probably 
have the net effect of the average sulphur content remaining the same (at best).  
 
WWF’s submission (MEPC 38/9/13) intended to apply the precautionary approach to the 
sulphur content issue in accordance with the newly adopted MEPC guidelines
79
 on 
incorporating the precautionary approach in its work. The submission also included WWF’s 
view of the sulphur debates. It was highlighted that Resolution A.719(17) on air pollution 
from ships stated a clear desire by the member States to reduce the sulphur content, with a 
recognition that SO2 caused acid rain and harm to the environment. A 5% global cap would 
do little to actually reduce the sulphur content and provide no emission reduction. The 
argument of minimal contribution from ships was countered with an argument that the relative 
contribution of shipping to problems was not the significant issue. If one only looked at the 
contribution from shipping as a reason for action, then all of MARPOL would be 
inappropriate since land-based sources represented about 70% of marine pollution. Instead, 
every industry that contributes to the pollution problems must reduce its emissions if the 
problems are to be solved. This was considered the underlying grounds for the Assembly 
resolution. It then highlighted the results of the marine exhaust research programme and that 
studies on deposition rates were complex and warranted further research. WWF argued that 
the sulphur content issue at the IMO was just the kind of situation that the precautionary 
approach was designed to address: a recognized environmental problem (or potential 
problem) with scientific uncertainties of the potential harm. The problem of SOx emissions 
was well recognized with far-reaching effects (e.g. by LRTAP), and the uncertainties were 
scientific, such as the fate and effect of emissions, and over achievable or acceptable emission 
reductions. With the precautionary approach, such uncertainties should not prevent action to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of environmental harm. A 1.5% global cap was considered an 
achievable goal that would result in a desired emission reduction. Further research was also 
proposed, especially on the fate and effects. 
 
                                                  
79 Resolution MEPC.67(37). 
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In addition to the above, the positions and scientific arguments of Singapore and its allies at 
MEPC 37 (MEPC 37/13/21) now had the support of nineteen countries
80
 in a joint submission 
(MEPC 38/9/11). Nineteen States thus supported a 5% global cap on the basis of the same 
scientific arguments. 
 
5.7 1997: Final Drafting and Adoption of the Combined Approach 
 
5.7.1 MEPC 39, March 1997 
At the session for the final drafting, the situation was similar to that at the end of MEPC 38. 
There was significant support for a 5% global cap, and other delegations supported a lower 
figure (MEPC 39/13). The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) had 
submitted a proposal (MEPC 39/6/21) of a single global regulation without any SECAs. A 3% 
sulphur content limit was proposed for application not only to the fuels used by ships but also 
to the fuels supplied. The only scientific argument for this, however, was the average sulphur 
content at the time. The Committee did not agree with the proposal. Instead, two other 
submissions gained significant support (MEPC 39/13). The combination of a global cap of 
5% and 1.5% SECA regulation was again proposed by Singapore allies: this time by a joint 
submission from Australia, Singapore and Vanuatu (MEPC 39/6/9), and another by the State 
of Bahrain (MEPC 39/6/17) stating the same views and arguments. Their view was that with a 
1.5% sulphur content in SECAs, there was no need for a global cap. ‘Global’ protection from 
sulphur depositions derived from ship emissions could be achieved through SECAs under the 
premise that the criteria for designation were fulfilled. Where adverse impacts had been 
proven, the 1.5% limit would effectively protect the coastal States against sulphur depositions 
from ships in both land and sea areas. There was no need to regulate all other areas where 
there were no observable effects from ship emissions. Continued monitoring of member 
States would provide for a possibility to designate further areas or extend existing ones where 
adverse impacts could be proven in accordance with the criteria.  
 
After a lengthy discussion, it was agreed to maintain the 5% figure in square brackets in the 
final draft sent to the conference. It was agreed to monitor the global average sulphur content 
with a new paragraph in square brackets and a draft conference resolution (MEPC 39/13). In 
this context, a submission by the UK and the Netherlands (MEPC 39/6/7) contained draft 
guidelines for monitoring procedures and setting the reference value
81
. The earlier proposal by 
the group of experts – and its preceding proposals on monitoring with a further reduction if 
the global average increased above a certain level – did not change the sulphur limits of the 
draft. This was something that was explicitly agreed on: “there should be no linkage between 
the results of monitoring and reduction of the global cap” (MEPC 39/13, para. 6.52). No 
scientific arguments were reported on this decision (ibid.; MEPC 39/WP.11). 
 
Nothing was reported on the criteria and procedures for special area designation other than 
concern from several delegations on the spread of special areas in the world in which the 
committee agreed that unwarranted special areas would be prevented with strict application of 
the criteria and procedures (ibid.). Designation of the North Sea could not be agreed on at this 
last session since additional information was needed due to changes in the revised criteria and 
                                                  
80 Antigua, Barbados, Bahrain, the Bahamas, Barbuda, Brazil, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Hungary, Liberia, Maldives, 
Mexico, Peru, Romania, Singapore, Tunisia, Turkey, Vanuatu and Venezuela. Four of the eight initial countries 
were absent in the new joint submission. 
81 As well as application of the now abandoned trigger mechanism. 
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procedures at MEPC 38. This additional information could not be finalized before MEPC 39 
and would thus be sent to the conference (MEPC 39/13; MEPC 39/6/20). The Baltic Sea Area 
was considered sufficiently justified for designation with additional information submitted by 
the BSS. Almost all the scientific arguments and information in the submission by the BSS 
(MEPC 39/6/24) were repetitions of their previous background document. Of the new 
information, analysis within the EU’s Acidification Strategy had found that its target for the 
whole of Europe would not be reached with the highest technically feasible reductions of 
land-based sources. SOx emissions from ships had been significantly underestimated 
according to a PhD project from the Carnegie Mellon University in the US. It was found that 
SOx emissions from ships represented about 7% of the global fuel consumption sources and 
about 25% of SOx emissions from petroleum sources. It was further emphasized that a 
designation of the Baltic Sea and North Sea Areas would result in a 50% reduction of the 
annual SOx emissions from ships within a deposition contribution distance of land (ibid.).  
 
5.7.2 Adoption at the 1997 Conference of Parties to MARPOL, 15-26 September 
With a final draft Protocol to MARPOL in place, it was time for adoption at the 1997 
Conference of Parties to MARPOL 73/78. Scientific discussions were unreported 
(MP/CONF.3/RD/1-8; MP/CONF.3/WP.4) and only a few submissions contained scientific 
arguments and information. On the global cap, the scientific arguments in submissions were 
for attempts to find a global solution at least in the long term. Like the submission at MEPC 
39, BIMCO (MP/CONF.3/10) proposed a 3% global cap without SECAs and with the same 
argument (though it was noted that the MEPC target would only be reached with 1.5%). A 
submission by ICS (MP/CONF.3/17) provided some scientific arguments. One was that SOx 
emissions would continue to be detrimental to the world’s atmosphere in areas outside 
SECAs, which was an inconsistency with the Assembly resolution. It also introduced two 
environmental aspects: (1) SOx emissions generated outside the SECAs would inevitably drift 
in, and (2) there was a possibility that ships would go around the edges of SECAs with 
conventional fuel and then take the shortest route across the SECA to its destination. . By 
establishing a global standard, the objectives of the Assembly resolution would be achieved. It 
was proposed that the global cap be set at 3.5% with a subsequent stepwise reduction starting 
with 3%. With this approach, SECAs were considered unnecessary.  
 
Greece made a proposal during the conference (MP/CONF.3/32) of a stepwise reduction of 
the global cap by 1% every five years after entry into force: from 4.5% down to 1.5%. SECAs 
with 1.5% limits were to be used during the period until the 1.5% global limit had been 
reached. The use of SECAs would thus be a short-term solution and unnecessary in the long 
term. The argument was that the previous positions on the issue had been focusing on the 
short term, i.e. using special areas as a measure to protect the environments of many 
concerned countries, but that there was only one atmosphere. The proposal would be an 
effective solution to problems of air pollution in both the short and the long term.  
 
A 5% global cap still remained in square brackets for the major part of the conference, 
however, and no stepwise reduction was agreed on. It was not until the second to last day of 
the Conference that unanimous agreement was reached on a 4.5% global cap. No scientific 
reasons were given. It was also agreed to monitor the average sulphur content by adopting 
Regulation 14(2) and a Conference Resolution 4 (MP/CONF.3/RD/1-8; MP/CONF.3/WP.4; 
MP/CONF. 3/34; IMO, 1998b). 
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The NSS submitted a more detailed proposal and background document (MP/CONF.3/16) to 
designate the North Sea Area as a SECA. It recognized that the draft criteria implied a 
restriction to only declare coastal areas of the North Sea (e.g. 100 nm from land), though the 
whole North Sea Area (as in MARPOL Annex V) was proposed to avoid changes in traffic 
patterns. A large part of the document concerned acidification effects in general, sulphur 
depositions and critical loads in Europe, as well as repetition from MEPC 37/INF.19. Of the 
new information, it was stated that about 80% of emissions in the North Sea were deposited 
on land due to long-range transport and a northeast wind. It then presented analysis of new 
data by Lloyd’s Register, which was considered to be the most reliable estimate of ship 
emissions at the time. The previously estimated 174 kt of SOx emissions from ships in the 
North Sea for 1990 was now 385 kt, which corresponded to 2-7 times the national emissions 
in the area the same year. On the EMEP maps, the biggest relative contribution to deposition 
compared with land-based emissions was found near the English Channel (25%), followed by 
areas along the eastern coastline (10-25%). A contribution of about 5-10% was found in 
extensive areas such as large parts of Sweden and Norway. Due to a reduction of 27% from 
land-based sources during 1990-1994, these contributions could have been underestimated. 
Without action, the land areas where ship emissions contributed 10-25% would be doubled in 
2010. It was concluded that this analysis showed a significant contribution to critical loads. In 
addition, the NSS highlighted that there was evidence of a contribution from ships in the area 
west of the UK (including the Irish Sea) to environmental damage in the UK. For these 
reasons, a proposal for SECA designation was made by the UK (MP/CONF.3/24). The 
proposal contained preliminary information. A detailed proposal would be submitted to 
MEPC 41. A North Sea SECA was not considered enough to protect the UK environment. 
The arguments included a 3.3% contribution of deposition in the UK, a possible increase to 
5.8% in 2010, and a concern that a North Sea SECA would result in changed traffic patterns 
with increased emissions in the UK. 
 
The 1.5% limit in SECAs was eventually adopted without reported discussions, and the Baltic 
Sea Area was designed a SECA. The North Sea Area was not designated, though a need to 
take actions against acidification in Europe was recognized. Conference Resolution 5 was 
drafted in a proposal by the NSS after a designation had been rejected by the conference. The 
resolution recognized the concerns of several States on the contribution of ships in the North 
Sea to sulphur deposition and its damaging effects. It thus invited the MEPC to consider the 
conference proposal for designating the North Sea as a SECA in accordance with the criteria 
and to take the necessary steps for implementing measures as soon as possible. The adopted 
protocol of 1997 also included a reference to the precautionary principle in its preamble 
without reported justifications for the measures against the principle (MP/CONF.3/RD/1-8; 
MP/CONF.3/WP.4; MP/CONF.3/29; Corr.1; MP/CONF.3/34; IMO, 1998b).  
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6 Investigating the Role of Economic Interests 
 
This chapter investigates the reported economic arguments, supportive information and 
economic discussions. The supportive information is primarily focused on figures of costs and 
benefits and on supply and demand of fuel oil markets. The chapter does not go as far back in 
time as in the previous chapter. When the issue reached the IMO in 1988, the proposals by the 
NSS and the BSS to include air pollution from ships in the future work programme and to 
deal with the issue of fuel oil quality were accepted without reported economic discussions 
(MEPC 26/25). At MEPC 27, when a proposed action plan for fuel oil standards and the 
inclusion of air pollution and fuel oil quality in the long-term work plan were agreed on, costs 
and benefits were only mentioned as something that were needed to be taken into account 
(MEPC 27/16; MEPC 27/6/2; 27/6/7; 27/WP.3). The economic contents of the process did not 
appear until MEPC 29 in 1990. I thus start by investigating MEPC 29. 
 
6.1 1990-1991 
 
6.1.1 MEPC 29, March 1990 
As shown in the previous chapter, MEPC 29 was the session in which the issue of air 
pollution was viewed as a significant issue for the IMO to deal with as a high priority. The 
committee merely noted that reducing the sulphur content in fuel oils would result in cost 
impacts on the shipping industry (MEPC 29/22). Nevertheless, a cost impact study had been 
submitted by the State of Kuwait (MEPC 29/18/5). The submission first highlighted that the 
sulphur content in marine fuels significantly depended on the source of the crude oil and thus 
varied in different parts of the world. In the Arabian Gulf area, sulphur contents of crude oil 
were higher than in, for example, the North Sea Area. A reduction of the sulphur content to 
1% would result in a financial impact on States producing crude oil with high sulphur 
contents. This would have negative impacts on the shipping industry and the oil-producing 
developing countries. The study had been conducted in Kuwait and addressed the cost impact 
of reducing the sulphur content in marine fuel oils. It highlighted that most refiners producing 
marine fuel oils had limited desulphurization capacities, which meant that any reduction of 
the sulphur content would require investment in desulphurization plants. A table was 
presented that showed the desulphurization costs for marine fuel oils produced from crudes 
exported from Kuwait. Based on a sulphur content of 4%, reductions to 3%, 2% and 1% 
would result in total costs of 10.6, 15.6 and 19.5 USD per tonne of fuel oil respectively. It was 
concluded that these costs would probably cause a price increase in bunker fuel oils in the 
Arabian Gulf area of the same magnitude (11, 16 and 20 USD/tonne). The study 
recommended keeping the current sulphur content limits of 4-5% to avoid a substantial 
bunker price increase, and in turn “a very negative impact” (MEPC 29/18/5, Annex, p. 1) on 
industries within marine transport in developing countries. Kuwait stressed that the MEPC 
needed to take these aspects into account (MEPC 29/18/5). Another similar argument against 
a strict global sulphur content was found in the report of the session. The delegation of 
Venezuela had stated that since the sulphur content in fuel oil is dependent on the sulphur 
content of the crude oil used, it would be impractical with a global limit of 1% (MEPC 29/22). 
 
The BSS (MEPC 29/18/1) had a more positive view. It was noted that desulphurization of 
HFO in refineries was difficult and considered a costly method to reduce SOx emissions from 
ships. Most HFO with low sulphur content would thus have to be based on the origin of the 
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crude oil with low sulphur content. Due to the limited availability of these fuels, blending was 
considered a possible option however. Notwithstanding an environmental reason, it was in 
this context that the submission suggested a sulphur content limit near 0.8% as it would be 
beneficial for ships designed to burn HFO. Despite being a costly option, the BSS also 
highlighted the possibility of using distillate fuels, which would come with the benefit of 
reduced maintenance costs. 
 
The availability of low-sulphur fuels (LSF) and the economic consequences of reducing the 
sulphur content were also highlighted in the two studies submitted by Norway. The DNV 
study (MEPC 29/18/6) briefly assessed the availability of fuels by their sulphur contents. It 
was emphasized that known resources of crude oils with low sulphur contents were limited in 
terms of their volumes and their geographical distribution. On the basis of samples during 
bunkering in various countries, the study only found three countries (Argentina, China and 
Nigeria) that delivered LSF with less than 1% sulphur content, and nine countries with 
sulphur contents of 1-2%. However, the total HFO consumption by the world fleet was 
considered small compared with the total world consumption of fuel oils (about 4%). It was 
thus concluded that worldwide production of LSF could theoretically supply the whole 
shipping industry. The distribution of this oil to all ports for bunkering was considered the 
main constraint however, and a comprehensive distribution scheme would be needed. 
Desulphurization costs were only briefly mentioned in a list of reduction measures. 
Considerable fuel cost increases would be likely as a consequence of refineries not having 
suitable desulphurization processes to meet new sulphur content limits, though the technology 
as such was already in use by the refineries. On the feasibility of establishing stringent 
sulphur limits, the study recommended further studies to address problems such as increased 
fuel costs and the availability of LSF (MEPC 29/18/6). The Marintek study (MEPC 29/18) 
showed a reduction potential of 20-90% SO2 from changing to LSF – here distillate fuels – at 
a total cost for a ship of 0.0017-0.0024 USD/kWh (based on the price difference between 
MDO and HFO in 1989 of 88 USD/tonne) (MEPC 29/18).  
 
6.1.2 MEPC 30, November 1990 
Few economic arguments were reported at MEPC 30, and only one submission included 
economic arguments. The UK (MEPC 30/14/7) presented information on various fuel oil 
quality aspects. It was highlighted that a reduction of the sulphur content in marine fuels 
would require desulphurization in refineries around the world due to the low availability of 
LSF. The UK explained that this low availability was the result of quality demands for land-
based fuels and insufficient crude oil sources with low sulphur contents. It was stressed that 
extensive use of the available sources by shipping would thus meet considerable resistance. It 
was concluded that radical changes in the manufacturing, purchasing and supply of marine 
fuels could be expected from any significant fuel oil quality restrictions. It thus questioned 
fuel oil quality regulation as the only policy option for reducing air pollution from ships. 
 
This was the session at which a target level of 50% of the present emission level of SO2 was 
agreed by the target date of 2000 after proposals from the NSS (and the Commission of the 
EEC) (MEPC 30/14/2) and the BSS (MEPC 30/14/6). As described in the previous chapter, 
these proposals also included regional measures for ships for specific areas, and an exhaust 
gas strategy was agreed by the committee that included these regional measures as an 
alternative to universal regulations. The NSS and BSS submissions did not include any 
economic arguments for regional measures. Nevertheless, some economic aspects were 
included in connection to the exhaust gas strategy. The delegation of Venezuela suggested 
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that the instruction of the working group at the session would include an analysis of the 
financial implications for oil-producing developing countries and an analysis of alternative 
measures. The group was thus instructed to take into account economic and technical 
implications of measures in the exhaust gas strategy, but the specific focus on developing 
countries was not included (MEPC 36/22; 36/WP.11). The group could not consider the 
economic and technical implications in detail, however, due to the lack of information. In this 
context, the delegation of France stated that it would be able to adopt a sulphur content limit 
of 2% after taking into account economic and technical aspects.  
 
As described in the previous chapter, the committee took full account of the views of a 
working paper (MEPC 30/WP.3) by the Netherlands (MEPC 36/22; 36/WP.11). It proposed, 
among other things, assessing the impacts of the proposed measures, which included 
consideration of costs and benefits. The Netherlands stated in its paper that it had undertaken 
a study of these aspects, which included the Rotterdam bunker fuel market. It further 
highlighted two areas in need of additional information. The first was costs and constraints on 
reducing the sulphur content in bunker fuels including in conjunction with land-based 
reductions and scenarios of supply and demand changes. A second area in need of additional 
information was the impacts on the refining industry of a stricter sulphur content limit, 
including aspects such as regional differences in availability of fuel oils, effects on the 
relationship between supply and demand, etc. (MEPC 30/WP.3). The BCH sub-committee 
was instructed to deal with these issues (MEPC 30/24). No economic discussion was reported 
on the work with a first draft text of the Assembly resolution on air pollution from ships 
(MEPC 36/22; 36/WP.11). Nevertheless, the draft text included a section in which the 
members expressed their mindfulness on the necessity to assess available information with 
regard to “technical and economic impact on the whole of the industry” (MEPC 30/24, Annex 
13; Resolution A.719(17), 326).  
 
6.1.3 MEPC 31, July 1991 
The removal of target levels and dates from the draft resolution at MEPC 31 was proposed by 
the delegation of the US, which emphasized that no decisions on targets should be taken 
before a technical study had been carried out by the BCH. No other argument was given on 
either the proposal or the agreement by the committee, though the preceding presentations of 
submissions included economic discussions. The delegation of France presented a 
submission
82
 that showed the results of a study of the economic implications of possible 
refining processes. The costs of sulphur content reductions had been estimated to be identical 
with the figures presented by Kuwait at MEPC 29 (MEPC 29/18/5). It was stressed that 
careful consideration of the costs of reducing the sulphur content in residual fuels was 
necessary. Kuwait’s views were supported by Japan and Venezuela. Japan shared the same 
concern over the feasibility of implementing fuel oil requirements, while Venezuela stressed 
the importance of carefully studying impacts on the whole shipping industry. In the same 
context, the delegation of the Netherlands announced that a major study was being conducted 
on various consequences of desulphurization (MEPC 31/21; BCH 24/7/7).  
 
Sweden (MEPC 31/13/4) proposed a global sulphur content limit of 1.5% as a first step, while 
the earlier proposed 0.8% sulphur content by the BSS (MEPC 29/18/1) was viewed as a long-
term target. This was due to economic reasons. In contradiction to an immediate 0.8% limit, a 
1.5% limit “could be achieved without too heavy burden on the refining industry” (MEPC 
                                                  
82 MEPC 31/INF.6 – written in French and excluded for investigation 
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31/13/4, p. 3). This would promote technological developments on desulphurization and make 
such techniques less costly when they become common practice. Germany (MEPC 31/13/3) 
proposed a new paragraph of economic character in the preamble to the draft assembly 
resolution in which the members expressed their agreements: “BEARING IN MIND the 
international character of shipping and the supply of marine fuels, which should exclude 
national, regional or local restrictive regulations” (MEPC 31/13/3, p. 4). No economic 
arguments were given on this paragraph, however, and the draft was not amended 
accordingly. Moreover, several notifications had also been made at this session, primarily by 
the Netherlands and OCIMF, that a number of studies on bunker markets and implications had 
been initiated or were ongoing with results being available in the near future. The committee 
further instructed the BCH to deal with “economical/technical implication of possible 
measures for sulphur oxides and nitrogen oxides reduction” (MEPC 31/21, para. 13.23). 
 
6.1.4 BCH 21, September 1991 
At BCH 21, the discussion on SOx emissions was based on delegations introducing their 
submissions in plenary (BCH 21/15). The delegation of Japan introduced its submission 
(BCH 21/11/6) showing the results of an ongoing study on the demand and supply and 
economic implications of LSF. It explained that desulphurization was a difficult process that 
required an exclusive refining system with “tremendous expenses” (BCH 21/11/6, Annex, p. 
3) for construction coupled with high operational costs. On the operational costs, it was 
stressed that Kuwait’s earlier figures (MEPC 29/18/5) were based on a 20-year depreciation 
period of a plant. Assuming eight years instead would result in a cost increase of 60 USD per 
tonne
83
 for a sulphur content reduction down to 1% (Kuwait estimated ~20 USD) and 30 USD 
per tonne
84
 for 2% (Kuwait estimated ~11 USD). If the whole cost was to be passed on to the 
bunker fuel price, it would increase by 50% from the price level at the time. The high costs of 
desulphurization meant restrictions in the required desulphurization capacity for a global 
sulphur content standard. A trial model calculation had found that about 70% of the quantity 
of fuel oil in the world could be desulphurized and that 56% was required to reduce the 
sulphur content from 3% to 1.5%. Such a limit was thus considered feasible in theory but 
would not work in practice. In particular, the quantities permitting desulphurization varied 
significantly in different regions of the world – some less than 56% – which indicated that a 
1.5% sulphur content could not be reached globally (ibid.; BCH 21/INF.28).  
 
Japan further feared that low sulphur content limits would disturb the global supply and 
demand balance of oil in general. The high costs of desulphurization meant that refiners 
would instead choose low-sulphur crude oils as a basis for producing bunker residual fuels. 
This which was feared to result in a drop in crude oil supply and thus with “extremely large” 
(BCH 21/11/6, Annex, p. 9) impacts on crude-oil producing States. It could as well have 
“extremely large” (ibid.) impacts on the global crude oil market by changing the supply 
structure and bringing big price changes to crude oil. A thorough examination including the 
feasibility of action was emphasized. It was concluded that a global reduction of the sulphur 
content would result in “an excessive burden” (ibid.) on the refinery industry, increased 
freight costs for shipping and “a serious influence over the crude oil market” (ibid.). Since 
many difficulties would appear if an ‘inappropriate’ target level was set, Japan stressed that 
was “necessary to take realistic measures based on these realities” (ibid., p. 10). It was from 
                                                  
83 Original: ton 
84 Idem. 
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these economic arguments and supportive information that Japan proposed to address SOx 
emissions separately as a global problem and an additional problem in specific areas.  
 
As showed in the previous chapter, a communication (BCH 21/11/5) from the IEA of the 
OECD emphasized that no decisions were to be taken before the results of various studies. 
These ongoing studies included economic implications and costs and benefits of proposed 
measures, and were undertaken primarily by oil industry associations such as CONCAWE 
and the IPIECA as well as the Netherlands. The reason for concern was the economic 
implications being raised by some of the IEA member States. The measures proposed at the 
IMO would require “very significant additional refining investment” (BCH 21/11/5, p. 1). The 
document expressed that the relative cost-effectiveness of possible measures was unknown. In 
the discussions, the delegation of France pointed out that the submitted papers on industry 
implications correctly showed high costs but did not address the advantages of using LSF, e.g. 
less tear on engines, potentially less maintenance and energy savings. The delegation of the 
Netherlands highlighted that these benefits amounted to about 5 USD per tonne of fuel. The 
costs, however, would be of the magnitude reported in the earlier submission by Kuwait 
(MEPC 29/18/5) or much higher, as indicated by the Japanese submission.  
 
In addition to the above, Norway (BCH 21/11/2) provided an overview of possible measures, 
which was mostly a summary of documents considered at the IMO. The availability of LSFO 
and the costs of desulphurization were considered the constraints of reducing SOx emissions 
from ships. The sources of high quality fuel were too small to satisfy the needs on land and 
for ships. More environmental restrictions on fuel oil quality was considered reasonable, but 
cautious was emphasized so as not to take steps that could have negative effects on other 
applications of fuel oils, e.g. in developing countries. It thus concluded that a first step would 
be to request industry advice on the issue of high sulphur contents in marine fuels. The 
discussions at BCH 21 ended with an expressed need for further considerations and 
information, in particular on costs and benefits of desulphurization and the scope of 
application, i.e. global regulation or restricted to certain areas (BCH 21/15).  
 
6.2 1992: Towards a Regional Approach 
 
6.2.1 MEPC 32, March 1992 
The relevant discussion at MEPC 32 concerned two submissions that were then referred to the 
BCH (MEPC 32/20). OCIMF (MEPC 32/12/1) included the first interim report of the 
CONCAWE (1993) study. Although the study assessed both the costs and environmental 
benefits of reducing sulphur emissions from ships in Northern Europe, this interim report did 
not include any results with economic aspects. Nevertheless, OCIMF expressed the view that 
global control of ship emissions could not be justified by benefits or costs. The representative 
of OCIMF further raised the question of whether guidance was needed from the MEPC on the 
costs and benefits of desulphurization, though the committee decided that the BCH was 
responsible for this consideration (MEPC 32/20). INTERTANKO (MEPC 32/12/2) 
highlighted that the abatement costs would fall on the oil industry and oil tanker owners, with 
impacts such as higher bunker prices and operating costs. It was explained that the costs of 
reducing the sulphur content from an average of 3.5% had an exponential variation. A limit of 
1% would cost 70% more than a limit of 2%. This was due to the requirement for new 
technology when reducing the sulphur content by more than 2.5%. INTERTANKO would 
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support the IMO’s decisions if “measures would be feasible for all parties from both 
economical and technological point of views” (MEPC 32/12/2, p. 2). 
 
6.2.2 A Regional Approach at BCH 22, September 1992 
As repeatedly highlighted in this thesis, the BCH changed the focus towards regional control 
at BCH 22.
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 The BCH instructed a working group to consider regional measures without 
reported reasons. The preceding plenary discussions included cost-benefit aspects and the 
question on global versus regional special area regulation, but it was only mentioned that 
members expressed their views based on their respective submissions. The economic 
arguments did not show the same clear division of arguments as in the previous chapter. The 
following thus presents the submissions per member, followed by the discussions in the 
working group to gain further insight into the economic discussion on global versus regional 
measures and the developed ‘regional concept’. 
 
6.2.2.1 Submissions 
Japan 
Japan’s first submission (BCH 22/7/4) repeated its view (in BCH 21/11/6) that the issue 
should be treated separately as a global problem and an additional problem in specific areas, 
which was motivated by the many difficulties of a global sulphur content limit due to the 
limited supply of LSFO. The second submission (BCH 22/7/8) summarized its submitted 
information papers, of which two are relevant in this chapter (BCH 22/INF.11,12). The 
central argument in the summary was the above on treating the issue separately and that 
establishing special areas was the solution. The economic arguments of the submissions 
should thus be treated in that context. The first information paper (BCH 22/INF.11) showed 
the results of a continuation of the DNV study at MEPC 29 (MEPC 29/18/6) to reassure the 
state of the supply. As shown before, the sulphur contents in bunker fuels varied by region, 
which was shown in two tables and one figure. Of the 47 supply points in the world, only two 
were found to supply LSFO with ≤ 1% sulphur content, representing about 3% of the total 
bunker supply volume. Twenty-nine points supplied the bunker with sulphur contents over 
3%, representing about 68% of the total volume. It was stated that a 1.5% sulphur content 
limit would require desulphurization at as many as 43 supply points. This would affect the 
supply and demand relationship for oil in general. 
 
The second information paper (BCH 22/INF.12) showed the results of an analysis of potential 
desulphurization levels based on the global supply conditions in BCH 22/INF.11. This was 
the trial model calculation shown in BCH 21/11/6. In relation to the earlier submission, it was 
further explained that when the ratio of fuel oil capable of desulphurization goes below 56% it 
becomes impossible to desulphurize down to 1.5%. With the supply conditions found in 
INF.11, it was concluded that it would be impossible to desulphurize bunker fuel oil down to 
1.5% sulphur content in half of the world’s regions (Central and South America, Asia, Europe 
and Africa). Japan stressed that regional supply shortages could be expected and – as feared in 
BCH 21/11/6 – “very negative” (BCH 22/7/8, p. 8) effects on the global relationship between 
the demand and supply of crude oil. It was further stated that such negative effects could be 
undesirable for energy policies in countries based on oil for ensuring a stable energy supply. 
                                                  
85 Although the Correspondence Group on Air Pollution from Ships was the first to explicitly report on regional 
versus global regulations was, the report has little to contribute to this chapter. The only economic aspect 
reported was that desulphurization was expensive and would lead to a rather sharp bunker price increase. This 
was stated in a foregoing scientific argument for the preference for a regional solution by some members. 
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In similarities with BCH 21/11/6, the summary stressed that this is what to expect from an 
inappropriate target for the sulphur content, and it referred to a 1.5% limit as an inappropriate 
target. It further stressed that these aspects should be considered in the discussions. It had to 
be recognized that the choice of measures not only consisted of environmental aspects but 
also affected other policy areas and was strongly influenced by economic and technological 
factors (BCH 22/INF.12; 22/7/8). 
 
OCIMF 
OCIMF (BCH 22/7/9) believed that environmental regulation should be guided by well-
founded studies, including cost analysis. In particular, the impacts of producing LSFO needed 
to be considered, taking into account the energy-consuming desulphurization process, which 
could accelerate the depletion of global petroleum reserves if it were required to be widely 
applied. It was stated that decisions on SOx emission control and its geographical application 
should not be taken until careful considerations of studies with cost-benefit analysis. It further 
expressed that the significant funds required for a global sulphur content limit could be used 
for more urgent environmental issues. OCIMF thus opposed a global limit and proposed a 
special area approach. 
 
Submission BCH 22/7/12 showed that a major focus of the CONCAWE (1993) study had 
been to assess possible impacts on Western European refineries from sulphur content 
requirements. In a European control scenario, CONCAWE had studied the implications of a 
1.5% sulphur content limit for all European bunker fuel oils. A regional control scenario 
addressed the implications of a 1% limit applied to an assumed bunker volume representing 
30% of the total European bunker fuels. The results highlighted in the annexed report first 
showed that most refiners saw little or no possibility of using more low-sulphur crude oils in 
the European refineries. CONCAWE thus considered it unlikely that any significant reduction 
of the sulphur content in European bunker fuels would be achieved by such an approach. A 
reduction in the sulphur content had to be made through investments in desulphurization 
processes at the 23 primary European bunker refineries, though there was some small 
potential to use low-sulphur crudes in minor bunker refineries.
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 On the European control 
scenario, it was found that reducing the sulphur content of all European bunker fuels down to 
1.5% would require a capital cost of 5.6-8.2 billion USD (calculated for the year 1991) and 
result in a price increase of bunker fuels of 53-76 USD per tonne. On the regional control 
scenario, it was found that reducing the sulphur content of 30% of European bunker fuels 
down to 1% would require a capital cost of 2.1-3.5 billion USD (for 1991), which implied a 
price increase of bunker fuels of 67-95 USD per tonne. OCIMF concluded that these sulphur 
content limits were not justified in relation to the “extremely high costs” (BCH 22/7/12, p. 1) 
and the minimal reduction of sulphur burdens (see the previous chapter). 
 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands distributed a report at the session in limited copies that was neither found in 
the archives nor referenced. It also submitted a brief summary (BCH 22/INF.7). The report 
addressed technical, financial and market aspects of desulphurization. It concluded that 
desulphurization was technically feasible but rather costly with regard to bunker fuel prices at 
the time, which were 65 USD per tonne in December 1991 and 84 USD in June 1992. It was 
found that the costs of reducing the sulphur content down to 0.5-1% ranged from 20 to 83 
USD per tonne of bunker fuel oil. This wide range was explained to be derived from different 
opinions on how the capital costs would be included in the total costs (e.g. interest rates, 
                                                  
86 Of the 1989 bunker volumes sold in Europe, 70% was produced in 23 refineries that produced bunker fuels, 
while 10% was derived from production in smaller volumes by the remaining refineries. 
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depreciation, etc.). One uncertain factor was whether investments in desulphurization were to 
be mandatory for all refiners or voluntary. It was emphasized that the benefits of reduced 
sulphur contents in bunker fuels were not negligible, however, and highlighted reduced 
maintenance costs, increased calorific value of the fuel, etc. Combined, these benefits were 
estimated at up to 5 USD per tonne of fuel. Hence, they could partly compensate shipping for 
the increased bunker fuel costs. It was stated that these findings were largely confirmed by a 
comprehensive study on the implications on European refining industries of ulphur limits for 
all types of fuel. The results from this study were submitted in an information document 
(BCH 22/INF.33).  
 
The information document provided a summary note on the study from a presentation at a 
symposium in The Hague with 15 countries; oil -, power-, gas- and shipping industries; and 
environmental organizations. The study had been commissioned by the Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the Commission of the EC to provide a basis for policy discussions 
on a French proposal containing further sulphur content and SOx emission control within the 
EC. Among other things, it highlighted a considerable uncertainty over future fuel oil demand 
and thus for desulphurization investments. It was considered likely that crude oil producers 
would increase the price of low-sulphur crudes to reflect the value of the low sulphur 
contents. When comparing measures on land-based fuels, measures to reduce emissions from 
refineries and measures on bunker fuels, it was found that the three measures had largely 
similar costs. It was thus stated that there was “no clear ‘most efficient’ route to reduce SO2 
emissions” (BCH 22/INF.33, p. 3). Nevertheless, the proportion of SO2 on land derived from 
bunker fuels suggested that the cost of reducing the sulphur content in bunker fuels was 
considerably higher than for the other options. The importance of applying the same standards 
to bunker fuel oils globally as in the EC was highlighted; otherwise the EC bunker market 
could migrate to areas outside the EC. In general, the responses from the oil industry were 
positive of the study’s conclusions.87 They emphasized a flexible approach with focus on 
cost-effectiveness. On the summming-up of the symposium, it was noted that consensus 
between the oil industry and the study results had been reached on the extent of investments 
and economic impacts of measures. 
 
The UK 
The UK’s submission (BCH 22/7) stressed that the use of critical loads would result in the 
most cost-effective way of reducing SOx emissions from ships. The argument was preceded 
by a clarification that it was possible to reduce the sulphur content but that desulphurization 
was a costly process. It then presented critical loads and their use to achieve the most cost-
effective strategy. LRTAP had agreed to abatement with the most cost-effective strategies, 
and critical loads would serve as guidelines for such strategies. With the help of maps that 
showed critical loads and depositions, the most cost-effective abatement policies could be 
chosen. The UK stressed that reducing the sulphur content of bunker fuels for all ships may 
not be the most cost-effective way of reducing SOx emissions. It thus emphasized the use of 
critical loads to determine the emissions limits in the most cost-effective way.  
 
ICS and Liberia 
ICS (BCH 22/7/6) raised the shipping industry’s view that international regulation was the 
only acceptable control of ship operations since shipping was an international activity. 
Nonetheless, it was viewed as necessary in some cases to take into account specific 
                                                  
87 CONCAWE – who had been involved in the discussions with the author and the sponsors during the study – 
expressed a “hope that any legislation would focus on the largest contributors to SO2 emissions” (BCH 
22/INF.33, p. 4) with emphasis on minimal contribution from ships. 
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circumstances that required specific measures. ISC expressed concern over the speed and 
direction of the negotiations and a fear by the industry that regulations were being developed 
without enough time for consultation on both the need and the cost-effectiveness of measures. 
It was further stressed that there could be no confidence on the necessity or cost-effectiveness 
of the regulations being drafted if a comprehensive cost-benefit evaluation was not conducted. 
On SOx emissions, specifically, it questioned how cost-effective regulations could be 
determined without adequate information on ship emissions compared with land-based 
emissions (see the previous chapter). Liberia (BCH 22/7/7) could not support the proposed 
measures and stressed that a technical review addressing global, regional and local aspects 
was needed. Such a review would include a detailed cost-benefit analysis covering both 
capital costs and operational costs. OCIMF’s economic arguments should be included.  
 
6.2.2.2 Working Group Discussions and the Regional Concept 
As described in the previous chapter, the reasoning on the ‘regional concept’ for control of 
SOx emissions was given by a ‘group of volunteers’ (BCH 22/WP.4, Annex 2). The reported 
economic reasons for the regional approach were availability problems for the global use of 
LSFO and that environmental protection in particularly affected areas could be provided 
without unnecessary burdens for ship operators. It was clarified that the concept of regional 
control should not lead to proliferation of different standards but instead have uniform 
application. The only economic reason reported by the group of volunteers for introducing the 
global cap as a supplement to the regional concept was that it could be helpful in resolving the 
availability problem of LSF for regional control.  
 
After the regional concept had been presented to the working group members, they exchanged 
their views on regional versus global measures. “A number of members” (BCH 22/WP.4, p. 
3) supported Norway’s views that a regional approach would result in heavy burden on both 
ship operations and national administrations and significantly affect the free movement of 
international shipping. It could further result in different regional or national rules, and it 
would complicate international shipping if these were to apply to foreign ships. In addition, 
FOEI stressed that the costs of enforcement would result in a heavy burden for port States and 
coastal States and should be taken into account in cost-benefit studies for a regional approach. 
According to Norway, the above implications would be avoided with a global standard for all 
flags, which would prevent distortion of the competiveness of the shipping industry. A global 
approach was the solution that would benefit both the environment and international shipping. 
The response to these views was expressed by the delegation of the Netherlands – the 
chairman of the group of volunteers. It was stated that the risk of unilateralism could be 
addressed through uniform regional standards agreed by the IMO. Emission standards within 
a specific region would apply to all flags entering that region. A “number of members” (BCH 
22/WP.4/Corr.1) agreed with the Netherlands, i.e., they favoured the regional approach 
proposed by the group of volunteers. The working group recognized the importance of a 
unified international standard and that a regional approach should not be confused with 
unilateral action taken without international regulations. The principle of regulating shipping 
internationally would not be contradicted with the regional approach (BCH 22/WP.4; 
22/WP.4/Corr.1; 22/14). In addition to these discussions, the delegation of the Bahamas 
suggested that the paragraph on global capping in the working group annex on the regional 
concept would be placed in square brackets, though no brackets were found in the annex. The 
argument was an expressed need for consideration of economic implications even for a 
relatively high cap of 3.5%, with emphasis on whether it could “unfairly penalize domestic 
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shipping in some oil producing countries” (BCH 22/WP.4, p. 4). The BCH later agreed to 
further consider the regional concept (ibid.; BCH 22/14). 
 
6.3 1993-1994 
 
6.3.1 MEPC 34, July 1993 
No discussion took place at MEPC 34
88
, though some submissions were noted and referred to 
the BCH (MEPC 34/23). OCIMF’s submission (MEPC 34/3/1) contained a study undertaken 
by IPIECA, which comprised a forecast on global supply, demand and fuel oil qualities until 
the year 2000 linked to the costs and benefits of a 3.5% global cap. On the basis of samples on 
delivery in over 100 ports around the world, fuel oil quantities supplied in the world’s regions 
were presented by their sulphur contents. Fuels with a sulphur content above 3.5% totalled 
about 22 million tonnes for the world in 1990, which represented 20% of the total bunker 
quantities. About 4% of the total had a sulphur content of 1.5% or less. In a first scenario, all 
bunkers with a 1.5% sulphur content would be converted into fuels for land use and all 
incremental bunker demands after 1991 would have to be supplied from high sulphur crude 
oils in the Middle East. A second scenario included crude oil supply from the Middle East 
with a variation in sulphur contents. Combining these scenarios, bunker fuels above 3.5% 
were expected to increase to 31% of the total quantities. To guarantee a 3.5% sulphur content 
limit, the suppliers would have to apply a target of 3.3% when blending due to the margins of 
test methods. The expected proportion of bunkers above 3 % for the year 2000 was about 
60%; hence the quantities that required desulphurization were large and increasing. 
 
Based on these conditions, the global investment costs of a 3.5% cap were estimated between 
1.4 billion USD and 2 billion USD (representing scenario 2 and scenario 1 respectively). In 
addition, the annual costs would increase by 470-650 million USD. This would result in a 
price increase of about 14 USD per tonne of bunker fuel. Assuming that only 25% of ship 
emissions reach land – also in other regions than Europe – the cost of a 3.5% global cap 
would be at least 12,000 USD per reduced tonne of sulphur deposited on land. OCIMF’s view 
was that a global cap was not a cost-effective method to control SOx emissions and it 
supported work on “rational regional or local controls” (MEPC 34/3/1, p. 1) for areas that 
demonstrated cost-effectiveness.   
 
OCIMF further distributed the full report of the CONCAWE (1993) study and, once again, 
summarized it (MEPC 34/INF.36). A few things are worth noting from the final report. The 
European control scenario in CONCAWE (1993) not only focused on a 1.5% sulphur limit in 
Europe but also on a 2% limit. The 1.5% limit was based on the IMO proposal in accordance 
with the 50% reduction target, while the 2% limit was based on the French proposal to the EC 
briefly mentioned in BCH 22/INF.7. The capital costs for the 2% limit would be 4.2-6.4 
billion USD, with a bunker price increase of 35-52 USD per tonne. Notably, the estimated 
bunker price increase for the 1.5% limit had been lowered in CONCAWE (1993) without 
explanation: 46-68 USD per tonne compared with 53-76 USD per tonne. The regional 
European scenario also had a lowered estimated bunker price increase: 58-85 USD per tonne 
compared with 67-95 USD per tonne. No explanation for the higher bunker price increase for 
the regional European scenario compared to the European was found in the report. It also 
discussed general future demands for residues and distillates and highlighted uncertain 
                                                  
88 The preceding session, MEPC 33, had no reported economic consideration (MEPC 33/20). 
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strategies of refineries in choosing between investing in desulphurization of residuals and 
converting residuals into distillates. In general, a significant decline in the demand for 
residuals was predicted for the coming decade. It is also notable that the report briefly 
mentioned two benefits for the shipowner of using LSFO that would counter some of the 
increased fuel costs. The first was increased energy of the fuel by 0.8% for each 1% decrease 
of the sulphur content. A reduced sulphur content from 3.5% to 1.5% would result in fuel 
consumption savings of 1-2 USD per tonne. The second was savings of 1-1.5 USD per tonne 
from the ability to use another lubricant. In addition to OCIMF’s submissions, Finland 
(MEPC 34/INF.12) submitted a translated abstract of a study. It stressed the importance of 
international measures due to the international character of shipping. International measures 
would prevent disturbed competiveness of Finnish ships. 
 
6.3.2 BCH Correspondence Group on Regional Control Options 
The report of the Correspondence Group on Regional Control Options (BCH 23/7/4) included 
some economic reasoning behind choosing a regional approach, the concept of global capping 
and the use of a combined approach. On choosing a regional approach, it was considered 
unlikely that there would be enough support for a stringent global sulphur content limit as this 
would involve high costs and a risk of seriously disrupting the residual fuel market. The 
regional approach would have global characteristics. Following the principles of ‘special 
areas’, all designated regions would have the same standards that would apply to all ships 
covered by MARPOL. Uniform standards for all flags would prevent regulations with a 
burden that was too high for international shipping. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
individual countries’ concerns would not be sufficient justification to designate an area. The 
reported reason was that the establishment of areas with stricter regulations affect the interests 
of other countries. With the purpose of ensuring “that a country’s determination is reasonable 
and necessary” (BCH 23/7/4, p. 8.), guidelines with criteria for designating such areas would 
be developed in similar ways as to those for the concept of special areas under MARPOL. The 
criteria would contain socio-economic reasons and cost-effectiveness, including if it were 
more cost-effective to reduce ship emissions than land-based measures. It was further argued 
that an integrated approach with regional measures and a global cap of about 3% would 
provide some environmental protection “at acceptable cost levels” (ibid., p. 6). It was noted 
that a 3.5% cap would still result in a cost increase of about 14 USD per tonne of bunker fuel, 
according to OCIMF (i.e. the IPIECA study). The presented economic advantages and 
disadvantages of the regional approach and a global cap are given in Table 6.1. A 3% global 
cap and a 1.5% special area limit were placed in square brackets in the proposed draft 
regulation. It could not conclude on whether an increase of local and unilateral measures 
could be avoided by “universally agreed regional measures” (ibid., p. 1). 
 
Table 6.1. Economic Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Measures and a Global Cap (BCH 23/7/4) 
 Economic advantages Economic disadvantages 
Regional 
sulphur limits 
 Slightly reduced maintenance costs  Higher costs of LSFO  
 Possible availability problems of LSFO  
 Operational burden of technical problems on 
board, such as storage problems 
 
Global sulphur 
cap [3%] 
 Limited implications for refineries 
due to the limit being near the global 
average sulphur content 
 The sulphur outlet of refineries would be 
limited. This would cause market shifts and 
could result in cost increases. 
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6.3.3 BCH 23, September 1993 
The outcome of the correspondence group formed the basis for the working group at BCH 
23
89, but there were also two relevant submissions. OCIMF’s submission (BCH 23/7/5) first 
positively highlighted the agreement to consider regional control at BCH 22 and the work of 
the correspondence group. This was put in relation to the costs and increased awareness that it 
may not be necessary with such costly global action. The cost figures of the IPIECA study 
were referred to as support to the argument that it was not necessary with a global cap, and it 
was underlined that a 3% cap would result in significantly higher costs than these figures. 
These required funds could be better spent, according to OCIMF. It further had the view that 
reducing land-based emissions was the most cost-effective method to reduce impacts from 
SOx. OCIMF ended by expressing its support for uniformly applied local or regional control. 
It did not support that member States “and their citizens” (BCH 23/7/5, p. 3) would spend 
“huge sums of money” (ibid.) to finance global measures without clear environmental 
benefits. The second submission was by Saudi Arabia (BCH 23/7/6), who stated that the costs 
were very high in relation to the environmental improvements that the proposed draft 
regulation would provide. It was thus not considered feasible with global application, though 
regional application would be useful for both environmental and economic aspects. It should 
be noted that MEPC 34/3/1 (the IPIECA study) and MEPC 34/INF.36 (the CONCAWE 
study) were particularly listed in the working group report (BCH 23/WP.3).
90
 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, the working group left strict global measures behind due to 
the lack of support and focused on either regional measures or the combined approach. On the 
evenly divided opinions on whether global capping should be used, there were notably several 
economic arguments against a global cap, but no reported economic argument in support of a 
global cap. The delegations that did not support a global cap emphasized high costs and 
negligible environmental benefits. They also referred to Assembly Resolution A.500(XII)
91
, 
which included a recommendation to take into account “the costs to the maritime industry and 
the burden on the legislative and administrative resources of Member States” (Resolution 
A.500(XII), para. 3) with regard to new regulations. Despite the compromise proposal on 
monitoring and applying a threshold-trigger mechanism as shown in the previous chapter, the 
BCH was unable to draft SOx requirements (BCH 23/14). No economic aspects were reported 
on the criteria for special area designation in the two reports of the working group (BCH 
23/WP.3; BCH 24/7/1).  
 
After the consideration of the first working group report, the delegation of Venezuela 
expressed that a global cap would result in a change to the production process for petroleum 
and its derivatives, which would have “a far-reaching impact” (BCH 23/14, para. 7.40) on 
Venezuela’s economy and on consumers on a global scale. It thus did not support a global cap 
and emphasized examination and analysis of applying regional measures. The report further 
highlighted that Venezuela was a traditional petroleum product exporter and an OPEC 
member. The delegation of Egypt also had earlier – in connection with the issue of fuel oil 
quality – drawn attention to the industry implications with the emphasis on the costs of 
reducing the sulphur content of bunker fuels.  
                                                  
89 The first intersessional meeting of the BCH Working Group on Air Pollution was held before BCH 23 (July 
1993), though no SOx discussions were found in the report (BCH 23/7/7).   
90 Of further submissions, the US (BCH 23 /7/8) referred to the Assembly Resolution on air pollution 
(A.719(17)) in brief comments on the draft regulations by the first correspondence group (before BCH 22). The 
highlighted part of the resolution was the inclusion of assessing economic impact for the whole industry.  
91 The resolution set the objectives of the IMO in the 1980s. 
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Further in the plenary, the observer of FOEI highlighted the social costs of acidification. It 
was considered very difficult to estimate the costs of the damage caused by sulphur emissions 
on human health, crop production, water supplies, fisheries, forests and cultural heritage. On 
the other hand, the World Watch Institute had estimated that 30.4 billion USD of annual 
losses from forest damage in Europe were derived from sulphur deposition alone. FOEI thus 
stressed that acidification was already causing huge cost figures for society. The delegation of 
the Bahamas added that shipping was merely one of the contributors to these problems, 
though it supported FOEI and both emphasized that these costs should be taken into account 
in cost-benefit discussions at the IMO (BCH 23/14; BCH 24/7/7). A later statement by the 
delegation of Sweden criticized the presented cost figures during the process as “deliberately 
high and lacked objectiveness” (BCH 23/14, para. 7.62.2). It also expressed hope of 
cooperation to find a solution that would prevent the possibility or necessity of some countries 
taking unilateral action. Several delegations supported these views. 
 
6.3.4 BCH Correspondence Group on the Regional Approach  
The report of the Correspondence Group on the Regional Approach (AP/WG 2/3) did not 
provide any economic arguments for the reported polarization of views on global capping 
between proposals A (3.5%) and B (delayed trigger method) (see the previous chapter). The 
question of delineation also had a polarization of views with either 12-15 miles or 200 miles 
from the coast, though no economic arguments were presented. Nevertheless, a few economic 
aspects were included in the draft regional approach. The primary criteria for special area 
designation did not include economic aspects, though additional factors that could strengthen 
the arguments for a special area designation did. These included whether there were threats to 
the value of a region and whether it was more cost-effective to reduce ship emissions than 
land-based measures (previous correspondence group criterion). The delineation part also 
included taking into account economic impacts on both shipping and international trade. In 
addition, the required general description of a particular area in the required background 
report had to include the social and economic value of the region.  
 
6.3.5 2nd Intersessional Meeting of the BCH Working Group, February-March, 1994 
The submissions at the second intersessional meeting did not include economic arguments, 
and neither did the reported intense discussion on global capping (discussions centred around 
4-5%) (BCH 24/7/6). In the discussion on scientific evidence for special area designations 
described in the previous chapter, the proponents of scientific evidence also thought it was 
important to consider the costs and referred to Assembly Resolutions A.500(XII) and 
A.777(18)
92
. Regarding the issues on designating the Baltic Sea Area and the North Sea, no 
economic arguments were found (BCH 24/7/6). Of further relevance here, the representative 
for the EC informed of a proposed directive that could include a maximum sulphur limit of 
3% in the EU and 1.5% in special areas. A wish for coordination of this legislative process 
with the IMO was expressed, though if no IMO legislation with acceptable sulphur limits was 
in place by 1995, the EU could take its own measures (BCH 24/7/6). 
 
                                                  
92 This resolution addressed the work methods and organization and merely invited the attention of committees 
to the recommendation in A.500(XII). 
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6.3.6 MEPC 35, March 1994 
No economic arguments were found in the documents for MEPC 35, though the BSS proposal 
to declare the Baltic Sea Area as special area was further discussed, and the Swedish 
delegation commented on the fact that a designation was not agreed on. It stated that there had 
been no success at the IMO at this stage and that it would thus seek for a regional agreement 
for the Baltic Sea Area. It further had the view that the MEPC was co-responsible for this 
action that Sweden now had found to be necessary (MEPC 35/21). 
 
6.3.7 BCH 24, September 1994 
As with the second intersessional meeting, no economic arguments were reported for the 
intense discussions on global capping at BCH 24 (5% in majority and a compromise of 4.5%). 
Nevertheless, economic arguments were given in the formal proposals of the discussed limits 
(BCH 24/15; 24/WP.2; 24/WP.7). Spain (BCH 24/7/8) proposed a 4% global cap. The 
submission provided a list of the costs in Europe of different sulphur content limits for the 
year 2010 based on the IPIECA study and CONCAWE (1993). The revised lower bunker 
price figures of CONCAWE (1993) were not taken into account. It was expressed that cost-
benefit considerations had to be applied before taking any decision, and that it should be a 
basic principle at the IMO with regard to the socio-economic situation of the world. With 
these economic aspects, Spain’s policy was no global cap and a preference for special areas, 
but it changed its policy to prefer a 4% cap as a compromise solution that would fit its cost-
benefit criterion. It would “help to reduce SO2 emissions without significantly harming” 
(BCH 24/7/8, p. 5) the producers and users of fuels and crude oils with high sulphur contents.  
 
Singapore (BCH 24/7/14) proposed a 5% global cap. It stressed that any measure to reduce 
SOx emissions has to have a significant cost-benefit payoff. Based on data from the oil 
industry in Singapore, a study had estimated that bunker prices would increase by at least 
35% from a sulphur content reduction from 4.5% down to 3.5% due to the costs of 
desulphurization. Estimated figures from earlier submissions by Kuwait (MEPC 29/18/5), 
France (MEPC 31/INF.6), Japan (BCH 21/11/6; 21/INF.28) and OCIMF (the IPIECA study: 
MEPC 34/3/1) were then highlighted. Singapore’s position of a 5% sulphur content was 
further clarified by referring to Assembly Resolutions A.500(XII) and A.777(18), as well as 
the resolution on air pollution A.719(17), which all included taking economic implications 
into account. It also explained that the marginal environmental benefit from a 3.5% or 4% 
global cap would not justify the high costs and that the required funds could be used for more 
urgent environmental issues.  
 
A special heading in the session report was devoted to OCIMF’s presentation of the second 
CONCAWE study
93
, which had been summarized in an OCIMF submission (BCH 24/7/13). 
The full report (CONCAWE, 1994) was handed out during MEPC 36, though it is briefly 
reviewed here together with OCIMF’s submission. As described in the previous chapter, 
CONCAWE (1994) aimed to provide data for assistance in designating special areas. Based 
on the results of emission dispersion and deposition modelling (for the English Channel and 
the Southern North Sea), the report also included an assessment of the relative cost-
effectiveness of emission reduction. A reminder from the previous chapter is in place. 
CONCAWE had found that in-port emissions represented a higher proportion of the sulphur 
deposited on land than those from ships out at sea. Based on an assumption that the reduction 
                                                  
93 OCIMF had submitted an interim report (AP/WG 2/3/1) at the second intersessional meeting, though it did not 
include any economic aspects. 
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cost per unit of fuel consumed was constant independent of where a ship was operating, it was 
concluded that it was more cost-efficient to reduce in-port emissions were in order to achieve 
a given reduction of deposition. It was found that the relative costs for reducing emissions in 
ports were 10-20% of the costs for reducing emissions outside territorial waters and 15-50% 
within territorial waters. At least this was the case for the four grid squares with the highest 
proportion of ship emission deposition on land (also representing the areas where in-port 
emissions contributed most). The corresponding figures for reductions within territorial 
waters in other areas with over 10% contribution from ships to land deposition were 30% 
compared with the reduction outside territorial waters (represented the areas where emissions 
within territorial waters contributed the most). For areas with a lower contribution, the 
corresponding figure was 50%. OCIMF (BCH 24/7/13) stated that a focus on regulating in-
port emissions was the most cost-effective way to reduce sulphur depositions derived from 
ship emissions.  
 
In addition to the above submissions, the Secretariat had compiled a document (BCH 24/7/7) 
that very briefly summarized the key documents with economic considerations submitted so 
far in the process. This document was a response to expressed concerns over the cost-
effectiveness of measures at MEPC 35. Estimated costs per capping level provided by 
OCIMF were presented. These figures are reproduced in Table 6.2 (adapted). The Secretariat 
did not only highlight the contents of Resolution A.500(XII) and A.777(18) but also 
emphasized that the costs to the maritime industry and the burden on member States (as well 
as the compelling need) should be considered before the MEPC took its final decision. This 
should be based on information provided by members, including the submissions summarized 
in the document. 
 
Table 6.2. Estimated Costs per Capping Level According to OCIMF (adapted from BCH 24/7/7, pp. 3-4) 
Cap level Cost 
Global sulphur cap  
1.5% 20 billion USD 
3.5% 1.4-2.0 billion USD 
5.0% 
 
0 
Regional cap in 
Northwestern Europe 
1.5% 5.6-8.2 billion USD 
2.0% 4.2-6.4 billion USD 
 
With regard to the discussion on special areas at BCH 24, not much was reported. This was 
also the case for the second report of the correspondence group (BCH 24/7/9). Nevertheless, 
the documents revealed that cost-effectiveness had been a particularly debated issue. The 
second report of the correspondence group had received comments from its members on 
whether the cost-effectiveness of reducing other sources than shipping should be considered 
(BCH 24/7/9). When the issue reached the drafting group at BCH 24, the draft document on 
criteria and procedures was amended with cost-effectiveness as an additional criteria-category 
in square brackets. This category included the previous part on cost-effectiveness in relation 
to other sources.
94
 In addition, the text had been reformulated so that it was now a criterion for 
designation as follows (BCH 24/WP.7, Annex 1, para. 2.5 / 2.4.2): 
 
 
                                                  
94 Originally in the additional factors that could strengthen the possibilities for designation 
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Mandatory reductions in shipboard air emissions should not be considered 
unless the target level […] cannot be achieved by land based measures alone 
[…] and/or when shipboard measures are as cost effective as comparable land 
based measures. 
 
This was then discussed in plenary, where some delegations opposed this new criterion, but 
the majority of delegations who took the floor preferred it. Hence, no consensus was reached 
and the BCH kept the text in square brackets (BCH 24/15). At the end of the agenda item, the 
delegation of Norway gave a statement on the lack of progress on SOx emission regulations, 
and criticized the focus on the oil industry. It further expressed grave concern that unilateral 
measures would be taken, which it viewed as a possibility due to the lack of progress. 
 
6.4 1995-1996 
 
6.4.1 MEPC 37, September 1995 
No economic arguments were reported on the discussions at MEPC 37
95
 despite many views 
being expressed by a large number of delegations on global capping (a majority favouring 
5%) (MEPC 37/22). Nevertheless, there were plenty of economic arguments and supportive 
information in submissions and statements given when presenting the submissions. 
 
The Bahamas, Liberia and Panama 
The delegation of the Bahamas presented a joint submission with Liberia and Panama (MEPC 
37/13/3). They stated that most member States had now recognized that it was neither cost-
effective nor possible to address acid rain by a global sulphur cap for marine fuels. The 
submission highlighted conclusions from CONCAWE (1993) and stressed that the very small 
environmental improvements in Northern Europe would be achieved by “unacceptable and 
unfair consequence of extraordinarily high costs being imposed on many oil producing and oil 
refining countries in other parts of the world” (MEPC 37/13/3, p. 1). Although the costs of a 
compromised cap of 4% would be much smaller than for a 1.5% global limit, the costs 
“would be quite real to those members affected and they will be borne disproportionately by 
those members” (ibid., p. 2). The three States did not believe that it was proper IMO action to 
“impose a real financial hardship on some of its member States when there is no 
environmental benefits to be gained by doing so” (ibid.). The delegation of the Bahamas used 
different words in its statements, e.g. some members should not be ‘penalized’ (MEPC 
37/22/Add.1, Annex 15, p. 1). Moreover, a potential future rise of the sulphur content was 
considered too small to justify these costs. The precautionary principle was also referred to 
with regard to a cost-effective solution not being in place. The three States did not support a 
global cap and were against establishing large special areas. It was considered far more cost-
effective to reduce land-based sources and ship emissions near affected areas than to reduce 
ship emissions out at sea. Special areas should thus be restricted to selected ports or certain 
areas close to shore, which would provide deposition reductions at reasonable costs. The 
delegation of the Bahamas did express support for a global cap of 5%, however, and clarified 
that special areas should be limited to 12 nm from the shore (MEPC 37/22/Add.1).  
 
 
                                                  
95 MEPC 36 was held during October-November 1994. No economic arguments were reported or found in 
submissions besides OCIMF’s repeated summary (in MEPC 36/9/1) and distribution (in MEPC 36/INF.9) of the 
CONCAWE (1994) report (MEPC 36/22). 
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A Group of States 
A group of States consisting of Austria, Bahrain, India, Mexico, Singapore, Salomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and Venezuela submitted their joint views (MEPC 37/13/21). Their position and the 
content were very similar to Singapore’s submission at BCH 24 (BCH 24/7/14). Figures were 
highlighted from the Japanese study at BCH 22 (BCH 22/INF.11) which, among other things, 
showed that fuels over 4% were supplied in Singapore and Mexico. It was underlined that 
“any global cap of less than 5% will not result in ‘equal misery’ for all” (MEPC 37/13/21, p. 
2), with emphasis on severe impacts on States exporting or processing high-sulphur crude oil 
and large flag States. Similarly to Singapore (BCH 24/7/14), it stressed that any measure to 
reduce SOx emissions has to have a significant cost-benefit payoff. In this regard, it referred to 
Assembly resolution A.777(18) (and thus also A.500(XII)). The study conducted and 
highlighted by Singapore in BCH 24/7/14 was further highlighted with presented cost-
estimates of different sulphur content reductions. These figures are given in Table 6.3 below. 
 
Table 6.3. Estimated Costs/Bunker Price Increases for Different Sulphur Content Reductions (MEPC 37/13/21) 
 
Sulphur content reduction Average incremental cost / tonne 
(bunker price of 80 USD / tonne) 
From 4.5% to 4.0% 6 USD 
From 4.5% to 3.5% 28 USD 
From 5% to 4.5% 15 USD 
From 5% to 4.0% 15-30 USD 
From 5% to 3.5% 25-50 USD 
 
The capital costs from the IPIECA study (MEPC 34/3/1) were also highlighted. According to 
the group of States, these figures showed that any global cap below 5% would result in higher 
bunker prices and, in turn, increased freight costs, which would result in increased prices of 
consumer goods. Similarly to Singapore, the group of States had the view that the benefits of 
a 3.5-4% global cap were marginal and did not justify the huge costs. The required funds 
could be used for more urgent environmental issues. Such regulation was also not considered 
to be in line with Assembly Resolutions A.777(18) and A.500(XII). Reference was also made 
to A.719(17) (air pollution from ships) on assessing economic impacts. The group of States 
proposed not establishing a global cap or a 5% cap. It also believed that it was more cost-
effective to reduce land-based sources, but that small areas with high shipping traffic could be 
regulated locally or regionally if such measures were justified on the basis of costs.  
 
The Baltic Sea States 
The BSS submitted their background document for special area designation of the Baltic Sea 
Area (MEPC 37/13/7). Before presenting the document, the submission stated that the BSS 
had been advocating a global solution to not place unnecessary burden on the international 
shipping industry. In the context of a lack of support for a global approach and the emergence 
of the special area approach, they had decided to designate the Baltic Sea Area as such a 
special area. As seen in the previous chapter, the background document contained many 
aspects on the basis of the draft criteria and procedures. The BSS had a firm opinion that the 
criteria were fulfilled for designation. Let us take a closer look at the economic contents.   
 
Under the category ‘social, ecological and economic values’, the economic importance of fish 
resources and the necessity of healthy marine environments for recreational activities were 
highlighted. Under environmental effects, the annual cost of liming due to acidification in 
Sweden alone was estimated at 25 million USD. It was underlined that the total economic 
losses from acidification were difficult to estimate but that billions of SEK were spent 
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annually on measures against declining catches of fish and crayfish, corrosion of buildings 
and cultural heritage, as well as acidified forests and drinking water. It should be noted that 
these figures represented problems derived from all emission sources. On the additional 
strengthening arguments for designation, severe effects on fishing in inland waters and coastal 
areas were highlighted. Both commercial fishing and angling were considered to be highly 
important for several areas. Acidification was considered a serious threat to the attractiveness 
and value of the whole region’s fishing lakes and coastal areas. The annual cost of corrosion 
damages was over 700 million SEK in Sweden. It had been shown from practical experience 
in Sweden that reducing ship emissions using LSF had been more cost-effective than reducing 
emissions from land transportation and other land-based sources further. The additional fuel 
cost for Scandinavian ferries burning bunker fuels with 0.5% sulphur content had been shown 
to be 15 USD per tonne of fuel. The reduction cost per kg of sulphur varied between 0 and 20 
SEK. The BSS thus saw no economic reason to exclude shipping from taking necessary 
measures. In addition, the Task Force on Integrated Assessment Modelling under the LRTAP 
convention had concluded that reducing ship emissions was cost-effective compared to 
measures on land. The estimated implementation costs of the second sulphur protocol were 
further reported to be about 16 billion USD (MEPC 37/13/7). 
 
Of further relevance, the delegation of Sweden was particularly critical of economic self-
interests with an intervention on another issue: the entry into force criteria of the new Annex 
VI to MARPOL. Although this is not within the scope of this thesis, its following view could 
be put into the context of the sulphur content discussions (MEPC 37/22, para 13.11): 
 
Sweden further underlined that the times in which the ethic of pure self-interest 
dictate policy were gone and that an era of mutual inter-dependence had been 
entered. If self interest would prevent IMO from fulfilling its obligations 
regarding air pollution, progress would inevitably occur outside IMO and other 
agencies and institutions would certainly not mind doing the Organization’s job 
for it. 
 
Norway (also representing the North Sea States) 
On the global cap, Norway (MEPC 37/13/6) merely stated that a 5% cap would result in 
pressures for regional / unilateral solutions. Instead, it supported a maximum 3.8% limit (see 
the previous Chapter). On special areas, the Norwegian submissions concerned a proposal to 
designate the North Sea (MEPC 37/13/6/Add.1) along with a background document 
presenting arguments for designation (MEPC 37/INF.19). Norway considered that the criteria 
had been fulfilled with the background document, but it did not evaluate the information 
against the criteria and not many economic arguments were given. It was stated that the most 
effective way to reduce sulphur depositions in a sensitive area would be to reduce emissions 
close to such an area. Taking the reduction of sulphur deposition in Norway as an example, 
the document reasoned that it would be more cost-effective to reduce emissions from ships in 
the North Sea than to reduce emissions in countries such as the UK or Belgium, though this 
was based on the assumption that the marginal abatement costs were the same for these 
sources. It was further noted that this was not inconsistent with the conclusion by CONCAWE 
(1994) that it was more cost-effective to reduce in-port emissions than those of ships out at 
sea, with regard to protecting selected areas. 
 
ICS 
ICS (MEPC 37/13/14) referred to Assembly Resolution A.777(18) (and thus to A.500(XII)). 
There could be a need for special areas, but ICS was concerned for economic and practical 
reasons. Special areas could disrupt smooth ship operations, mainly due to technical problems 
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with the required fuel switch, which could result in engine failures. It further stressed that 
regional control could result in serious implications for ship operations due to different 
emission standards at international, regional and national levels. It thus stressed the need for 
internationally agreed regulations and procedures for special area designations to prevent 
regional or national authorities from declaring special areas on their own. An international 
agreement was not only considered essential to prevent unilateral action but also to avoid 
distortion of competitiveness within the shipping industry. It further supported the idea of a 
global sulphur cap (unspecified limit). 
 
IAPH 
The International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) had two relevant submissions. 
The first (MEPC 37/13/16) strongly emphasized that the criteria for special area designation 
should include cost-effectiveness, and thus suggested removing the square brackets from the 
draft criteria and procedures. The second (MEPC 37/13/17) reasoned that an ideal global 
regulation would be at a level of 0.5-1% sulphur content, though this would result in financial 
difficulties for the oil industry, which in turn would affect the shipping industry with 
increased fuel costs. This would result in increased freight rates and negatively affect 
competiveness in relation to other transport modes. IAPH was particularly concerned about a 
possible distortion in the competitiveness between ports within and outside special areas if 
such areas were to be established. It was also noted that the competiveness of shipping could 
be distorted. It thus opposed regulating sulphur emissions in special areas and stressed that the 
IMO should develop a strategy that would eliminate the need for special areas. A global cap 
was the solution and it should be at a level close to the global average sulphur content at the 
time, with a regular review in the long term. 
 
Germany 
Germany (MEPC 37/13/26) had the view that a 3% cap should be established, but taking into 
account the “temporarily practical and financial problems to some refineries or countries” 
(MEPC 37/13/26, p. 3), an interim cap of 3.5-4% was proposed for a suggested period of five 
years. On special areas, it was underlined that the delineation was of most importance due to 
the international character of shipping. Competitive distortion in both shipping and between 
ports had to be avoided. The delegation of Germany added that regional and unilateral actions 
could not be avoided if acceptable IMO standards were not established.
96
  
 
6.4.2 MEPC 38, July 1996 
At MEPC 38, the draft criteria and procedures for special areas (now named SECAs) were 
revised by a group of experts. The economic contents were moved from the criteria (initially 
additional strengthening factors) to procedures for assessment and adoption. The new draft 
stated that the relative costs of reducing ship emissions to decrease depositions in relation to 
land-based measures should be taken into account in the IMO’s assessment of a proposal to 
designate a special area. The assessment should also take into account economic impacts on 
international shipping (MEPC 38/WP.12). In the discussions on delineation of special areas, it 
was underlined that the competiveness of ports should be taken into account. No economic 
arguments were reported for the designation of the Baltic Sea Area. As before, no economic 
arguments were reported for the discussions on global capping. Although new proposals 
                                                  
96 In addition to the above submissions, OCIMF (MEPC 37/13/4) stated that it could not support any global cap 
established by the IMO. The argument was that no limit below the existing 5% ISO standard could be justified 
based on the available and submitted environmental and cost data. 
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emerged on a gradual long-term reduction
97
, the 5% limit remained in square brackets. 
Nevertheless, the 5% majority had been broken with evenly divided views between a 5% cap 
and a lower figure (unspecified) (MEPC 38/20). As with the previous chapter, we can only 
turn to the submissions in the search for an insight into this turn in positions. 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, a submission by Norway (MEPC 38/9/2) presented a 
written communication from the chairman of the Executive Body to LRTAP addressed to the 
secretary-general of the IMO. An analysis for the preparatory work on the second sulphur 
protocol had indicated that the agreed targets could be achieved cost-effectively by reducing 
ship emissions. As with the background document of the NSS, it was stated that the most 
effective way to reduce sulphur depositions in a sensitive area would be to reduce emissions 
close to such an area. It would also be more cost-effective to reduce emissions from ships 
close to a sensitive area than to reduce land-based sources.
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FOEI (MEPC 38/9/6) first stated that a balance between shipping industry interests and 
environmental interests had been reached in other issues by the IMO, but that it had been 
impossible to apply a meaningful approach to sulphur regulations due to oil industry interests. 
It was stated that the lack of majority on a global cap lower than the average sulphur content 
could only be explained by the influence of the oil industry. The reasoning was that a strict 
global sulphur limit would merely result in marginal increases in the costs for shipping and 
not distort the international competiveness since it would be applied globally. Benefits of 
using LSFO were also highlighted, e.g. higher energy content of the fuel, decreased use of 
costly lubricants, cheaper fuel systems, less wear on engines, less manpower, etc. It was 
stressed that if HSFO was not completely removed, these benefits would not be fully utilized. 
While the shipping industry was considered to have little to fear and instead could expect 
these benefits, the oil industry could lose its market for high-sulphur products, which was on 
the way to disappear on land. The regional approach would instead result in significant 
commercial implications for the shipping industry and competitive distortion. Fuel switching 
would require expensive retro-fitting for dual fuel storage and supply systems. It was also 
stated that enforcement of special areas would be both costly and ineffective compared with a 
global cap. Without effective enforcement, some operators would burn the cheaper HSFO to 
gain a competitive advantage. FOEI also highlighted the social costs of acid rain by repeating 
what was stated at BCH 23. As shown in the previous chapter, it preferred a global cap of 0.5-
1%, though it recognized that agreeing on such a cap would take some time and proposed a 
cap that was just below the average but with a timetable for further steps of reduction. 
Preliminary special areas could be established and then be replaced with a strict global limit. 
Such an approach would benefit both environmental interests and the shipping industry. 
 
WWF’s submission (MEPC 38/9/13), which intended to apply the precautionary approach to 
the sulphur issue (see the previous chapter), also included economic aspects. Deciding the 
level of a global cap was thought to be mostly an issue of market availability and cost-
effectiveness. WWF thus stressed that problems with availability of LSFO would only be 
temporary and that the market would eventually meet the demand.
99
 The guidelines on the 
precautionary approach included a requirement to consider the cost-effectiveness of different 
policy options. WWF stressed that such analysis would have to include a weighting of the 
costs of fuels against the long-term social costs of environmental impacts. It was also 
                                                  
97 See the previous chapter. 
98 Based on the assumption that the marginal abatement costs were largely the same 
99 WWF also claimed that there was no documentation on the availability of the fuels required to achieve a 1.5% 
global sulphur limit. 
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underlined that no definition of cost-effectiveness was included in the guidelines. WWF 
proposed that a cost-effective measure would be a measure that “eliminates or reduces the risk 
to the maximum extent possible, unless the measure is clearly unreasonable (economically) 
when viewed on an industry-wide basis” (MEPC 38/9/13, p. 4). The MEPC should thus focus 
on the lowest sulphur content limit that was technically feasible and then decide on whether it 
was unreasonable on an industry-wide basis. If other measures existed that were not cost-
effective, the MEPC should explore how cost-effectiveness could be achieved with different 
forms of incentives. It was emphasized that a 1.5% global cap would ensure a level playing 
field where the cost burdens were shared equally, which would make it reasonable on an 
industry-wide basis. It was also thought that this could generate a supply that could meet the 
demand. If the required fuels where not available on the global market, a market for these 
fuels would simply be created by the demand. As LSFO was not considered instantly 
available for to meet a global 1.5% limit, WWF suggested a phase-in period for such fuels of 
about two to three years. An interim cap of 3-3.5% was proposed, but coupled with a phase-in 
schedule for a lower cap (including technical and economic support for developing countries). 
 
In addition to the above submissions, the UK (MEPC 38/9/7) underlined that failure to reach a 
strict global cap could result in increased regional/unilateral measures, and that the EU was 
already considering a proposed directive. If this proposal was adopted, it would restrict the 
sulphur content of fuels within the EU to 3.5%. In this context, it repeated its position on a 
delayed trigger mechanism. The Russian Federation (MEPC 38/9/5) proposed an exemption 
of ships with restricted voyages within SECAs (in total 144 hours) to be determined by the 
responsible national authorities. This was proposed due to economic and practical reasons 
related to the required fuel switch. Moreover, 19 States
100
 (MEPC 38/9/11) now supported a 
5% global cap based on the same economic arguments as the submission by eight countries at 
MEPC 37 (MEPC 37/13/21).  
 
6.5 1997: Final Drafting and Adoption of the Combined Approach 
 
6.5.1 MEPC 39, March 1997 
As seen in the previous chapter, the global capping discussions at the final MEPC session 
were similar to the end of MEPC 38: maintaining a 5% limit in the final draft but split views 
on a lower figure (MEPC 39/13).
101
 A proposal of a single global regulation by BIMCO 
(MEPC 39/6/21) was considered. It underlined that if the IMO fails to provide standards that 
are acceptable worldwide, regional requirements could be established, which would result in 
severe operational problems for shipping. BIMCO proposed a 3% sulphur content limit to be 
applied not only to the fuels used by ships but also to the fuels supplied. It further did not 
favour the delayed trigger mechanism, which it viewed as expensive and time-consuming. As 
seen in the previous chapter, the Committee did not agree with the proposal. Instead, the 
submissions by Australia, Singapore and Vanuatu (MEPC 39/6/9) and the State of Bahrain 
(MEPC 39/6/17) gained significant support (a 5% global cap and 1.5% in SECAs). Their only 
relevant economic arguments were an emphasis to consider the costs presented by the group 
of 19 States at the previous session and a need for uniform standards for all special areas.  
                                                  
100 Antigua, Barbados, Bahrain, the Bahamas, Barbuda, Brazil, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Hungary, Liberia, Maldives, 
Mexico, Peru, Romania, Singapore, Tunisia, Turkey, Vanuatu and Venezuela 
101 This session further placed both the new draft Regulation 14(2) and the draft Conference resolution on 
monitoring within square brackets. This was due to concerns from a number of delegations on financial and 
administrative implications of monitoring the sulphur content. 
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A waiver on the SECA regulations was introduced by the working group as an additional 
paragraph in square brackets. The waiver postponed the effect of the SECA regulations by 
one year for ships entering a SECA from the outside (MEPC 39/13; 39/WP.11). This was a 
compromise that originated from a proposal by the Russian Federation (MEPC 39/6/19). As 
with its earlier proposal at MEPC 38 (MEPC 38/9/5), the reasons were economic and practical 
related to the required fuel switch. The Russian proposal was sort of a mix between its earlier 
proposal and the agreed paragraph: an exemption of three years for ships with restricted 
voyages within SECAs (in total 144 hours) to be determined by the responsible national 
authorities. No economic aspects were reported on the criteria and procedures, except for 
concern from several delegations on the spread of special areas in the world in which the 
committee agreed that unwarranted special areas would be prevented with strict application of 
the criteria and procedures (MEPC 39/13; 39/WP.11).  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a designation of the North Sea as SECA could not be 
agreed on since additional information was needed and would thus be sent to the conference 
(MEPC 39/13; MEPC 39/6/20). The Baltic Sea Area was considered to be sufficiently 
justified for designation with additional information submitted by the BSS, though it was 
placed in square brackets in the regulation (MEPC 39/13). The new information by the BSS 
(MEPC 39/6/24) primarily focused on the development of an acidification strategy within the 
EU, which aimed to identify and propose cost-effective emission reductions to achieve the 
objective of no exceedance of critical loads within the EU. The strategy was based on an 
analysis with different scenarios. It showed that measures to reduce SOx emissions from ships 
in the Baltic and North Seas, as well as in parts of the Atlantic Ocean, were more cost-
effective than only reducing emissions within the EU member States. The total abatement 
costs would decrease by 25% if focusing on these ship emissions. It was thus considered a 
cost-effective method to reach the deposition targets. The BSS underlined that such measures 
required measures outside EU jurisdiction; hence the necessity of reaching agreement within 
the IMO was highlighted. The MEPC further noted information from the European 
Commission regarding the acidification strategy and that the use of LSFO for ships was a 
cost-effective method to reduce European acidification (MEPC 39/13). 
 
6.5.2 Adoption at the 1997 Conference of Parties to MARPOL, 15-26 September 
Economic discussions were unreported at the 1997 Conference of Parties to MARPOL 73/78. 
Nevertheless, some submissions were noted (MP/CONF.3/RD/1-8; MP/CONF.3/WP.4). A 
submission by ICS (MP/CONF.3/17) expressed a concern over far-reaching impacts on the 
shipping industry with a disproportionate burden on some parties. The required use of more 
expensive fuel in SECAs would result in a significant burden on ships entering such areas on 
occasions. The availability of such fuels could be limited outside SECAs, and all ships 
entering a SECA would have to carry a supply of the more expensive fuel for switching. In 
this context, ICS highlighted the increased risks of engine breakdowns and other problems of 
engine reliability and performance, loss of deadweight capacity due to fuel storage, as well as 
the administrative burdens of administrations with regard to enforcement at the right timing of 
the fuel switch. More SECAs could be established and this would mean that all ships in 
international trade would have to handle two different fuels. It was underlined that the 
responsibility of conserving the atmosphere was for all but that the burden of measures would 
be borne almost completely by international shipowners, which ICS considered unfair. 
According to ICS, the majority of shipowners held the view that a single global standard 
would prevent these problems. It was proposed that the global cap would be initially set at 
3.5% with a later a stepwise reduction starting with 3% and that no SECAs would be 
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established. This approach would give sufficient time to gain experience and adapt technology 
and would prevent complications for ship operations and reduce the costs of enforcement. 
With regard to oil industry implications, ICS stated that “the major oil companies have 
indicated that they can meet any refining or blending requirements – although this would be at 
a cost” (MP/CONF.3/10, p. 3). The effective date of the global cap would need to take into 
account the adaptation of the bunker supply industry however. Incentives for the shipping and 
oil industries could be provided by governments for an earlier date. 
 
Like its submission at MEPC 39, BIMCO (MP/CONF.3/10) proposed a 3% global cap 
without SECAs and with the same arguments. It further highlighted some old cost estimates in 
a short reasoning of choosing a sulphur limit from the initially considered 1.5% global limit to 
the proposed solution. Greece also made a proposal during the conference (MP/CONF.3/32) 
of a stepwise reduction of the global cap (see the previous chapter). The only economic 
argument presented was that this approach would provide a significant time period for the oil 
industry to adapt. Nonetheless, a 5% global cap remained in square brackets for the major part 
of the conference and the conference adopted a 4.5% global cap (MP/CONF.3/RD/1-8; 
MP/CONF.3/WP.4).  
 
With regard to special areas, the NSS submitted a more detailed proposal and background 
document (MP/CONF.3/16). As with the additional information by the BSS (MEPC 39/6/24), 
the economic aspects mainly concerned the acidification strategy and its background analysis, 
which had been conducted by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA). Calculated abatement costs from IIASA reports were showed for three scenarios in 
tables. The first scenario was a reference scenario and the second represented a 50% reduction 
of acidification in unprotected areas. The third included a use of fuels with 1.5% sulphur 
content in the Baltic and North Seas as part of reaching the 50% target. The annual costs of 
using LSFO in these areas were estimated at about 75 million USD
102
, while the annual costs 
of reducing land-based sources to gain the same environmental benefits were estimated at 
about 1 billion USD. It was stated that the assessment clearly showed that a 1.5% sulphur 
content limit in the North Sea (as well as the Baltic Sea) would reduce acid deposition at a far 
lower cost than for land-based measures. It was thus concluded that the assessment clearly 
showed the rationale for reducing ship emissions in the North Sea as part of a cost-effective 
approach. Of further relevance, the NSS report also stated that the future reductions of the 
second sulphur protocol had been estimated to result in savings of 8 billion USD due to 
decreased damage to buildings. As shown in the previous chapter, a proposal was also made 
by the UK (MP/CONF.3/24) to designate the area west of the UK, though it did not include 
any economic aspect.  
 
The SECA regulations were eventually adopted with a 1.5% limit, but the weaver paragraph 
was slightly amended after considering four alternative versions. In broad terms, the adopted 
paragraph was consistent with the draft version. The alternative versions were not found in the 
investigated documents. As seen in the previous chapter, the Baltic Sea Area was designated 
as SECA, and Conference Resolution 5 was adopted to consider the conference proposal for 
designating the North Sea after a designation had been rejected by the conference 
(MP/CONF.3/RD/1-8; MP/CONF.3/WP.4; MP/CONF.3/34).  
                                                  
102 The analysis was based on the assumption that the full potential to use available LSFO was used. 
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7 Analysis and Discussion 
 
This chapter has five sections. The first two analyses and discusses the empirical findings in 
Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, with explanations sought for each research question through 
the two conceptual lenses. The third section discusses connections and differences in 
explanations. The fourth section discusses theoretical and methodological implications. The 
chapter ends with a fifth section on research contributions. 
 
7.1 Explaining by the Role of ‘Science’ 
 
The following analyses and discusses the results presented in Chapter 5. Explanations are 
searched for, for each research question through the first conceptual lens on the role of 
science in policy-making. It focuses on Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and the 
under- and over-critical model (see more in Section 3.2).  
 
7.1.1 Why Change the Focus to Regional Measures at the BCH? 
As highlighted in the introduction of this thesis, the BCH took an explicit policy direction 
towards regional regulations by developing a framework on regional requirements for SOx 
emissions from ships. How was this regional move scientifically motivated in relation to the 
MEPC target of a50% emission reduction globally, and why did the MEPC agree on a global 
target in the first place? In the search for explanations, we need to start with the concept of 
framing. Framing the issue of SOx emissions from ships has two initial dimensions. The first 
is the historic background of long-range transboundary air pollution and the regulation of 
land-based sources. Acidification from SOx emissions was framed as a large-scale regional 
problem requiring international action. The impacts were found mainly in Northern Europe, 
and the LRTAP regime became regional and primarily European-centred. EMEP evolved into 
a European research community bound to the LRTAP regime, sharing the same perspective 
and producing a common research pool mostly centred on European emission data, i.e. an 
epistemic community had been established (see Section 3.2) (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002; 
2011). Thus, prior to the studied IMO process, the shown impacts, the framing, the 
international cooperation, the actions, the knowledge and the experiences were all regional 
and European-centred. In the middle of this regional issue were the NSS and the BSS. They 
were the first actors to frame the policy issue of air pollution from ships, and SOx  was a 
significant part of this framing: air pollution was connected to fuel oil quality. The framing of 
the issue for political action thus started outside the IMO in other institutional settings at 
regional levels. When the NSS and the BSS introduced this issue to the IMO, it was not 
framed as a regional problem as before on land-based emissions, but as a global issue 
requiring international action. The second dimension to framing the issue of SOx emissions 
from ships is the nature of the IMO, an international organization responsible for global 
measures for a global shipping industry. Hence, the issue of SOx emissions from ships was 
framed by the NSS and the BSS as a global problem connected to the quality of bunker fuels.  
 
7.1.1.1 Early Acceptance in an Uncritical Policy Environment 
At the first two sessions of the process, the MEPC accepted the framing by the NSS and the 
BSS and recognized that the IMO was the international organization to address both fuel oil 
quality and air pollution, as well as develop global measures. This recognition was based on 
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the framing presented by the NSS and the BSS without much support from scientific claims. 
The submissions and scientific arguments were dominated by the NSS and the BSS, though 
new actors soon arrived on the scene. Scientific arguments and submitted information 
increased, but the content of the submissions and discussions were dominated by framing, 
policy views and supporting scientific arguments. The factual claims were few, and often 
presented without references. At MEPC 29, two Norwegian studies changed this trend, and 
the Marintek study would become a frequent reference in the process. This time, Norway’s 
framing of air pollution from ships as a significant problem was supported by scientific 
studies – or rather factual claims made by a governmental institution and a classification 
society: Marintek and DNV. This session was also when air pollution was framed as an urgent 
international problem requiring global action by the IMO. In addition, the agenda item 
included both air pollution from ships and fuel oil quality, which indicates a framing by the 
MEPC that recognized the interconnections of air pollution and fuel oil quality. Taken 
together, the framing by the NSS and the BSS were simply accepted by the MEPC. At MEPC 
30, the NSS and the BSS once again played significant roles to the outcome with their 
proposals of a 50% reduction target by the year 2000. 
 
Why did the participants at these sessions accept the initial framing? What explains this 
shared belief of the problem and the need for action? Two findings of SSK are central: (1) the 
concepts of uncritical (science-accepting) and critical policy environments, and (2) that 
science only influence policy under certain social conditions. The acceptance of the proposals 
and framing by the NSS and the BSS the MEPC suggests that this first stage of the process 
had an uncritical policy environment that accepted scientific claims (of a significant emission 
contribution from ships). Social conditions highlighted by SSK include the question of which 
actors or institutions are given moral and scientific authority. For this case at the IMO, I argue 
that the early parts of the process recognized LRTAP and its epistemic community EMEP as 
the institutions with such authority. This argument is based on the acceptance of the framing 
by the NSS and the BSS, coupled with the special influence of LRTAP and EMEP by their 
submissions and participation at IMO sessions. Since the LRTAP regime was established 
under the UNECE, recognition of the problem existed within the UN, though not of global 
nature.  The BSS and the NSS were also parties to and a driving force within LRTAP and 
included the countries most affected by acidification. As an example, EMEP could have 
played its part at MEPC 30 indirectly through information submitted by the IMO Secretariat 
(MEPC 30/INF.17). The submissionshowed that an EMEP workshop had concluded that 
different calculation methods based on  oil consumption as basis had showed rather similar 
results and could be used as a basis for assessments. Although, this can be viewed as an 
example of the uncritical policy environment, it can  just as well be related to the concept of 
epistemic communities. Norway submitted studies to the MEPC that the EMEP workshop 
accepted and uncritically highlighted in its report as Norway was a driving party of LRTAP 
and strongly connected to the epistemic community EMEP.
103
 Social conditions thus played 
its part of accepting the problem despite weak scientific support; hence there was an uncritical 
policy environment at the MEPC at the time. This resulted in the target at MEPC 30 to halve 
SOx emissions from ships by the year 2000. 
 
7.1.1.2 Gradual Changes and Partial Explanations 
Why did the above global ambitions change towards regional control? One factor is that the 
NSS and the BSS themselves changed their policy to include regional measures in the same 
                                                  
103 E.g. a host for the ‘EMEP Meteorological Synthesizing Centre – West’ (MSC-W) since 1979 (EMEP, 2014) 
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proposal as their proposed and agreed global target. Regional measures could be applied in 
areas such as inland waters, harbours and territorial waters, but perhaps the most significant 
example is “near coastal zones” (MEPC 30/14/2, p. 1), which implies some sort of special 
area approach. The BSS further used the term special areas. No scientific arguments were 
given for their proposal, however, which makes it a factor outside this conceptual lens. 
Nonetheless, the Japanese delegation stated that decisions on targets without scientific 
justification. This implies a lack of scientific claims in support of different reduction levels
104
. 
This is confirmed in this thesis from the investigation of the documents; the reduction target 
was agreed on without scientific evaluation against different targets. Was the target removed 
from the Assembly resolution for such reasons? Other than an indication of a lack of 
information for establishing such a target, its removal is difficult to explain from this lens. 
Nevertheless, it can be speculated that the Norwegian proposal (MEPC 31/13/2) had a role in 
this development. It questioned the accuracy of the methods used in studies as grounds for 
reference levels and years, as well as the targets on NOx to such an extent that it would further 
discuss the targets at BCH 21. It is thus possible that this proposal could have contributed to 
Norway’s and other countries’ acceptance of removing the targets from the Assembly 
resolution. No discussion on targets or reference levels and years was found at BCH 21, 
however, and it thus stands as an unexplained possible factor. Finally, it should be noted that 
several initiated or ongoing studies were highlighted at MEPC 31. These could have played a 
part in the decision to remove the targets in accordance with the argument to await further 
study by the BCH before taking decisions.   
 
Discussions on regional measures were gradually taking over the issue of reference levels and 
dates. It began at BCH 21 when it was noted that the geographical scope of application 
needed further consideration. On the basis of the investigated documents, no conclusion could 
be drawn on the role of the scientific arguments or scientific claims for the expressed need to 
consider the geographical scope. The submission by the IEA, however, played its part by  
emphasizing the lack of scientific information and uncertainty, with particular emphasis on 
whether local measures could provide most of the desired reductions. The IEA emphasized 
that no decisions were to be taken before the results of the listed ongoing studies. In 
particular, it highlighted the (then ongoing) CONCAWE study, which would become a sort of 
cornerstone of the regional approach as the process continued. As a result of the IEA 
submission, the BCH requested that members submit further information to the next session 
“in order to facilitate co-operation between Members” (BCH 21/15, para. 11.23).This implies 
a belief by the policy-makers at the BCH that further scientific information would enable 
cooperation (and ultimately agreement). SSK and the under- and over-critical models hold 
different views on this relationship, but let us wait with such analysis until the second 
research question. In addition to implied local framing by the IEA, the BCH 21 was also the 
first time clear framing of the issue, as regional or local, could be found in the submissions. In 
particular, it was the start of Japan as a frequent submitter of scientific arguments for regional 
and local measures.  
 
A correspondence group was then held and it reported a discussion on regional versus global 
measures for the first time. In Chapter 5, it was found that the way different actors framed the 
problem was a significant factor for the way they viewed the scope of actions. It was basically 
a question of limited impacts in coastal areas versus the long-range transport of SOx 
emissions. A majority of the group supported the global approach since it was the only option 
                                                  
104 It further implies that Japan used the situation of uncertainty as an argument to postpone decisions on the 
level of reduction. 
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that would achieve the target. The correspondence group was the basis for the work at BCH 
22, yet the BCH chose to develop a regional framework.  
 
7.1.1.3 Changed Framing of the BCH with Scientific Support 
One significant explanation for this change in policy direction is a change of the framing by 
the actors at the BCH compared with previous MEPC sessions. No scientific argument for 
global measures were found at BCH 22, and the issue of SOx emissions from ships was 
framed by the actors (in submissions and reported discussions) as a regional issue, no issue or 
local at most. Even the necessity for action was questioned, which is notable considering the 
previous recognitions that air pollution (SOx included) from ships was a serious international 
problem requiring international action. It appears not just to be a change of framing by the 
actors at the time, but a change of framing between the MEPC and the BCH.  
 
Those favouring no measures or local at most used the contribution of ship emissions as 
arguments. Their keywords were ‘minimal contribution’. The main actors were OCIMF and 
Japan. OCIMF had a strong focus on the CONCAWE study. In addition to the debate on the 
levels of emission contribution, OCIMF started the scientific debate on how the ship emission 
contribution should be assessed – the importance of investigating depositions instead of 
comparing emissions. Based on my own background in environmental science, I argue that 
OCIMF had a significant point to use deposition instead of comparing emissions, but what 
OCIMF (BCH 22/7/11) also did was to show a 2% contribution in Norway (representing 
deposition) instead of 14% (representing national emissions). It thus compared a figure for 
deposition with a figure for national emissions. Whether this was the intention could only be 
speculated, but it should be noted that presenting a lower figure for the policy-makers could 
be interpreted as the ship emission contribution not being significant but instead minimal. 
Norway and OCIMF were simply measuring different things, but the question is how such 
figures were interpreted by the majority of the policy-makers and which approach (emissions 
or deposition) had most policy relevance. At this session, OCIMF’s deposition approach had 
the greatest impact on policy. The results of the CONCAWE study influenced the major flag 
State Liberia to argue against global measures with local being the only alternative. Shipping 
interests aligned with OCIMF and used the same scientific arguments. One example of such 
alignment is that ICS, Liberia and OCIMF (BCH 22/7/6; 7/7; 7/ 9) shared the view that 
regulations should only apply to main engines, not auxiliary engines, which were stated as 
being responsible for only 10% of the emissions of air pollutants from ships. This is notable 
considering their recognitions of the potential local contribution, i.e. in areas close to shore or 
in ports where auxiliary engines were used. 
 
Japan was particularly active in emphasizing a special area approach, and it presented 
examples of how such areas could be designated. To show only local contribution, dispersion 
studies where used by both Japan and CONCAWE/OCIMF. These could be interpreted as 
SOx emissions from ships were diluted at sea and not harmful to the environment after 15-20 
km from the source, though deposition was not taken into account in such studies, nor the 
later discussion on retained sulphur. OCIMF favoured a regional solution with special areas, 
though, at the same time, its main focus was to show no significant contributions at both 
regional and local levels, and it clearly showed the framing of the issue as no problem, or 
local at the most. This is part of a strategy to make the geographical application of regulations 
as small as possible, which is further discussed below for the second research question. A 
significant factor with regard to the special area approach is the concept of critical loads. The 
UK used this concept at BCH 22 as an argument for a regional special area approach. As an 
101 
 
LRTAP party, the UK highlighted a background strategy for the upcoming second sulphur 
protocol to LRTAP and stressed the importance of using the critical loads concept agreed on 
by LRTAP. The emerging use of the concept of critical loads at the IMO implies epistemic 
community influence, though LRTAP and EMEP are institutions under UNECE, and 
influences of different institutions within the UN system are common. This is a topic for 
further research with other theoretical perspectives however. 
 
7.1.1.4 A Critical Policy Environment and Lack of Data 
Many scientific arguments at BCH 22 were counterarguments or used to criticize earlier 
presented science to support a policy of no global action. This suggests that the policy 
environment of the process had changed from an uncritical environment in earlier MEPC 
sessions to a critical policy environment being manifested at the BCH. Almost all scientific 
content at BCH 22 was about showing a minimum global, regional or even local contribution, 
and previous studies were criticized and even redone. It is significant that they all focused on 
Northern Europe and some on Norway in particular. The SSK finding of deconstructing and 
reconstructing socially constructed factual claims could thus be applied to this process. 
OCIMF’s submissions and the CONCAWE study used the data of Norway’s studies, in 
particular the Marintek study, and deconstructed Norway’s factual claims. It then 
reconstructed the factual claims to build a case for regional measures followed by local 
measures, and finally none at all, by showing minimal contributions at all levels. Japan also 
redid the Marintek study but only to confirm its results, expressed as an extremely low global 
contribution. The Marintek study was thus redone twice. These two studies focused on the 
same area and used the same data but were interpreted by different actors with different views 
on policy. Both were presented at BCH 22. Although the first part of the CONCAWE study 
had been presented before, it was at BCH 22 we could see its effects on policy. Given these 
developments, a critical policy environment at BCH 22 can be confirmed. 
 
Lack of scientific knowledge was frequently highlighted during the early parts of the process, 
as well as at BCH 22. Data were lacking on emissions and contributions for the world and 
studies thus focused on Europe – in particular Northern Europe – where data existed. Notably, 
these were the areas where the countries concerned about the ship emission contribution were 
located, and these countries had experiences of reducing land-based SOx emissions due to 
acidification impacts. This situation did not result in more research and data gathering for 
other countries around the world however. Instead, other countries targeted the same areas, 
which is part of the process of deconstructing and reconstructing factual claims rather than 
dealing with the lack of data and reducing uncertainties. In addition to reconstructing factual 
claims, Japan showed its focus on Northern Europe when it introduced possible methods for 
special area designations. Japan emphasized designations in areas where there were high 
emissions and high contributions to total emissions. Nonetheless, it chose to focus particularly 
on Northern Europe – the area with the highest emissions – when its own investigations had 
shown that ship emissions contributed most in Southern Europe and the Middle East. Special 
areas enabled emission reductions where they were needed most, and the North and Baltic 
Seas were specially targeted as such areas. Hence, opponents of global measures targeted the 
areas of the NSS and the BSS as the geographical application of measures, as impacts had not 
been shown elsewhere in the world due to the critical policy environment.  
 
Early in the process, there were not only differences in methodology and data between the 
studies but also in data sources and reference years in each study. Perhaps the most significant 
problem of the lack of data for decision support has been that the total global emissions were 
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estimated based on emissions in OECD countries. This puts all figures on the contribution 
from ships to the total global emissions in question. This can be argued to have been one 
reason for such figures not being presented or discussed in the later parts of the process. 
Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the figures on global contribution were accepted early 
on in the uncritical policy environment and that the figures did not undergo criticism during 
the critical policy environment. This was due to the figures being low enough to draw a 
conclusion on minimal global contribution by the actors framing the problem as regional or 
local at most.  
 
The situation at BCH 22 has many similarities with the over-critical model. Oil industry 
studies and OCIMF’s submissions are examples of Collingridge and Reeve’s (1986) theory 
that stakeholders affected by regulation are likely to be involved in research that critically 
questions the basis of the research used behind a policy, e.g. look for methodological 
weaknesses, in order to raise doubts about, for example, environmental impacts and benefits 
of a proposed policy. The CONCAWE study made a strong case – with support from OCIMF 
– against the high contribution of ship emissions shown in Norway’s earlier studies. This case 
of low contributions, in turn, made previously rather silent actors argue against global 
regulations with the results of the CONCAWE study as arguments, taking the big flag State 
Liberia as an example. 
 
It was in this situation that the BCH started to develop a regional framework for control of 
SOx emissions from ships. The factors discussed in this section, when taken together, are all 
significant explanations of the first research question. In this analysis, I have found that SSK 
has proven to provide explanations on the first research question based on the empiric 
material, but the basic premises of the over-critical model can also be confirmed. With this in 
mind, let us approach the second research question. 
 
7.1.2 Why Adopt a Combination of Stricter SECAs and a Global Cap?  
Global capping was introduced at BCH 22 and thus in the critical policy environment and 
dominant framing of the issue as a regional or local problem (hereafter regional/local framing) 
and therefore with no need for a global emission reduction. It was thus introduced as a 
supplemental element included in the regional concept. A regional approach was framed as 
the leading principle to control SOx emissions from ships. Given this framing, no global 
reduction of emissions was intended with a global cap. Instead, it aimed to prevent a possible 
future increase in the sulphur content of fuels. The results of BCH 22 with a combined 
approach of regional control and a global cap formed the very basis of the coming discussions 
of the process. The critical policy environment and the regional/local framing existed 
throughout the drafting period by the BCH.  
 
The correspondence group on regional control options was then a final turning point towards 
the regional concept with a supplemental global cap. Much of the content in the report was a 
mere continuation of BCH 22. The difference is that this group assembled all previous and 
new arguments into a ‘case document’ for the regional approach. This term is used here 
inspired by Collingridge and Reeve’s (1986) discussion on scientific ‘advocates’ who gather 
‘evidence’ of their interests and fight counterclaims to form a technical ‘case’ for a policy. 
This should not be confused with the concept of reconstructing factual claims since the report 
did not include scientific claims. Instead, it presented scientific arguments and 
counterarguments for the regional approach, weighing the pros and cons into a case for action. 
The scientific arguments were merely justifications of an already chosen regional approach. In 
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particular, the concept of critical loads was used as justification. The regional approach would 
be applied in areas where there was a clear need for measures, and a designation of such areas 
would require fulfilling specific scientific criteria. Of particular importance with regard to 
framing was the realization that the target could not be achieved in terms of either quantity or 
time, and it was suggested that it be reviewed. This adds to the difference in the framing 
compared with the MEPC. The target was something that the policy-makers at the MEPC had 
agreed on, but at the BCH it would have to be reviewed. The report emphasized that reference 
levels and years should still be established, however, though as we look further in the process, 
we cannot find any such discussion.  
 
Although it left the choice between regional and global measures to be made by the BCH, it 
should be viewed as a strong case document that led to a policy with no point of return at 
BCH 23. A single global approach was thus abandoned at BCH 23. As the process continued, 
the scientific arguments and information focused on supporting different policies on the level 
of or need for a global cap, as well as the delineation of special areas. A concern of increasing 
sulphur contents in bunker fuels due to regulation of land-based sources had been used as a 
scientific argument for regulating ship emissions right from the start of the process, though 
scientific support was lacking. With the emergence of a global cap, this argument thus 
became central, but there was still no scientific support for this concern. It became a trend, 
however, to use the average sulphur content at the time as an argument for various proposals 
on the level of such a global cap. Findings of the average sulphur contents and trends over 
time became significant in terms of proving or disproving the benefits of a particular global 
limit or of its establishment, both for preventing an increase and a reduction of emissions. The 
figures that gained most support for the global cap were between 3% and 5%, with increased 
support towards a majority for 5% at BCH 24.  
 
The 1.5% limit for special areas was little debated, but the criteria for such areas, in particular 
the delineation, were highly debated. When the BCH had ended its work, the MEPC was 
provided with a draft that contained a 5% global cap and 1.5% in special areas (in square 
brackets). As the work went on at the MEPC, these figures would remain even at the final 
draft. This brief summary of the continued process highlights the question on the different 
framings found between the MEPC and the BCH. During the work of the BCH, we saw that 
MEPC 33 rejected the BCH proposal to reopen the question on the necessity of action. It 
referred to the Assembly resolution (A.719(17) on air pollution from ships) and the scientific 
data behind it. Hence, a reframing of the issue could not be found at the MEPC, and different 
framings within the MEPC and the BCH at this time are confirmed. Why then did the MEPC 
finalize a draft with a combination of SECAs and a global cap? How did the role of science 
evolve in the critical policy environment at the BCH, and how did it develop when the MEPC 
took over? Did closure come about due to reconstruction? These questions are addressed in 
the following subsections. 
 
7.1.2.1 Lack of Data, Uncertainties, Resolutions and the Precautionary Principle 
The need to review the target, as emphasized by the correspondence group on regional control 
options in 1993, should be viewed in light of US criticism during the first intersessional 
meeting. It emphasized a need to evaluate the target levels (all considered pollutants) and 
stressed that they had not been supported by estimations of environmental benefits. This 
indicates that scientific information was still scarce at this point in time. An expressed need to 
evaluate the target against environmental benefits two years after the target further implies 
that scientific information and the MEPC target had little impact on policy-making at the 
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BCH. At first sight, the comprehensive bibliography submitted at MEPC 33 implied that 
available information on air pollution from ships was not scarce at the time and that much had 
been addressed by science: 171 papers and reports covering 1971-1992 with several published 
in scientific journals or conference proceedings. On the other hand, the studies included in the 
policy-makers submissions were the only ones that specifically targeted SOx emissions from 
ships. Submissions containing scientific information were not few, however, and they 
increased as the process continued, which is demonstrated by Chapter 5. Not much of this 
information was represented in the reported discussions, which made it difficult to analyse the 
influence on policy-making. Most submissions did not have many scientific references, 
though there were exceptions, e.g. the CONCAWE reports, the background document for 
special area designation of the Baltic Sea Area, etc.  
 
The lack of scientific data was further highlighted as the process continued. At the later stages 
of the process, it mainly concerned the contribution of ship emissions to deposition on land 
and the long-range transport of SOx, as well as environmental evaluations of the target and the 
different proposals on the table. Three Assembly resolutions were frequently referred to in 
arguments for the need for more data. The first was the Assembly resolution on air pollution 
from ships (Resolution A.719(17)), which requested that the MEPC and the BCH collect and 
assess information on emissions to establish reference levels. The other two (Resolutions 
A.500 (XII) and A.777(18)) emphasized a clear and well-documented demonstration of a 
compelling need in proposals for new conventions (or amendments), as well as the 
importance of informed decisions. These two resolutions indicate that the need to demonstrate 
scientific evidence and to base decisions thereon was part of the IMO’s institutional culture 
and formal procedures. Following Jasanoff (1997), this implies that ‘science’ had a condition 
to successfully affect policy-making. This remained as a condition however. Although the 
references to these resolutions criticized the lack of science-based decisions, they were made 
by actors questioning scientific claims that showed a need for a global cap as well as by those 
who saw it as important that scientific criteria constituted a significant part of special area 
designation, i.e. as a strategy to further restrict the application of measures (see also Section 
7.1.2.3). Uncertainty is a concept that is of high importance in this process. The use of 
scientific uncertainty and the lack of information along with references to these resolutions 
were not just for the above reasons but were also used as arguments to postpone decisions on 
strict – primarily global – regulations. These kinds of arguments had already been found in 
the early sessions. In addition to resolutions, the precautionary principle was frequently 
referred to and interpreted in different ways depending on the policies of different actors. 
Proponents of a strict global cap used the precautionary principle to justify action despite 
scientific uncertainties, with the argument that SOx emissions were threats of serious or 
irreversible damage. Opponents instead considered that the available evidence did not show 
that ship emissions posed such threats.  
 
References to the resolutions show a lack of information as the basis of decisions. Overall, it 
is not difficult to conclude that the policy-makers faced a lack of information – e.g. on 
emission quantities, atmospheric dispersion, impacts and reduction benefits – for their policy 
choices and decisions. Following the discussion in Section 7.1.1.4, I highlight that new 
studies primarily focused on building cases against previous studies instead of focusing on 
research areas where information was lacking. The critical policy environment was thus a 
factor that explains this lack of information. A clear example of the lack of scientific 
information for decisions and the role of uncertainty in a critical policy environment is the 
debate on emissions versus deposition. Norway’s submission (BCH 23/INF.18) at BCH 23 
showed the scientific uncertainties at the time and the complexity of drawing conclusions 
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from the results in favour of a particular policy on the geographical scale for regulations. It 
was the first with scientific support for the scientific argument that the transboundary nature 
of SOx emissions required global regulations. Nonetheless, the extraordinarily low 
contribution figure that was presented could be viewed as a counterargument to its 
conclusion. Another policy-maker could easily have referred to this document with a different 
conclusion in favour of its policy or used the same data and reconstructed the scientific 
claims. With uncertainty, the policy-maker decides how to interpret the results, which leads us 
back to the question of which actors or institutions were recognized with moral and scientific 
authority. 
 
7.1.2.2 Scientific Authority  
In Section 7.1.1.1, I argued that the early parts of the process recognized LRTAP and its 
epistemic community EMEP as the institutions with scientific authority, and thus, in turn, the 
member States connected to LRTAP, the NSS and the BSS. According to Jasanoff (1996, p. 
181), definitions of what is and is not science are negotiated in policy-making: “Labelling an 
issue as either ‘science’ or ‘policy’ implicitly entails an allocation of power – the power to 
speak or be heard on the issues in question – and interest groups will fight over these labels”. 
From BCH 22 forward, EMEP still stood as the primary scientific authority, but other actors 
took advantage of this authority and used emission data provided by EMEP to gain their own 
scientific authority by the policy-makers. In particular, OCIMF and CONCAWE became the 
primary actors recognized by their interpretation of these data. As an example, Singapore 
specifically highlighted a 2% ship emission contribution to the total European emissions at 
BCH 24 with the formulation: “according to EMEP” (BCH 24/7/14, p. 2, abbreviated). Did 
Singapore mean the results of CONCAWE (1993) – contribution to depositions in 
Scandinavia and Northwestern Europe – or was it another study actually conducted by 
EMEP? This cannot be determined in this thesis, but if it meant the results by CONCAWE, 
Singapore’s submission is written so that the reader interprets that the conclusions from a 
study by CONCAWE were the words from EMEP. In that case, it shows a good example of 
the importance of referring to its authoritative status: the data were from EMEP – an 
epistemic community with authoritative status of interpreting science – though the actual 
interpreter was an oil industry organization.  
 
At BCH 23, OCIMF argued that it could not accept that there were threats of serious or 
irreversible damage – as prescribed by the precautionary approach – based on “the best 
available authoritative scientific information” (BCH 23/7/5, p. 3). This implies that OCIMF 
held the view that submitted and discussed studies during the process had scientific 
authoritative status, including studies from industry organizations, governmental agencies and 
consultants. Given OCIMF’s influence in this process, I assume that this view was shared by 
the actors that shared the same regional/local framing and scientific arguments. When 
scientific claims approach the policy-making arena, it is the policy-makers that determine 
which studies and actors are given authoritative status in the policy-making context. This was 
the case for this process. The status was given to that which supported a particular policy of a 
specific actor.  
 
7.1.2.3 Framing Even Closer to the Shore 
The correspondence group on regional control options initiated the need for criteria – in 
particular scientific ones – in order to establish special areas. Notably, neither global capping 
nor the actual regional choice had been subjected to a thorough scientific evaluation. How 
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then did scientific criteria appear for this particular policy? What were the reasons? No 
argument was found in the report of the correspondence group, but it was stated that concerns 
of countries in an area were not reasons enough for designating special areas. This indicates 
that scientific criteria were to be used for restricting special area designations, which was 
confirmed at MEPC 39 when the committee agreed that unwarranted special areas would be 
prevented with strict application of the criteria and procedures. Hence, a clear role of science 
in this process was as a restriction of regulation and, thus, a restriction of environmental 
protection. This also provides us with a new picture on the regional approach – a picture more 
suited to the framing at the time. Limiting measures to a regional scale was not enough: it had 
to be in special areas with special circumstances, and these had to be proven. This is well in 
line with the framing and policies of many actors, as well as their scientific arguments and 
supportive claims.  
 
A majority of the scientific arguments and supportive claims present after BCH 22 were about 
delineation of special areas and not about the global cap. Actors for the oil industry and 
shipping industry interests became increasingly involved in showing only local contributions. 
As before, OCIMF played an important role in this regard, as did its further submitted studies 
by CONCAWE and IPIECA. As stated above on the first research question, OCIMF’s 
submissions clearly showed the framing of the issue as not being a problem, or local at most, 
but it could agree to a special area solution. Was this a strategy to put a special area regulation 
in place and then make the area as small as possible? Later submissions showed just this kind 
of strategy. Almost every study by OCIMF in the continued process was about showing that 
ship emissions only contributed to impacts within ports and port areas. These studies gained 
significant support, e.g. a big alliance of States connected to Singapore.  
 
This chapter has found no scientific information behind the criteria except on the issue of 
delineation. Instead, scientific criteria were first established and then negotiated in political 
terms on the basis of different policies of different actors. How the scientific criteria were 
negotiated could not be answered. Investigating amendments or new words in individual 
paragraphs of a draft is not the intention of this thesis. A group of experts was involved in a 
revised draft, though the reported list of participants indicated that these were merely 
delegations and representatives from observer organizations. Hence, these scientific criteria 
were the result of drafting and negotiations by policy-makers. 
 
7.1.2.4 Changed Framing of the MEPC and a Persistent Critical Policy Environment 
The discussions on delineation of special areas became the main issue in the scientific 
arguments and information found after BCH 22. The regional/local framing dominated both at 
the BCH and the MEPC. The framing of the MEPC had thus changed from a global issue to a 
regional one. After BCH 24, the MEPC found itself in locked negotiations with a regional 
special area approach and a majority favouring the highest possible global sulphur content 
limit (5%), a limit without any effect on emissions due to the already existing ISO standard. 
The content of the investigated submissions suggests that the higher the proposed sulphur 
content policy – i.e. the lesser the regulatory level – the more scientific arguments. This 
situation changed at MEPC 36 due a UK submission showing that a 50% reduction could not 
be reached with 1.5% in SECAs or globally. This was highlighted by several actors towards 
the end of the process, and more studies were submitted that showed the transboundary and 
complex nature of ship emissions.  
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The findings provided by the UK did not change the draft global cap of 5% (in square 
brackets) however. Scientific studies showing a need for stricter measures simply had no 
effect on policy at this stage of the process, and this despite the IMO having agreed to include 
the precautionary principle in its work. In this context, we are reminded that the 
correspondence group on regional control options had already realized that the target could 
not be reached and that it had the view that the target had to be revised. No revision was made 
however. Instead, the reference levels and years lost their policy significance during the years 
after the correspondence group. The target merely became a constant argument of those 
favouring stricter requirements and thus a less important factor for the majority favouring as 
low regulations as possible. The lack of policy impact of studies showing a need for stricter 
measures is explained by the critical policy environment. The process and the scientific 
debates had reached a deadlock. There were long discussions on scientific methods and 
concepts and strong cases of deconstruction and reconstruction. This time it was not all about 
emissions versus deposition but also about retained sulphur in the atmosphere. In the 
discussions on delineation at MEPC 38, it was reported that that the scientific evidence on 
transportation of SOx emissions from ships had led to different interpretations among the 
policy-makers. This implies that there were uncertainties or that different studies gave 
different results with different conclusions or interpretations of the same phenomenon. It 
could easily be argued that it concerned the debate on emissions, retained sulphur and 
deposition, and it could be speculated that the different interpretations and opinions on the 
necessary size of special areas were derived from the submissions of Norway and OCIMF at 
the previous session. 
 
As argued earlier, the important questions are how different figures were interpreted by the 
policy-makers and which approach had most policy relevance. Given the changed framing of 
the MEPC, it came down to the figure that confirmed the framing and majority positions. 
MEPC 37 is a good example of the critical policy environment, with OCIMF submitting 
criticism of studies that did not confirm its policy and further criticism being submitted both 
in support of and as counterviews on the OCIMF-CONCAWE-ICCET conclusions. At this 
time, it seemed that the process had arrived at an extensive technical debate, as the over-
critical model suggests.  
 
7.1.2.5 Closure 
Following the SSK concepts of policy environments, deconstruction and reconstruction from 
Jasanoff (1987, 1997), extensive scientific debates in a critical policy environment should not 
mean failure to reach agreement but instead closure in critical policy environments is derived 
from deconstruction. Chapter 5 has shown increased scientific content for each session as the 
process progressed. The scientific arguments and claims increased, as did the submissions and 
the scientific discussions, yet policy-making remained stuck for many years with the majority 
5% global cap and a special area approach. In this analysis, we have seen an uncritical policy 
environment with few scientific claims and many uncertainties turn into a critical policy 
environment, with criticism, deconstruction and reconstruction of scientific claims, existing 
uncertainties being exacerbated and debates without progress on scientific concepts and 
methods. How did closure occur is this situation? 
 
Participation and the Role of ‘Science’ 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that the total participation of members and observers increased at 
both the MEPC and the BCH. These were primarily an increased number of member States 
and NGOs as shown in both figures. Figure 7.3, however, shows big variations in working 
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groups and drafting groups. No conclusion could be drawn on a participation trend of the 
groups due to the different kinds of groups at different stages of the policy-making process. 
According to Jasanoff (1996), it seems easiest to achieve international agreements on complex 
technical issues when participation is narrowed in the early parts of the process. Taking the 
Montreal protocol on ozone depleting substances as an example, the negotiations were 
initially restricted but the participation was gradually extended to include many countries. As 
a result, States that joined the negotiations on later parts of the process did not have the 
necessary preparation: they did not share the expertise, the framings of the environmental 
problems and an understanding of the causes of ozone depletion that the early participants had 
shared. The result was an emission-targeted policy and thus a shared Western belief by 
epistemic communities backed by the authority of science. For the studied case of this thesis, 
however, science had the conditions to be successful in the early parts of the process, but this 
remained as a condition (as for the earlier discussion on conditions). The framing and the 
scientific arguments were accepted, but this was due to the uncritical policy environment and 
the fact that few scientific claims were presented at this stage.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Participating Group of Actors, MEPC 1988-1997 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Participating Group of Actors, BCH 1991-1994 
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Figure 7.3. Participating Group of Actors, Working and Drafting Groups 1989-1997 
 
As stated in Section 7.1.2.2, Jasanoff (1996) argued that different interest groups will fight 
over the label ‘science’ (or ‘scientific’ studies), since it represents the power to speak or be 
heard on an issue. A conclusion of the submitted studies of this process is that they were 
conducted by governmental agencies and industry organizations or in the interests of member 
States or member organizations for the purpose of providing input to the policy-making 
process. These studies thus represented socially constructed factual claims by actors with 
certain policy beliefs. Their policy beliefs guided their framing of the issue. The early studies 
were framed in a global context. As the number of participants increased, new participants 
with other policy beliefs arrived on the scene, resulting in criticism of previous scientific 
claims. These new beliefs formed alliances between member States and epistemic 
communities with shared policy beliefs, in particular oil and shipping industry organizations, 
flag States and oil-producing/exporting States. Two groups with different framings evolved: 
one that framed the issue as global and another as regional/local. This resulted in deadlocked 
negotiations, but the regional/local group was in a majority.  
 
An Over-Critical Policy Environment: Negotiating the Framing and Compromising 
Chapter 5 showed different framing by different actors, sometimes with support from 
scientific claims but often mere policies with later scientific arguments as justifications. No 
consensus on the framing was found from the investigated documents, and what looked like a 
clear global framing by the IMO in an Assembly resolution did not hold once the BCH started 
its work. A change of framing by the actors is clear at BCH 22, though what has been shown 
in this thesis is that the framing was not just an early stage of a policy process but rather it 
characterized the whole process. At almost every point in time of this process, there were 
different communicated messages from different actors on how the issue should be framed but 
no clear framing from the policy-makers as a group. Instead, what was found in this thesis 
when analysing the role of science was a ten-year process of negotiating the framing with 
attempts to agree on measures at the same time. 
 
As shown in Section 2.2, NGOs function as knowledge pools and advisors to the policy-
makers and are thus viewed as epistemic communities. In line with what has been described 
for land-based transboundary air pollution (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2011), this studied 
process has shown a group of policy-makers and epistemic communities – e.g. LRTAP/EMEP 
and environmental NGOs – that emphasized the transboundary nature of the problem and 
submitted scientific claims to advance these arguments so that political action could be taken 
through the IMO. It has also shown another group of policy-makers and epistemic 
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communities – oil and shipping industry NGOs and the IEA – acting to prevent the issue from 
being perceived as global or even regional. These steps primarily focused on showing a 
minimal contribution of ship emissions to total emissions and depositions, thereby taking 
away the responsibility of one industry, among many, that contributed to pollution. They used 
scientific arguments and supporting claims as well as uncertainties and confusion over 
different scientific methods and concepts to confirm their framing and communicate it to the 
rest of the policy-makers. In line with the over-critical model and not SSK, however, these 
two groups of actors never really agreed, and the negotiations continued until the very end. As 
mentioned many times with regard to global capping, a majority favoured 5% and the other 
group of actors favoured a lower limit. At MEPC 38, however, the views were evenly divided 
between a 5% cap and a lower figure (unspecified). Hence, the 5% majority had been broken. 
Did scientific arguments and claims change the deadlocked negotiations?  
 
Viewed from this conceptual lens, the answer is no. At MEPC 38, the previous main actors of 
the process were locked in their previous positions and arguments. New proposals on the 
global cap emerged, but these were mere compromises without scientific arguments. At the 
preceding session, the deadlocked scientific debates had resulted in compromises being 
manifested in submissions. For the BSS, designating the Baltic Sea Area as a special area had 
become the main priority due to the lack of support for a global solution, and their scientific 
arguments thus focused on the Baltic Sea Area. The UK (MEPC 37/13/10) made a clear 
compromise given its scientific arguments. Although it had shown that the targets would not 
be reached with a SECA for the North Sea, it proposed the use of a 12 nm limit for special 
areas, with larger areas needing to be proven by scientific evidence. The argument for this 
proposal was that awaiting further research would delay the finalization of Annex VI. This is  
just the kind of compromise due to extensive technical debates described by the over-critical 
model, and this analysis has indeed shown extensive technical debates. The agreement on the 
combined SECA and global cap approach can thus not be viewed as anything other than a 
mere compromise and determination of the actors to stop contesting it due to the time limit of 
the process. Hence, the outcome of this case confirms the over-critical model and not SSK. 
Closure could not appear in this critical policy environment by the use of ‘science’.  
 
Lidskog and Sundqvist (2011, pp. 11-12) reasoned that “by negotiating and constructing 
boundaries among the global, regional, national, and local levels, an identity is shaped 
between a specific environmental problem and a specific spatial level”. They further clarified 
that “an image of a geographical location at risk is constructed and becomes the object of 
action” (ibid.). That the policy-makers negotiated the framing and at the same time tried to 
agree on measures explains the outcome of this process. An identity between the problem of 
SOx emissions from ships and a specific spatial level was never established. Hence an image 
of the geographical location at risk had not been shaped and, thereby, no clear object of 
action. This can explain the adopted combination of a global cap and SECAs; Regulation 14 
shows a negotiation of the framing. 
 
Further Prerequisites for Science to Influence Policy 
In addition to the above explanations on the research questions, a significant difference 
between the processes towards agreement on land-based emissions and ship emissions was 
the prerequisites for science to influence policy. As described in the background, the 
cooperation on long-range transboundary air pollution can be explained by science enabling 
cooperation in an East-West conflict. LRTAP and EMEP evolved in a mutual 
interdependency of the two contexts of science and the geopolitical climate. Science was a 
tool for cooperation demanded for by the policy-makers and EMEP was the response. The 
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policy-makers gave science both priority and authority, and an epistemic community became 
strongly connected to the policy-making arena as well as the regime. The extended role of 
science in policy-making was accepted by scientists who were given technocratic powers. Put 
in SSK terms, this is an example of knowledge and policy being co-produced (Lidskog and 
Sundqvist, 2002, 2011). The IMO simply did not have such prerequisites during the studied 
process. When the issue arrived at the IMO it concerned all the world’s oceans and the 
international nature of shipping. The cold war was also nearing an end. There were thus no 
strong political pressures for using science as a means for cooperation. The institutional 
culture of the IMO is as important. With the smallest secretariat in the UN system and a 
budget relying on developing countries due to flags of convenience, there was no scope for 
conducting science, monitoring emissions, etc. (see more in Campe, 2009). The earlier 
discussed Assembly resolutions also played a very important role in determining the direction 
of the role of science in this process. 
 
According to Jasanoff (1997), epistemic communities are needed to produce science that is 
meaningful to policy, which has been shown in this case by scientific claims and influence 
from LRTAP/EMEP and NGOs (primarily industry NGOs). No decision-making power was 
allocated to these communities by the IMO however. This is an important explanation for the 
role of science not being able to influence the policy outcome and yet another important factor 
explaining why the same issue could evolve into one of the most science-based and successful 
environmental regimes for land-based emissions and not for ship emissions. 
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7.2 Explaining by the Role of Economic Interests 
 
The following sections analyse and discuss the results of Chapter 6 with explanations from 
the second conceptual lens; collective action and Wilson’s theory of politics (see Section 3.3).  
 
7.2.1 Why Change the Focus to Regional Measures at the BCH? 
Since no economic aspects were reported until MEPC 29, let us start at a theoretical level to 
provide a conceptual starting point. 
 
7.2.1.1 A Conceptual Starting Point and Early Acceptance 
If viewed as a problem affecting our common atmosphere in general, SOx emissions can be 
seen as a problem of public goods. However, the known problems of SOx emissions at the 
time were not about the atmosphere or the oceans. The problem was acidification on land as 
well as air quality problems in general. This could be viewed as CPR problems on regional to 
local scales affecting the following ‘goods’: air quality, forests, lakes, precipitation, etc. 
Common to all of these is that it is not possible to exclude an individual from the benefits of 
these goods, but if a ship emits acidifying SOx emissions, the goods are used as a ‘sulphur 
sink’: first the air, then precipitation, and then it falls on forests and lakes. A ship’s sulphur 
emissions thus affect others’ benefit from clean air, healthy forests and lakes, productive fish 
stocks, etc. by contributing its individual part to destroying these goods (given the rivalry of 
the issue structure).  
 
The categorization of SOx emissions from international shipping as a CPR problem is not 
suitable for explaining collective action at the IMO however. The issue structure is both rival 
and non-excludable, but the actors that caused the problems of acid rain and regional air 
quality at the time were not the same as those that suffered from it. The sources for this policy 
issue were individual ships that sailed around the world. Even if we assumed that the problem 
at the time was perceived as global with acid rain being manifested globally from a moving 
source around the world, it would not be a CPR problem. The significance of the directional 
character of acid rain – as emphasized by DeSombre (2007) – is thus underlined here, and a 
directional problem is viewed as a suitable characterization for this particular policy issue. 
However, since the source in this case was international shipping, the directional character is 
more complex and dynamic and covers greater distances. This policy issue was not a State-to-
State directional issue with net polluters and net recipients. The source could ‘send out’ 
emissions to recipient States – and it could be relatively near the manifested problem – but it 
was a moving source and could be the responsibility of an owner or flag State far away from 
where the emissions took place. It could further be the responsibility of the producers and 
suppliers of HSFO. The sources and  actors that caused the problem thus have two main 
dimensions as shown in Table 7.1: (1) the ships and the shipping industry, and (2) the fuels 
and the producers/suppliers. Connected to these actors are member States with decision-
making powers at the IMO – flag States, States with maritime interests, oil-
producing/exporting States and bunker-supplying States – and a number of interests 
represented in observer NGOs. For simplicity, connected interests to these such as charterers 
and cargo owners are excluded. 
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Table 7.1. Dimensions of sources, causing actors and IMO representatives 
Source Polluters Representative States Representative NGOs 
1. Ships operating 
internationally  
 
Ship operators, 
shipowners, etc. 
- Flag States (including 
FOC States) 
- States with maritime 
interests 
 
Shipping industry NGOs 
2. High-sulphur fuels Refineries and 
suppliers of high-
sulphur fuels 
Oil-producing/exporting 
States 
Bunker-supplying States 
Oil industry NGOs 
 
 
Strict interpretation of traditional collective action holds that self-interests are paramount and 
not the collective interests. A rational State will always put its self-interests first and free-ride 
in international environmental cooperation. I, however, assume that the free-rider problem 
does not apply to this case as it is a directional problem. The actors that caused the problem 
were not affected by it and did not have anything to benefit from; hence they could not free-
ride. Instead of using the term free-riding, the term opposition is more appropriate in this 
particular case. Nonetheless, opposition could be expected from these two groups of actors 
even at the early stage and, given the international and directional character of the issue, such 
opposition would be strong according to DeSombre (2007). 
 
Why then were the proposals by the NSS and the BSS on global action accepted collectively 
at an early stage when viewing it from this second lens? The early recognition of SOx 
emissions from ships as a global problem for the IMO to deal with was mostly connected to 
air pollution as such. The concept of issue linkage
105
 thus comes in as the sole theoretical 
explanation. The air pollutants addressed early on at the IMO included CFCs, which had been 
agreed to be phased out at a global level under the Montreal Protocol adopted in 1987 (UNEP, 
2014): the year before air pollution made its way onto the IMO agenda. Measures on CFCs 
could thus have been important for many States, which could have given acceptance to start 
the negotiations on a multi-issue treaty that also addressed SOx emissions. Such an 
explanation is without empirical support however, in other words, a speculation. In this 
regard, it should be kept simple and include other speculations. It could just as well be that the 
economic implications were simply not well known or thought of at this stage of the process 
or that it took some time to mobilize against the policy.  
 
7.2.1.2 Early Economic Interests: Oil Industry Implications and Concentrated Costs 
The investigated documents showed no indication of economic interests affecting policy 
choices until MEPC 31 in 1991. Nevertheless, the submitted information accumulated and 
economic interests slowly but steadily increased their role in the discussions. When the 
economic discussions appeared at the IMO, it immediately became strongly centred on oil-
industry implications connected to the availability of LSFO and the costs of desulphurization. 
The sulphur content of HFO was dependent on the sulphur content of the crude oil used in the 
refineries, which varied across the world’s regions. The availability of LSFO that would 
comply with the proposed 1.5% global limit was low and these fuels were only supplied in 12 
countries. A global reduction of the sulphur content would thus require desulphurization of 
HFO in most refineries around the world. This meant high investment costs for 
desulphurization technology and high operational costs due to an energy-demanding process. 
 
                                                  
105 With issue linkage, a State could agree on an issue since it links the issue with another issue or issues of its 
interest to be solved at international level. See Section 3.3. 
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Economic implications were first introduced by Kuwait and Venezuela. These States were 
producing and exporting petroleum products with high sulphur contents (Eni, 2013), thus 
representing the second group of polluting actors in the above table. Viewed from this 
conceptual lens, these actors would put their self-interests first and not the collective interests. 
In this view, their self-interests were to protect their oil industry and markets for high-sulphur 
products. Their concerns were thus impacts on their exports if the sulphur content was 
regulated, and these States were those that would have to use and pay for costly 
desulphurization processes as their only way to stay in the market of marine fuels, as their 
crudes had high sulphur contents. So far, we can thus see that a concentrated group of actors 
would have to pay for benefits that were perceived at a global level
106
 or for other States than 
this group given the directional character of the problem. In either case, the benefits were for 
a larger group of States than this one. We thus have a perceived policy issue in Wilson’s third 
category: distributed benefits and concentrated costs – the typical environmental policy issue 
with polluters as a concentrated group of actors that would bear the cost burden and 
widespread or diffuse benefits. According to Wilson (1973, 1980), a concentrated group of 
actors that bears the costs of a policy has a strong incentive to mobilize against it if it has 
widely distributed benefits. Strong opposition could thus be expected from this group of 
actors. The first submission on economic impacts that entered the process was in fact by 
Kuwait, which was keen on keeping the sulphur content limits of 4-5% at the time, and by 
Venezuela, which opposed a 1% limit at the same session. 
 
7.2.1.3 A Small Role of Shipping Interests 
The highlighted costs for shipping were connected to the focus on oil industry implications 
and consisted only of figures of increased bunker fuel prices based on the costs of 
desulphurization. These figures should be viewed as arguments of self-interested oil-
producing/exporting States concerned with their own industrial impacts but addressed to 
shipping interests to raise concern and, ultimately, gain support against a strict global sulphur 
limit. Notably, shipping industry organizations and FOC States were absent in the early 
discussions. On the other hand, Norway, the UK, France, and Sweden and the BSS addressed 
the implications for the oil industry and increased costs for shipping. These are States with 
maritime interests whose positions and economic arguments could be viewed as part of 
shipping interests, e.g. big ship-owning States such as the UK and Norway (Tan, 2006), but as 
they represented the NSS and the BSS they should instead be viewed as beneficiaries of 
regulations. They were the initiators of the issue at the IMO and the driving actors towards 
global regulations at the time. Their policies were also somewhat unclear, e.g. highlighted 
implications mixed with positive views on the feasibility of stricter measures. The fact that the 
NSS and the BSS themselves proposed including regional measures when they proposed the 
(later agreed) 50% reduction target at a global level should be viewed in this context. No 
explanation could be given on their introduction of regional measures due to the lack of 
presented arguments. On shipping interests, it should further be noted that the adopted 
Assembly resolution included taking into account the economic impacts of the shipping 
industry.
 107
  Although no prior discussion on this matter was found, its inclusion was an 
                                                  
106 This is an assumption derived from the early acceptance of the IMO action for a global problem. Although 
this acceptance mainly concerned air pollution in general, arguments that it was a regional problem had not 
appeared at this stage (see more on the role of science). 
107 When approaching MEPC 31, it should also be noted that – the also big ship-owning State (Tan, 2006) – 
Germany proposed that the Assembly resolution on air pollution from ships should include an exclusion of 
national, regional or local regulations due to the international character of shipping.  
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important reference for the upcoming discussions and it increased the role of economic 
interests of the shipping industry. 
 
7.2.1.4 An Opened Door for a Greater Role of Economic Interests 
The removal of the target from the Assembly resolution at MEPC 31 is a significant factor 
towards a regional approach. Although specified as a ‘technical’ study, the US proposal 
indicates a request for an evaluation of measures before decisions, including evaluating 
economic implications. That is in fact one of three things the BCH was then instructed to do: 
deal with economic/technical implications of possible measures. Several notifications had 
been made at MEPC 31 on a number of initiated and ongoing studies on bunker markets and 
implications, with results being available in the near future. These notifications could also 
have played an important part in the decision to remove the target in accordance with the 
argument to await further study by the BCH. With no decisions on the target being taken 
before the outcome of the technical consideration by the BCH, there was time for evaluating 
the costs and benefits before decisions and more time given for discussing economic 
implications in general. The drafting period at the BCH became characterized by more and 
more highlighted economic implications and huge cost figures for the oil industry and, in turn, 
for shipping. I thus argue that the removal of the target opened a door for an increased role of 
economic interests. In particular, it allowed for a possibility for the oil industry and oil-
producing States to make their self-interests heard by the policy-makers and to show as high 
economic implications as possible so that others would also oppose strict global regulation. It 
should thus be viewed as a first breaking-point towards a regional approach.  
 
A US response to a Swedish statement at BCH 24 supports the removal of the target dates as a 
first breaking-point towards a regional approach. The delegation of Sweden emphasized that 
the BCH had taken a turn away from the MEPC objectives. The US delegation responded that 
the role of a sub-committee was to technically evaluate those areas that the main committee 
requested it to consider. Thus, the target level should not be seen as sole MEPC tasking 
without further technical review. Since the target levels and dates were not included in the 
Assembly resolution, the US delegation expressed that it was comfortable with a combined 
global and regional approach that did not strictly hold on to the MEPC target.
108
 The removal 
of the target and this motivation for a regional approach were the only significant roles the US 
played through this lens. The US is otherwise a significant State of maritime interests and a 
dominant player in the policy-making dynamics for shipping (Tan, 2006). From 1985 to1995, 
it was still among the top ten flag States (in tonnage) and in 1999 it was the third biggest ship-
owning State (by tonnage). In addition, most of the tonnage in registered open registries such 
as Liberia and the Bahamas are US-owned ships. Given that most of the largest oil-producing 
companies are located in the US, and it is a very significant petroleum importer, producer – 
including large quantities of sour crude oil – and consumer, with about 25% of the wold’s oil 
consumption , its small activities in this process are notable. Nevertheless, the role of the US 
interests should not be considered small given its contribution to a first breaking-point 
towards a regional approach. 
 
                                                  
108
 The views of the US were supported by “other delegations” (BCH 23/14, para. 7.64) (meaning others than 
those that supported Sweden). 
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7.2.1.5 New Actors Went ‘All In’ for Economic Implications 
When the issue arrived at the BCH, all possible arguments of availability problems, estimated 
costs and wide-reaching implications were basically thrown at the policy-makers, and new 
actors entered the scene. It is clear here that this analysis cannot just focus on DeSombre’s 
division between those that caused and those that suffered from the problem. I thus follow 
Wilson that those that would bear the costs of regulation are those that would oppose 
regulation, and we thus need to focus on these actors. This does not mean an abandonment of 
collective action and DeSombre’s insights on international negotiations but rather that 
connecting collective action and Wilson’s theory of politics is a suitable approach to 
explaining the role of economic interests in this particular case. 
 
The economic implications were taken to their heights by Japan. Its submissions at BCH 21-
22 are remarkable in many ways: significantly higher desulphurization costs and, in turn, 
significantly higher bunker fuel prices, higher freight costs, words such as an ‘excessive 
burden’ (on the refining industry) and ‘extremely high’ costs, and an argument with 
supporting information that a 1.5% sulphur content could not be reached globally. Most 
remarkable, however, is that Japan extended the question of implications to a different and 
much higher level of importance to the policy-makers. Japan both feared and argued that low 
sulphur content limits would disturb the global supply and demand balance of oil in general. 
The use of low-sulphur crude oils as a basis for producing bunker fuels could result in a drop 
in crude oil supply. This would have huge impacts not only on crude oil-producing States but 
also on the global crude oil market, with effects also on the energy policies of countries 
dependent on oil for a stable energy supply.  
 
According to Tan (2006), Japan has a significant role in shipping and significant influence at 
the IMO, not only because it is one of the largest ship-owning States and has a large 
shipbuilding industry but also because it is heavily dependent on imports by sea transport due 
to its lack of natural resources. The fact that Japan highlighted economic impacts for the 
shipping industry and high estimated bunker price increases should thus be seen in this 
context, as should the importance of Japan’s submissions to this policy-making process. But 
why did Japan focus so much on oil industry implications and even bigger impacts on energy 
dependence? The lack of natural resources does of course have an energy dimension. Japan is 
dependent on importing oil primarily from the Middle East (ibid.). It could thus be considered 
to belong to both groups: States with maritime interests and States with interests in maritime 
trade (see Chapter 2). Hence, its submission should be viewed as an effort by a self-interested 
State to oppose regulation that would have economic implications on a national scale due to 
its high dependence on sea transport and high-sulphur crudes and also connected to the 
implications on its significant shipping industry.  
 
Through this lens, Japan is the actor that showed the strongest arguments towards a regional 
approach before it was decided to take that policy direction. The fact that it was highlighted at 
BCH 21 that further consideration was needed on global versus regional application supports 
the direct influence of Japanese economic interests. Japan and OCIMF – with its CONCAWE 
summaries and support from IEA – became the primary influential actors of economic 
interests towards a regional approach at BCH 22. Their submissions are partial explanations 
of the turn at BCH 22 to develop a framework on regional control of SOx emissions. The 
CONCAWE study showed even higher costs than for previous actors. Since these costs were 
found at European and regional European levels, it could be assumed that the global costs 
would be even higher perceived by the policy-makers. In addition to Japan and OCIMF, the 
Netherlands showed costs in a similar range. The Netherlands is a State with interests in 
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maritime trade, with Rotterdam as the largest port in Europe and the world's fourth largest 
container port in 1993 (Stopford, 1997). Moreover, Tan (2006) included the Netherlands as an 
influential maritime State actor. Notably, the group of volunteers for developing the regional 
approach was chaired by the Netherlands, which shows its policy significance in this process. 
Its submitted report on measures on the sulphur content of overall fuels in the EC further 
showed consensus between the oil industry and the study results, which is significant since it 
confirms oil industry implications from a study commissioned by 15 European countries. 
 
The shipping interests aligned with the interests of the oil industry at this stage of the process. 
INTERTANKO – representing the interests of a large number of the tanker owners that are 
independent from the large oil companies (Tan, 2006) – is perhaps the most obvious 
connection between the economic interests of the oil industry and the shipping industry. At 
MEPC 32, it was stated that the costs would fall on both the oil industry and oil tanker owners 
and reaffirmed previous arguments on oil interests. Although the international character of 
shipping was highlighted by ICS – representing national shipowner associations worldwide, 
with about 50% of the merchant fleet tonnage (Tan, 2006) – as a reason for international 
regulations, it supported a regional approach. This shows the interdependence of the oil 
industry and shipping industry, and the impacts of the high cost figures presented by the oil 
interests. Some implications related to shipping interests were used, however, as arguments 
against a regional approach by Norway at BCH 22 with regard to the heavy burden on ship 
operations as well as national administrations and impacts on the free movement of 
international shipping. This had some support, but the working group agreed that the regional 
approach would encompass uniform standards that would prevent such implications.  
 
The regional approach was motivated by the group of volunteers with the argument of 
availability problems for global use of LSFO and that environmental protection in particularly 
affected areas could be provided without unnecessary burdens for ship operators. This shows 
that the role of economic interests is important in explaining the turn towards a regional 
approach, and this analysis has showed that the above actors’ self-interests connected to the 
oil industry and petroleum markets were the most significant factors. Annex 3 of this thesis 
shows the presented monetary costs and benefits from 1990 to 1997. Up to 1992, it shows an 
increasing number of cost estimates with ever higher figures for a strict global regulation of 
the sulphur content in marine fuels. The decision to develop a regional framework was taken 
in a policy climate in which the perceived costs of regulation were increasing each session, as 
were the actors highlighting them as arguments against global regulation. The benefits 
expressed in monetary values were few and only focused on the shipping industry with 
decreased fuel costs. No social costs or benefits were presented in monetary values during this 
period. Hence, the introduction of a regional approach was not based on an evaluation on the 
costs of regulations against the social benefits (or social costs without regulation).  
  
7.2.1.6 Perceived Concentrated Benefits and Distributed Costs? 
Japan attempted to show implications of strict global regulations to other States, and it used 
wider implications to do so. This is something we first saw by the oil-producing States, a 
strategy to use arguments and information that affect other actors’ self-interests based on their 
own. Japan’s recommendation to treat the issue separately as a global problem and a problem 
for special areas should not only be seen in the context of its self-interests but also in the 
context of influencing others to oppose a global regulation and to prefer a regional solution. 
The policy issue had now extended beyond implications for the refineries and the shipping 
industry. Negative effects on the global oil supply and demand structure and implication for 
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countries’ energy policies are affecting the self-interests of most member States. At BCH 22, 
OCIMF then continued the extensions of the implications and stated that the energy 
consumption of desulphurization could accelerate the depletion of global petroleum reserves. 
If the policy-makers believed that these implications were correctly estimated then the 
perceived costs were not concentrated but widely distributed. Since the way the actors 
perceived the problem had changed, the relevant characterization for analysis also has to be 
changed. At BCH 22, the problem was mostly viewed as regional and even local (see the role 
of science), hence as were the benefits of regulation. We thus turn the policy categorization 
around and find ourselves looking at a policy issue of concentrated benefits and distributed 
costs – Wilson’s second category.  
 
According to Wilson (1973, 1980), no opposition could be expected in such a situation and 
the benefitting group of actors would be able to mobilize effective support. Wilson’s theory 
on such a policy situation is thus very different from what this process has described at the 
international policy-making level. Wilson’s theory can thus not explain opposition to global 
regulation with regional benefits if many actors bear the cost burdens. To categorize global 
regulation as a policy with perceived widely distributed costs, however, is based on the 
assumption that the policy-makers kept the same views of the implications as Japan and 
OCIMF. This is something that cannot be determined within the scope of this thesis. It is fair, 
however, to assume that different actors had different views on the extent of the implications 
and presented cost figures, and that the same could also be said about the benefits. This is one 
of the key assertions in this analysis with regard to explanations derived from Wilson’s 
theory. We can turn it around in many different ways depending on the stage of the process 
and on who opposes the proposed policy. A categorization of this policy issue depends on 
different perceptions by different actors of who pays and who benefits, and these perceptions 
change with regard to the perceived geographical scale of the problem. This is not to say that 
we should discard Wilson’s second policy category for the continued process. Rather, the 
continuing analysis assumes that all categories should be kept as possible explanations for the 
investigated case, and that it could change due to different proposed policies during the 
process. In addition, the perceived ratio of costs and benefits could change with new 
information (Vedung and Klefbom, 2002). The positions of States could thus change during 
the policy process due to their perceptions of costs and benefits.  
 
7.2.1.7 The Regional Approach – Changing Wilson’s Policy Categorization 
Let us assume that the benefits were perceived by the policy-makers as concentrated at this 
stage of the process due to the regional character of the problem. Even if not all believed that 
global regulation would involve costs for all, the regional approach would at least change the 
costs to be more concentrated than regulation at a global level. The regional concept was thus 
a policy solution to a problem of widely distributed high costs that turned it into a policy issue 
of less costs for a concentrated group of actors. LSFO would still have to be provided for 
shipping but in smaller quantities and thus at lower costs for the States exporting high-sulphur 
crudes and HSFO. The smaller quantities of compliant fuels meant lower energy-demanding 
desulphurization processes and lower use of low-sulphur crudes. Hence, the implications 
would not be seen on the same wide-reaching scale for many member States as feared by 
Japan and OCIMF. This solution – or compromise – would mean less opposition from those 
that would bear the costs, while at the same time the smaller group of actors that were 
affected by acidification would accept the solution since it would provide benefits for them. 
The regional approach was a policy of concentrated benefits and concentrated costs: Wilson’s 
fourth category. However, Wilson’s theory holds that this is not a solution but rather the 
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policy of “continuing organized conflict” (Wilson, 1973, p. 335), which is discussed for the 
second research question.  
 
7.2.1.8 A Regional Solution for a Directional Problem 
DeSombre (2007) underlined that the self-interests of States determine international policy-
making processes more for a directional problem than for other problems, e.g. CPR’s. The 
directional character of the policy problem had made agreement on a global sulphur content 
limit difficult to reach. States affected by acidification sought global regulations on ship 
emissions while States causing pollution resisted it, at least at a global level. This is consistent 
with Sprinz and Vaahtoranta’s (1994) expectations that States that are victims of pollution 
would seek international cooperation while contributors to pollution would resist. DeSombre 
(2007) argued that their hypothesis can easily be used to explain the European (LRTAP) and 
North American responses to acid rain. The result – or solution – in the case of LRTAP was 
differentiated emission cuts among the parties.
109
 According to DeSombre (2007, p. 227), a 
directional problem is a policy-making case in which it actually could “makes sense to impose 
different levels of obligations on states” compared with other environmental issues. This 
particular case of SOx emissions from ships has confirmed DeSombre’s description that 
international cooperation is very difficult with a directional problem, but we should not forget 
that the issue was more complex due to the diffuse and moving sources of international 
character: ships. Having different sulphur limits for different parts of the world is also 
something that contradicts the very basic principle of the IMO and regulating international 
ship operations, ensuring a level playing field. A possible solution for this case could be a 
regional approach, but it would have to apply to all ships independent of the flag they sail 
under. A regional approach would have to have global characteristics – a special area 
approach – which leads us to the second research question.  
 
7.2.2 Why Adopt a Combination of Stricter SECAs and a Global Cap?  
No clear economic reason for the introduction of global capping was found in the investigated 
documents. The group of volunteers at BCH 22 merely mentioned that it could be helpful in 
resolving global LSFO availability problems with regional control. This was not explained 
further and thus remains an unclear motivation. Let us thus begin the analysis of the second 
research question by discussing a suitable categorization of the introduced global capping 
policy. This categorization also includes the special area concept, and the combined approach 
as a start of the analysis. 
 
7.2.2.1 Categorizing and Re-categorizing 
The Policy of Global Capping 
Above, I stated that a regional approach could be viewed as a policy solution for a directional 
problem, but the concept of global capping is more difficult to place as such a solution. The 
intention of the global cap was not actually to reduce emissions and it therefore put a burden 
on those that caused the problem without providing any benefits ‘worth mentioning’ (see 
more on the role of ’science’) to those that suffered from it. Collective action suggests that 
such a policy would generate strong opposition from the groups that caused the problem, and 
                                                  
109 However, they were not as differentiated as could be expected, according to DeSombre, and the first 
agreement was equal emission cuts for all. 
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indeed it did. After BCH 22, new actors arrived on the scene and economic interests evolved 
to play their strongest role in the process. Global capping generated even further conflict.  
 
When viewed with Wilson’s theory, the question on what was a solution and what was a 
policy for further conflict is turned in the opposite direction at first sight. A regional approach 
was a policy of concentrated benefits and concentrated costs, which is viewed far from a 
solution and rather as a policy of “continuing organized conflict” (Wilson, 1973, p. 335). The 
concept of global capping could thus be viewed as a solution to such conflict: to let more 
actors pay and benefit, which would widen the distribution of both the costs and benefits. At 
second sight, however, the costs of a global cap would be widespread and there would be no 
benefits (or at best very small) since noticeable benefits of such a global cap would neither be 
seen globally nor regionally. The problem with this categorization is that no such category 
was provided by Wilson. Following his approach and collective action in general, it has to be 
assumed that if no one benefits but many need to pay, there would be the strongest opposition 
from all those that do not see benefits and, in turn, I argue, the most difficult situation for a 
policy to be adopted in. 
 
We should not be so quick to categorize the costs as widely distributed however. Although it 
can be assumed that a stringent global sulphur content limit was perceived to have widely 
distributed costs due to the far-reaching implications on the oil markets in general, the same 
could not be said for a global cap of the proposed limits within the range 3-5%. These 
proposed limits were above the global average sulphur content at the time and not below it as 
before the regional approach emerged. The question of who would have to pay for a global 
cap is thus not only dependent on the actors that produced, exported and supplied fuels above 
or near the proposed limit but also on those that used it. It would firstly affect all the States 
producing and supplying fuels above a certain limit, and the higher the limit the fewer the 
actors that need to pay for desulphurization. A 5% limit would have no costs due to an 
existing ISO standard, while a 4.5% limit would have costs for a few States producing and 
exporting HSFO over 4.5%, as well as for States supplying HSFO over 4.5%, such as 
Singapore and Mexico. A 4% limit would affect a few more actors, 3.5% more still and 3% 
rather many actors as it is so close to the global average sulphur content. In line with Wilson’s 
theory, it is thus easy to assume that the lower the limit proposed for a global cap, the more 
opposition would be generated from a larger number of actors, while higher limits below 5% 
would have a more concentrated group of actors and thus stronger opposition from those 
actors that would bear the cost burden alone. The question of the moral justification of a 
global capping policy thus grows stronger the higher the limit (but below 5%), both for the 
lack of benefits and for the costs to be borne by a concentrated group of actors. All of the 
proposed figures involve concentrated costs compared with a strict global limit below the 
global average sulphur content, while, at the same time, there would be no noticeable benefits 
above this average. At third sight, the policy of a global cap is thus a policy of concentrated 
costs and no benefits (or at best very small) where the concentration of the costs would vary 
depending on the capping level. Due to the lack of benefits, however, this policy is still not 
part of Wilson’s categories.  
 
The Special Area Concept – More Concentration  
Along with the reappearance of a stronger economic debate on global capping, regional 
economic implications became as important and the concept of special areas became a tool to 
restrict the geographical application of regulations even further. The criteria and procedures 
for designating special areas/SECAs – which cost-effectiveness and implications for the 
shipping industry – were drawn up to restrict the geographical extension of an area and to 
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hinder proliferation of such areas around the world. This changes several important 
characteristics of the proposed policy. 
 
Firstly, DeSombre’s insights show that it is possible to change the issue structure through 
international cooperation, and it has high relevance with regard to special areas. Like EEZs, 
special areas provided an opportunity for certain coastal States to control ships’ SOx 
emissions within a designated area. In line with DeSombre (2006, 2007, 2012) on 
transforming the issue structure from non-excludable to excludable, this would provide 
excludability, and special areas could be regarded as a possible solution to collective action 
problems. Exclusion from benefits was not a relevant approach for this particular case, 
however. As previously emphasized, the actors that caused the problem were not affected by 
it and did not have anything to benefit from; hence they could not free-ride. 
 
Secondly, the regional concept was a policy solution to a problem of widely distributed high 
costs that turned it into a policy issue of less costs for a concentrated group of actors. If it 
were to be restricted to certain special areas with criteria for designation and delineation, the 
costs would be even more concentrated, as would the benefits. The categorization of the 
special area approach is thus Wilson’s fourth category but with a more narrowly concentrated 
distribution of the benefits and costs compared with the earlier regional approach without 
further defined restrictions. With further concentration, we should thus expect even more 
conflict. According to Wilson (1973, 1980), the benefitting group and the group that bears the 
costs have strong incentives to mobilize for and against the proposed policy respectively. A 
natural step here would thus be to start analysing how the economic interests evolved during 
the later parts of the process with this prediction of a continued conflict in mind, but let us not 
be so quick to treat the regional approach and global capping separately. 
 
The Combination 
We now have two policies before us to explain. The first is a regional special area policy of 
clearly defined concentrated costs and benefits in Wilson’s fourth category, while the second 
is a global capping policy of concentrated costs and no or very small benefits of undefined 
distribution. The main assertion after these categorization efforts is that these policies cannot 
be viewed on their own. Instead we need to view them as described by the policy-makers 
themselves: a global cap would be part of the regional approach. When viewed as a policy 
package, a global cap added costs and actors that would have to pay for the same benefits as 
with the regional approach on its own. It added a cost burden on those that caused the 
problem, while the benefits to those that suffered from it were the same as without it. Based 
on DeSombre’s insights of collective action for directional problems, I thus assume that more 
opposition would be expected from this combined policy than from a sole special area policy. 
The combination was a policy of concentrated costs and concentrated benefits, but the total 
sum of costs became higher and the new part of the costs would have to be borne by another 
group of specific actors that did not have to pay for a mere regional approach. We thus have a 
situation in which the costs are concentrated but unequally distributed. Based on Wilson’s 
theory, I thus assume that it would not only result in worse conflict but also tin strong 
arguments of moral aspects and questions of legitimacy. Questions such as why some would 
have to pay for no global benefits or some for the benefits of others are frequently found 
arguments, as discussed in the sections below. It could of course be argued that some actors 
perceived benefits from a global cap, but the information found in the investigated documents 
suggests that such benefits were merely perceived as future risk prevention of a possible 
increase of the sulphur content. 
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In this context, I once again highlight one of the key assertions in this analysis: a 
categorization of this policy issue depends on different perceptions by different actors of who 
pays and who benefits, and these perceptions change with regard to the perceived 
geographical scale of the problem. In line with this assertion, Figure 7.4 illustrates how the 
policy issue of SOx emissions from ships could be categorized in accordance with Wilsons’ 
theory and based on how the actors could have perceived the problem, the costs and the 
benefits. Category 4B represent the distribution of the adopted combined policy based on the 
above reasoning on concentrated benefits and concentrated but unequally distributed costs. 
Category 2C shows a different way in which the adopted combination could be categorized 
depending on how the actors could have perceived the costs and the burden sharing. The latter 
category has its basis in the moral views presented by the shipping and oil interests; they 
highlighted the cost burdens for all – including consumers – as well as for a concentrated 
group, and both were considered unfair. It was either a regional issue with global burden 
sharing or a regional polluter pays issue. Of course the actors could have perceived the 
distribution in other ways, but the categories in the figure are based on the economic 
arguments of the actors. With this in mind, let us take a closer look at how the economic 
interests evolved further in the process from 1992 to 1997. 
 
 
Distributed Costs 
 
Concentrated Costs 
 
 
Distributed 
Benefits 
 
1. A Truly Global Issue 
  Problem: global  
  Policy: global regulation 
  Benefits: global 
  Costs and implications: 
 shared globally * 
 
3. A Global Polluter Pays Issue 
 Problem: global 
 Policy: global regulation 
 Benefits: global 
 Costs and implications: 
- oil interests ** 
- shipping interests *** 
 
Concentrated 
Benefits 
 
2. A Regional Issue with Global 
Burden Sharing  
(A) 
  Problem: regional 
  Policy: global regulation 
  Benefits: regional 
  Costs and implications: 
 shared globally * 
(B) 
  Problem: regional 
  Policy: special area approach 
  Benefits: regional 
  Costs and implications: 
 shared globally * 
(C) 
  Problem: regional 
  Policy: special area & global cap 
  Benefits: regional 
  Costs and implications: 
 shared globally * 
 
4. A Regional Polluter Pays Issue 
(A) 
 Problem: regional 
 Policy: special area approach 
 Benefits: regional 
 Costs and implications: 
- oil interests ** 
- unequal burden for shipping  
   interests *** 
(B) 
 Problem: regional 
 Policy: special area & global cap 
 Benefits: regional 
 Costs and implications: 
- unequal burden for oil interests ** 
- unequal burden for shipping  
   interests *** 
 
 
* oil industry, shipping, member States & ultimately consumers 
** oil industry, oil-producing/exporting States & bunker supplying States 
*** shipping industry, Flag States & States with maritime interests 
Figure 7.4. Policy Characteristics of SOx Emissions from Ships 
Based on Perceived Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
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7.2.2.2 Strong Opposition from Intertwined Interests 
After investigating the documents of the whole process, it is easy to conclude that the 
economic focus of the policy-makers has mostly been on the oil industry’s costs and 
implications. An important aspect of this one-sided focus is that the shipping interests took the 
same positions as the oil industry and used the same economic arguments. The oil interests 
continued to emphasize high costs for shipping in the form of increased bunker fuel prices 
based on the costs of desulphurization. The figures came from the oil industry but were 
highlighted by a larger group of actors consisting of oil-producing/exporting States, oil 
industry organizations, HSFO-supplying States with an increasingly large group of Singapore 
allies, States with maritime interests, States with interests in maritime trade, major flag States 
and shipping industry NGOs. These actors’ policies were all intertwined during most of the 
continued process with the same policy positions and economic arguments.  
 
Opposition to global capping started immediately when it was introduced, and it was not by 
Venezuela, Kuwait, Japan or OCIMF as before. Instead, the first opposition came from the 
major FOC State Bahamas, which emphasized high costs and implications. The opposition 
then continued with the IPIECA study being submitted by OCIMF. This study was central to 
the further development on the global cap with the high costs of a 3.5% global cap being 
referred to in submissions up to the very last year – which was also the case for OCIMF’s 
submissions in general. OCIMF’s arguments that the environmental benefits of a 3.5-4% 
global cap would not justify the high costs and that the required funds could be used for more 
urgent environmental issues were frequently highlighted by high-sulphur oil-
producing/exporting States such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Egypt, Bahrain and Mexico 
(Eni, 2013), but most notable is the growing group of Singapore allies as well as the major 
FOC States. Singapore and some of its allies supplied fuels with over 4% sulphur contents, 
and other States in its alignment produced and exported such fuels (ibid.). This was a large 
group of actors that later increased to 19 States, and they all opposed any global cap under 
5%. Since the 5% limit was an existing ISO standard, by setting a global cap of 5%, no 
additional measures would be imposed on the oil industry and no costs would be borne by 
these States. Most relevant in their arguments is the moral aspects and their perceived 
distribution of costs and benefits. They felt that some States that exported and produced oils 
with high sulphur contents would be significantly affected economically and that it would not 
be an equal cost burden shared by the IMO members. This concentrated group of actors that 
would bear the cost burdens also highlighted that the costs would ultimately be borne by 
citizens in the member States or consumers worldwide, which thus is far from a policy issue 
of concentrated costs. The use of both arguments shows that they tried to affect the interests 
of other States. On the introduction of the concept of special areas, the oil industry was quick 
to respond with economic arguments to further restrict regulation by making such areas as 
small as possible, preferably only applying to ports and port areas. OCIMF’s submission of 
the second CONCAWE study was used to support such restrictions. Although it was 
considered more cost-effective to reduce emissions from land-based sources, it was at least 
more cost-effective to reduce in-port emissions than those further out at sea 
 
Now, let us look at the shipping interests. The major FOC States Bahamas, Liberia and 
Panama were against a low limit of the global cap and establishing large special areas, which 
according to the Bahamas should be limited to 12 nm from the shore. They highlighted cost 
figures and implications from the CONCAWE and IPIECA studies and used the same 
economic and moral arguments as the oil interests: “unacceptable and unfair consequence of 
extraordinarily high costs being imposed on many oil producing and oil refining countries in 
other parts of the world” (MEPC 37/13/3, p. 1). Furthermore, these cost were viewed to “be 
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borne disproportionately” (ibid., p. 2), and it was considered that the IMO should not take 
action that would penalize some of the member States. This is repeated here to highlight the 
magnitude of the way the shipping and oil interests were intertwined. The major FOC states 
even thought it was unfair that the oil industry, some oil producing/exporting States along 
with some supplying States would have to pay. They did not highlight such an unfair situation 
for themselves and thus completely represented the oil interests. It is also repeated to refer to 
the above reasoning around Figure 7.4, and on the moral aspects. 
  
The FOC States highlighted an unfair distribution of costs borne unequally by a concentrated 
group of actors, and their wording implied a preference for an equal sharing of the burden by 
the IMO member States. With regard to the intertwined interests, we should not forget the 
early Norwegian opposition to regional measures due to the implications for shipping – as 
shown in the first research question – but then it was rather quiet on that matter. Finland 
stressed that international measures would prevent disturbed competiveness of Finnish ships. 
In addition, threats of unilateral measures were frequently used to draw the attention of the 
shipping interests to stricter global measures, as discussed below. The intertwined positions 
and economic arguments provided a large and strong group of policy-makers with economic 
interests opposing strict regulation at global level and minimum regulation at regional level. 
At the second intersessional meeting in 1994, a majority favoured a global cap of 4-5%. This 
majority group included oil-producing States, major flag States and oil and shipping industry 
organizations.
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7.2.2.3 Pro-Environmental Efforts but Concessions and Compromises 
The BSS and the NSS had difficulties to influence with this large opposition group of 
intertwined interests. High criticism of cost figures and the oil industry focus was given by 
Sweden and Norway, followed by two environmental NGOs: FOEI and WWF. Part of the 
strategy of the NSS, the BSS and the environmental NGOs was to show social costs of SOx 
emissions and positive economic aspects of a reduction, e.g. WWF’s view that availability 
problems would be solved on their own. Despite its criticism of cost focus and economic self-
interests, cost-effectiveness became an important argument by this pro-environmental group. 
By its side were representatives for the EC/EU and LRTAP. Both had the opportunity to 
express their views on regulating ship emissions through the IMO, and both stressed that it 
was more cost-effective to reduce emissions from ships close to a sensitive area than to reduce 
land-based sources. With the EC/EU acidification strategy, the use of LSFO for ships was 
found to be a cost-effective method to reduce European acidification. The most important 
strategy against the large opposition, however, was to use threats of unilateral action if the 
IMO did not take action globally and at an acceptable level. Sweden was particularly active in 
statements indicating such threats, as were Norway, the UK and Germany. In this regard, the 
EC/EU became a key player in the process. The Commission of the EC/EU had indicated 
early on that measures would be taken at the EC/EU level if progress was not met at the IMO 
and it soon proposed a directive with a 3% sulphur content in all EU waters and 1.5% in 
special areas to be adopted by the IMO. Hence, the EC directive was a clear unilateral threat 
that the policy-makers at the IMO had to take into account due to the international character 
of shipping. It added pressure for a stricter global cap and increased the pressure to designate 
the Baltic Sea Area as a SECA. 
  
                                                  
110 See more on the different views in Svensson, 2011. 
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This pro-environmental group did not have much effect on policy, however, due to the large 
opposition. The lack of support was a main reason for the real abandonment of a strict global 
approach at BCH 23. This was after the arguments of the correspondence group, which saw a 
lack of support as a result of the high costs and risk of seriously disrupting the residual fuel 
market; hence a clearly expressed economic reason. The lack of support for a global approach 
also forced the BSS and the NSS to adapt to this large opposition: to abandon a policy 
position of global strict measures and apply for special area designation in their areas. This is 
confirmed by the submission presenting the background document by the BSS, along with 
statements with preferences for a low global cap, but proposals were made that took the 
economic implications into account or were stated to be compromise proposals. The focus of 
costs-effectiveness by these actors thus became concentrated to measures in their own areas, 
which strengthened the special area approach. Since cooperation is necessary for 
environmental protection, proposed measures often need concessions in order to persuade 
them to join (DeSombre, 2007). With the directional character of the problem, I assume that 
the significance of concessions was strong. The polluters and connected interests had little 
incentives to cooperate since they did not suffer from acidification problems, while, at the 
same time, the BSS and the NSS – that were affected most by emissions from ships – were 
dependent on the actions of the polluters. According to DeSombre (2007), States that aim to 
resist regulation based on their self-interests thus gain great power in international 
negotiations, which is confirmed in this case. States affected by acidification had to accept 
concessions and compromised solutions far beyond their own preferences.  
 
A strong factor forcing these concessions is the fact that the shipping interests aligned with 
the oil interests. As mentioned in Chapter 2, flag States and States with maritime interests 
have a high level of influence at the IMO. The entry into force criteria of MARPOL Annex VI 
was 15 States representing not less than 50% of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant 
fleet (MP/CONF. 3/34, Article 6). The flag States with the largest fleets – i.e. FOC States – 
thus decided when and if Annex VI would enter into force. This suggests implications on the 
negotiation dynamics of the process.. The FOC States had the possibility of hindering entry 
into force and render proposed regulations useless, independent of the sulphur limit adopted. 
This means that the policy-makers had to listen to them and find a compromise solution or, to 
put it another way, the least common denominator. This adds to the powers of the large group 
of opposition in the directional issue. Once the major flag States had opposed a stringent 
global solution, and preferred special areas and a global cap under 5%, there was no other 
way than to accept the combination of special areas and a high sulphur cap. The only thing the 
pro-environmental actors could do was to try to find a compromise solution. In this regard, we 
should not forget that the 5% majority on the global cap was broken at MEPC 38. This is 
argued to be the result of the above efforts of the pro-environmental group – in particular the 
threats of unilateral action – but it could not be concluded with confidence in this analysis.  
 
7.2.2.4 Efforts of Separated Shipping Interests 
The shipping interests gradually became divided and partially separated from the oil interests 
in the later part of the process. It was primarily NGOs that broke away from the locked 
positions shared with the FOC States and States with maritime interests. At the conference, 
however, Greece joined the shipping industry NGOs. It started at MEPC 37 when ICS briefly 
mentioned problems with disturbance of international competiveness by a regional approach, 
but it still saw special areas as a solution if agreed and applied internationally. However, 
IAPH – representing the interests of ports worldwide – completely defended the basic 
principles of international shipping and opposed special areas with a preference for a global 
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uniform solution. IAPH’s primary reason was a possible distortion of the competitiveness 
between ports within and outside special areas, but it feared distortion of competiveness in 
shipping as well. 
  
The NGOs representing the shipping industry then made a turn in 1997 by proposing the sole 
use of a global cap for economic and practical reasons of switching fuels in SECAs and due to 
the international competiveness of shipping. BIMCO – the world’s largest private shipping 
association, represents shipowners, shipping agents, etc. in over 120 countries (Tan, 2006) – 
underlined the threat of unilateral measures in the absence of IMO standards that were 
acceptable worldwide, which would result in severe operational problems for shipping. 
BIMCO’s solution was a 3% global cap without SECAs. Then, at the conference, ICS made 
its huge turn of policy. It had concerns over the far-reaching impacts on the shipping industry. 
SECAs would result in a significant burden on ships entering them on occasions. The required 
use of two fuels for these ships was costly and problematic not only due to the more 
expensive fuel but also due to several technical and practical aspects. It also feared 
proliferation of SECAs around the world, which could have consequences for the whole of 
international shipping. ICS also turned the policy issue of SECAs the other way around with 
regard to previous moral arguments on who would pay and who ought to pay. As highlighted 
in connection to Figure 7.4, the issue was either perceived as a global burden shared by all or 
by a concentrated group of actors: the polluters. It seems that ICS had the view that the 
problem was a public good with all actors being responsible for conserving the atmosphere. It 
thus saw it as unfair that the cost burden would be borne by international shipowners. 
However, it also highlighted that SECAs would merely provide protection around SECAs and 
not globally. Hence, its view was still that it was a regional problem. Its solution of a global 
uniform standard without SECAs should thus be viewed both as an argument against 
disturbance of international competition of the shipping industry and as a moral argument 
against the polluter pays principle. In addition to ICS, BIMCO repeated its views at the 
conference. Most remarkable at the conference, however, was that Greece also made a 
proposal of a stepwise reduction of the global cap. Hence, even the world’s largest ship-
owning State (by tonnage in 1999) and the fourth largest flag State (by tonnage) in 2000 (Tan, 
2006) had joined the shipping organizations’ opposition to the SECA approach and preference 
for a global approach.  
 
7.2.2.5 Reaching Agreement 
Although not much was reported at the conference, it is not difficult to conclude that the 
above efforts by the shipping interests had little effect on the established policy of a combined 
SECA and global cap approach, and thus little effect on the positions of the majority of the 
States with decision-making powers at the conference. At least it could be concluded with 
confidence that the preceding efforts by IAPH and BIMCO did not affect the deadlocked 
positions at the MEPC. Instead, the Singapore allies got significant support for their repeated 
proposal of a 5% global cap and 1.5% in SECAs, and these were the figures reflected in the 
final draft to the conference. This indicates that the flag States and the policy-makers in 
general had listened more to the voices of the oil industry than the voices of international 
shipowners. Nevertheless, taken together, the shipping and oil industries have had both close 
and diverse positions. One explanation for the acceptance of the regional approach by the 
shipping interests and their partial turn lies at the heart of governing international shipping: 
uniform standards to ensure a level playing field. The regional approach would have global 
characteristics with uniform standards for all flags in SECAs, but it was later realized that it 
would disturb the international competiveness of shipping. On this particular policy issue, the 
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principle of a level playing field fell aside due to fears of high costs and then reappeared when 
it was too late, when the positions of States where locked for adoption at the conference. The 
adoption was a compromise solution reflecting a balance of interests: a balance not worth 
disturbing. To disrupt the balance could take the policy-makers back to where they started and 
would mean that a conference would not go through with adoption in 1997. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that the global cap was adopted at 4.5% and not the former 5% and that a 
waiver was introduced that postponed the effect of the SECA regulations by one year for 
ships entering a SECA from outside. It could thus be concluded that the efforts of the pro-
environmental group at least had some success in reaching through with their unilateral 
threats, and that the same could be said about the efforts of the shipping industry with its 
highlighting of problems with SECAs for ships entering them on occasions. Surprisingly, the 
waiver was the result of an actor that previously silent actor viewed through this lens: the 
Russian Federation. Notably, Russia was the tenth largest ship-owning State (by tonnage) in 
1999 (Tan, 2006).  
 
Before ending this analysis, let us take another look at Annex 3 of this thesis, which 
summarizes the presented monetary costs and benefits of the process. It could easily be 
observed from the annex and Chapter 6 that the policy-makers put their focus on the costs and 
impacts of regulations rather than the social costs, in the absence of regulations. Compared 
with the earlier part of the process, however, some social cost figures were provided by the 
BSS, the NSS and environmental organizations, and these figures were very high. On the 
other hand, no social cost was specifically estimated for impacts derived from ship emissions, 
but instead all possible sources were marked by parenthesis in the annex. Even the simplest 
form of cost estimates using the estimated proportion of ship emissions in a specific area was 
not made. As an example, cost figures of liming in Sweden did not take into account the 
percentage contribution of shipping to deposition in Sweden. All the estimated cost figures for 
the proposed policy options were thus limited to industry costs – in particular the oil industry 
– and did not cover the costs to society. The presented social costs were also merely parts of 
many different impact factors for the costs to society, e.g. forest production in Europe, liming, 
etc. Many impacts were highlighted, as well as the difficulty estimating them. On the benefits 
of regulation, the presented or reported benefits also focused on industry rather social 
benefits, but in this case for the shipping industry (with the exception of the highlighted 
savings of the second sulphur protocol). It could thus be concluded that the decision to adopt a 
regional SECA approach with a supplementing global cap was based on biased cost-benefit 
assessments that almost only addressed the costs of the oil and shipping industries. The 
shipping industry costs were based on the costs for the oil industry and the figures supplied by 
the oil industry. Specific economic analyses for shipping were absent for this policy issue in 
this process from 1988 to 1997. Questions on other costs for shipping derived from 
technological implications and operational burdens did not arrive until the later parts of the 
process and were never presented in monetary cost figures.  
 
The frequently referred to Assembly resolutions are most important explanations for this cost 
focus. Resolution A.500(XII) (para. 3) with the connected Resolution A.777(18) 
recommended taking into account “the costs to the maritime industry and the burden on the 
legislative and administrative resources of Member States”, and Assembly Resolution 
A.719(17) (p. 326) on air pollution from ships highlighted taking into account “technical and 
economic impact on the whole of the industry”. The resolutions determined what role 
economic interests would play in this process. These principles enabled one-sided focus on 
the economic impacts of measures rather than economic impacts without measures. The focus 
on the costs was put on the oil industry, however.  
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I end this analysis by highlighting issue linkage as an aspect that could not be analysed in this 
thesis and that should be explored in future research. The negotiated and adopted Annex VI 
was a multi-issue treaty that provided a possibility for the policy-makers – with different 
priorities for different pollutants – to trade off their positions and ultimately to agree on 
sulphur regulations far from their preferences in return for actions on prioritized pollutants. In 
addition, Annex VI is just as it reads a sixth annex to the MARPOL Convention, which 
should be viewed as a multi-issue treaty  and thus opens up possibilities of other trade-offs. 
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7.3 Two Explanations: Connections and Differences 
Two conceptual lenses have been used in this thesis to guide the empirical investigation and 
to analyse the results of Chapters 5 and 6. We have thus seen the process from two lenses that 
provided different explanations to the research questions. From here and on, ‘the first lens’ 
and ‘the second lens’ are used as reference for both the empirical results and the analysis on 
the role of science and economic interests respectively. The lenses show a number of 
connections as well as some differences in explanations of individual policy choices of the 
process. This section discusses those connections and differences. 
 
7.3.1 The Removal of the Target 
The first lens showed that an acceptance of the framing by the NSS and the BSS resulted in 
agreement on the 50% reduction target for the year 2000. The analysis on the role of ‘science’ 
was not conclusive on why the target was then removed from the Assembly resolution. 
Several initiated or ongoing studies were highlighted at MEPC 31 when the target was 
removed. These studies included both scientific and economic aspects and could have played 
its part in the decision to remove the target. When viewed from the second lens, the influence 
of the US as a significant State of shipping and oil interests played an important role in the 
removal. The US proposed that decisions on targets would await a technical study, and the 
BCH was immediately instructed to deal with technical and economic implications. The first 
lens further showed that the reduction target was agreed on without scientific evaluation 
against different targets, and there were indications that the necessary scientific data for a 
decision on a target was missing. This situation of scientific uncertainty added to the 
economic reason to remove the target. The removal of the target from the Assembly 
resolution at MEPC 31 is a key factor towards a regional approach. Viewed from the second 
lens, it opened a door for an increased role of economic interests, in particular for self-
interests of oil industry and oil-producing States. It was viewed as a first breaking-point 
towards a regional approach. Viewed from the first lens, the BCH did not consider the 
reference levels and dates as instructed but instead initiated the regional concept. The 
correspondence group on regional control options realized that the target could not be 
achieved with the regional concept and suggested that it had to be reviewed. No revision was 
made and the target had lost its importance other than as an argument of stricter requirements.  
 
7.3.2 Observer NGOs: Epistemic Communities and Interests 
NGOs with observer/consultative status had a significant appearance in the process and 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show increased participation in the sessions. The investigated documents 
showed particularly high activity by industry NGOs (INGOs), primarily oil-industry 
organizations, and gradually increasing activity by shipping industry organizations. These 
also attracted great attention by the policy-makers. The two environmental NGOs (ENGOs) 
with active participation in this issue – FOEI and WWF – attracted less attention in this 
process. As described in Section 2.2, observer NGOs serve with expertise relevant to the IMO 
and function as knowledge pools and advisors to the policy-makers on primarily technical 
issues with scientific and economic aspects. Viewed from the first lens, they are epistemic 
communities. NGOs played an important role as epistemic communities in producing 
scientific claims that are meaningful to policy, primarily INGOs. Oil and shipping INGOs 
were important actors in the group that framed the issue as regional/local. They used scientific 
arguments and claims to show a minimal contribution of ship emissions and emphasized 
uncertainties and confusion over different scientific methods and concepts. Viewed from the 
second lens, however, they are interest organizations, directly and indirectly influencing the 
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policy-makers with their submissions and arguments in discussions. Notwithstanding the 
environmental interests of ENGOs and various economic interests connected to shipping such 
as port interests, the active NGOs in the process mainly represented the actors that caused the 
problem and that would be affected economically by regulation: the oil and shipping 
industries. As with the process in general, the arguments and positions of oil interests and 
shipping interests were intertwined. Shipping industry NGOs made a huge turn, however, at 
the end of the process by stressing the economic implications of the SECA approach. The 
ENGOs were also involved in the economic arguments and joined the efforts of the BSS and 
the NSS against the intertwined interests.  
 
Taken together, INGOs had played a substantial role in the process and OCIMF was a key 
player from both lenses. OCIMF was able to shape policy by the use of both scientific and 
economic arguments and supportive information by creating scientific claims showing 
minimal contribution and presenting economic figures showing extremely high costs. The 
views of the shipping INGOs were crucial in enabling this influence due to their support. The 
later break in this support did not result in an abandonment of the SECA approach but was 
one of two factors that enabled the compromises at the end of the process, i.e. the 4.5% global 
cap and the waiver. The second was efforts by the BSS, NSS and ENGOs to show a high 
emission contribution with transboundary transport, high social costs and cost-effectiveness, 
and to use unilateral threats. Both shipping INGOs and ENGOs were thus important for the 
outcome of the process. This thesis has shown that NGOs have acted both as epistemic 
communities and interest organizations. The view of observer NGOs as knowledge providers 
in international organizations should be seen in the context of epistemic communities sharing 
policy views and presenting scientific claims based on their views. For the studied process, 
NGOs provided knowledge in a clearly biased manner from INGOs with underlying 
economic interests of the oil industry. Although, ENGOs joined the group of actors that 
framed the issue as global, they did not contribute with scientific claims. 
 
7.3.3 Justification, Legitimacy and Strength with Combined Arguments 
The first lens showed no direct influence of scientific arguments or claims behind the 
expressed need for further considerations of the geographical scope of regulations at BCH 21. 
However, the submission by the IEA is viewed as particularly important in this context. 
Uncertainty and a lack of scientific knowledge were used by the IEA as arguments not to take 
decisions at the time. Most important for explaining the focus on the geographical scope is 
that the IEA had particular emphasis on whether local measures could provide most of the 
desired reductions. When viewed from the second lens, it was shown that the reason for 
concern was the economic implications connected to refining investments being raised by 
some of the IEA member States. By this submission, the IEA started a significant trend in the 
process: to use scientific arguments and claims to justify views with underlying economic 
arguments. Different industrial interests of both member States and NGOs started to use 
scientific arguments and claims to highlight their own results or uncertainties as reasons not to 
take decisions with high economic consequences. 
 
This trend was taken to its heights at BCH 22. The cost-effectiveness of regional measures 
was a motive that was further justified with scientific arguments of impacts being worse in 
specific areas. Since special areas enabled emission reductions where they were needed most, 
this approach was a cost-effective solution to reduce SOx emissions from ships. An important 
factor in this context is the concept of critical loads being introduced at BCH 22. Critical 
loads measure natural barriers and maximum pollution loads of ecosystems. It is thus a 
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concept in natural science; yet, behind it were economic motivations on cost-effectiveness 
within LRTAP. According to Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002, p. 93), the concept of critical 
loads is “an instrument of integration between science and policy” and “is basically a choice 
of policy and should be scrutinized as such”. With the use of this policy tool, cost-effective 
strategies could be developed, with science providing the necessary information. The UK 
used this concept as an argument for a regional special area approach. The use of critical loads 
would result in the most cost-effective way of reducing SOx emissions, and this argument was 
placed in a context of desulphurization being a costly process. The second lens showed that 
the focus on the high costs of global emissions was paramount to the introduction of the 
regional approach. The issue was turned from perceived widely distributed high costs into less 
costs for a concentrated group of actors. The UK used critical loads to add a stronger 
argument – a cost-effective solution – to the problem of high cost figures for achieving global 
emission reductions. Critical loads thus provided scientific justification for a policy of 
economic reasons.  
 
At BCH 22, the necessity of action was questioned. This was explained from the first lens by 
changed framing by actors at the BCH, coupled with scientific claims showing a minimal 
contribution from ships and a critical policy environment targeting the previous studies and 
starting a debate on scientific concepts. Viewed from the second lens, the economic 
arguments and supportive information presented during this session certainly added strength 
and legitimacy to the scientific arguments questioning the need for action. Given the huge and 
widely distributed costs shown, with feared impacts on global crude oil reserves and 
countries’ energy supplies, why should measures be taken if the need was not scientifically 
proven? This question puts particular emphasis on the reasoning of collective action with 
rational utility-maximizing actors that act out of self-interest and not the collective interest. It 
also emphasizes the role of scientific uncertainty in policy-making connected to the concept 
of critical policy environments and the over-critical model. With uncertainty, the policy-
makers decided how to interpret the available information based on their views of policy, 
which allowed an increased role of economic interests. Based on the economic interests of the 
actors that caused the problem and would bear the cost burden of regulation, a critical policy 
environment emerged in which these actors criticized scientific arguments and claims and 
showed both extreme economic implications and a low contribution from ship emissions. 
 
The correspondence group on regional control options – the ‘case’ document for a combined 
approach – weighed scientific arguments and economic arguments of global versus regional 
measures, as well as a combined approach with a global cap. The main argument for a 
regional approach was the lack of support for a global approach. This was also a main reason 
for the real abandonment of a strict global approach at BCH 23. Viewed from the second lens, 
the correspondence group saw the lack of support as a result of the high costs and risk of 
seriously disrupting the residual fuel market. Compared with the first lens, we thus have one 
clearly expressed economic reason for this lack of support. The first lens instead showed that 
scientific arguments were used to justify the regional and combined approach. The weighing 
of arguments by the correspondence group resulted in a conclusion that the combined 
approach with a global cap of about 3% would provide some environmental protection at 
acceptable costs. This shows a relationship between scientific and economic arguments of the 
process where the policy goal was to reach a balance between environmental and economic 
interests, but the economic interests were weighed higher. A policy was drawn up based on 
the high costs of strong economic interests of oil and shipping industries. Environmental 
protection was down-prioritized due to these interests and scientific arguments were used to 
justify this policy. 
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The introduction of scientific criteria for special area designation justified and enabled a 
restriction of the geographical extension of an area and hindered proliferation of such areas 
around the world. As stated by the correspondence group, the establishment of areas with 
stricter regulations around a few countries affects the interests of other countries. The 
economic interests of shipping and oil interests were behind the establishment of scientific 
criteria. Although the complication of ship operations by many special areas was part of the 
concern, the arguments centred around the costs of large and many special areas, along with 
the cost-effectiveness of small and a few areas where the need for measures could be proven 
scientifically and by cost-effectiveness. The first lens showed that ‘local framing’ was a 
central explanation of this restriction. The arguments presented were all about showing a 
minimal contribution on a regional scale, with emphasis on the local contribution mostly from 
ships in or close to ports. The second lens showed that the same actors presented economic 
arguments and figures of cost-effectiveness based on these scientific claims. Studies on cost-
effectiveness used data to show a low contribution from ships, which showed it to be more 
cost-effective to reduce land-based sources or those in ports compared with large special 
areas. Taken together, the economic arguments used on the issue of special area delineation 
were not only strengthened with legitimacy by using scientific arguments, but scientific 
arguments enabled the use of economic arguments of cost-effectiveness. This is interplay of 
scientific and economic arguments driven by underlying economic interests and interplay 
between science and economics merged into a format of a basis for decision-making. 
 
As the process continued, combined scientific and economic arguments continued with the 
emphasis on justification. Discussion on global capping included the argument that the 
environmental benefits of a global cap were too small to justify the huge costs of a global cap. 
These arguments were made by the large group of intertwined interests. On special areas, the 
cost-effectiveness approach was also used by the NSS and the BSS. It was shown to be more 
cost-effective to reduce ship emissions in Europe than land-based sources, which was a strong 
argument against local cost-effectiveness and local framing. Moreover, cost-effectiveness and 
the implications for the shipping industry would be taken into account for designation along 
with the scientific criteria. This provided strength through combined scientific and economic 
legitimacy of restricting regulation and preventing proliferation of special areas in the world. 
 
7.3.4 Knowledge, Self-interests and the Power of Persuasion  
The above discussion on observer NGOs highlighted two concepts surrounding the two 
lenses: knowledge and interests. Scientific claims can be argued to have provided knowledge 
for the policy-makers as a basis for decisions, but this thesis has shown that ‘science’ was 
primarily used to compete among the self-interests of different actors. Economic arguments 
and figures on costs and benefits as well as on supply and demand could also be viewed as 
knowledge necessary for decisions. However, there is a big difference between viewing 
scientific claims as knowledge and economic figures as knowledge. Science claims to 
represent nature – the object – with constraints of the physical world. For this case, it was 
shown that business as usual for shipping using high sulphur contents as fuel caused 
acidification and that the pollutants were transported long distances. Regulating the sulphur 
content, however, puts a constraint on the economic development of oil and shipping 
industries and, in turn, on world trade and economic developments of countries dependent on 
sea transport for their imports and exports. Economics thus represents the economic interests 
of different actors – the subjects. Science and economics are two different world views 
representing knowledge about the object and the interests of the subjects respectively. What 
happens in policy-making when these world views come together?  
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This thesis shows that economic interests have played the most important role in the process. 
The basis of the knowledge gained by the policy-makers had higher influence from the 
different self-interests of different actors. As emphasized by SSK in the first lens, it is not 
knowledge that unites policy-makers through epistemic communities but shared beliefs of 
policy that allow knowledge to be used when it is seen as relevant to the policy. For the 
studied case, the interests of the policy-makers have decided this relevance, and the economic 
interests were prioritized over environmental interests. The second lens showed that the focus 
on oil industry costs was one of the main factors for many elements of both the process and 
the outcome. The lens had its conceptual premise that self-interests were paramount. It did 
show, however, that economic arguments and supportive information were used to show how 
the proposed policy would affect other actors’ self-interests. Dimitrov (2012) termed this 
strategy “the Trojan horse approach” (Dimitrov, 2012, p. 80). This approach is about the 
power of persuasion in international environmental negotiations. One key proposition of his 
work was that considerable efforts are made by governments to persuade others. Dimitrov 
found that the type of arguments that were most effective in changing the minds and policies 
of others were to focus on their interests: 
 
Countries seek to take others in a particular policy direction by delivering 
information that reflects their rivals’ interests. This is a “Trojan horse” 
approach to argumentation because it seeks change from within the camps of 
other nations. Actors seek to affect their opponent’s policy preferences by 
molding their own arguments to their opponents’ concerns (Dimitrov, 2012, p. 
80). 
 
This phenomenon relates to a persuasion technique of altering the perceived costs and benefits 
of action (ibid.), which is something we have clearly seen in this thesis. The scientific 
arguments and supportive information were used in this manner to persuade others. A lesson 
from this thesis is that we cannot merely view the action of member States and observer 
NGOs in negotiations as a result of their self-interests, nor can we view it as a mere result of 
science as decision support either. Rather, economic self-interests were underlying factors for 
the way arguments were shaped by actors. Some arguments emphasized self-interests and 
others shaped their arguments in a way to persuade others. This thesis has shown that 
arguments with a ‘Trojan horse approach’ indeed have affected the policies of other actors. 
These changes in were behind the policy choices and decisions by the MEPC and the BCH 
that resulted in a combined regional approach with SECAs and a global cap. Viewed from 
both lenses of this thesis, self-interests have found to be paramount in understanding both the 
economic and scientific arguments and how these arguments shaped policy-making towards 
the adopted regional approach by the power of persuasion. As emphasized by Jasanoff (1996), 
values and power are always present in negotiations, whether expressed politically or 
scientifically. 
 
This thesis thus questions the conventional view of science as decision support for policy-
making by providing ‘knowledge’. The first conceptual lens was based on SSK, which holds 
that science does not speak truth to power but that science can influence policy under certain 
social conditions. The next section elaborates on such conditions. Putting this discussion aside 
for now, a conclusion is that the framing of the issue, the scientific arguments and claims, and 
the positions of actors were all shaped by interests: one group of actors with environmental 
interests and a larger group of actors with economic interests. This thesis thus confirms the 
views of radical relativists such as Collingridge and Reeve (1986) that policy outcomes are 
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determined by the actors’ competing interests and values with science being used to gain 
strength in arguments in this competition of different interests.  
 
7.3.5 Economic Interests as Social Conditions and the Significance of Resolutions 
Viewed from the first lens, one of the mechanisms on how science could influence policy 
includes whether science is supported by economic interests, and that these interests allow for 
science to enable consensus. This thesis has shown that such support was highly selective and 
that science did not enable consensus among the policy-makers. Economic interests supported 
those scientific claims that backed the economic interests. For this case, it involved industrial 
interests, in particular oil interests. DeSombre’s view of a directional problem in which the 
actors that caused the problem were not the same as those that suffered from it is central in 
understanding this selection. States affected by acidification sought global regulation on ship 
emissions while States causing it opposed global regulation. This connects to Collingridge 
and Reeve’s (1986) description that the actors that are affected by regulation will both 
criticize the scientific claims and try to show unexpected costs or impacts of a proposed 
policy. Criticism of science, emphasis on high costs and scientific justification of economic 
arguments were mainly manifested by opponents of strict global regulation. Scientific claims 
did not enable consensus among the policy-makers but rather divided them into two groups 
with different framing due to this selective support by economic interests. The largest group 
consisted of intertwined oil and shipping interests with both member States and epistemic 
communities with shared policy beliefs based on industrial and economic interests. This large 
group had the greatest impact on policy viewed through both lenses.  
 
Common to both lenses are the frequent references to three Assembly resolutions. The first 
was the Assembly resolution on air pollution from ships (Resolution A.719(17)), which 
included a request to take into account economic and technical impacts on industry. The other 
two (Resolution A.500 (XII) and A.777(18)) emphasized a clear and well-documented 
demonstration of a compelling need in proposals for new conventions (or amendments), as 
well as the importance of informed decisions. They also recommended taking into account 
costs for the shipping industry and administrative (and legislative) burdens of member States. 
Viewed from the first lens, the Assembly resolutions had a substantial role in determining the 
direction for the role of science in this process. IMO’s institutional culture and formal 
procedures were regarded as necessary social conditions for science to successfully affect 
policy-making. The way science was treated in these resolutions determined what roles 
science was to play. The principle of a ‘compelling need’ is a factor that directed the role of 
science in this process. References to these resolutions were made by actors questioning 
scientific claims that showed a need for a global cap, expressing the need for scientific criteria 
for special areas and using scientific uncertainty as arguments to postpone decisions on strict 
– primarily global – regulations. The principle of a compelling need was used by actors that 
caused the problem and that would be economically affected by regulation. Based on their 
economic interests, they used scientific arguments and claims and highlighted uncertainty to 
show that a compelling need was not proven. 
 
The second lens showed that the inclusion of economic impacts in Resolution A.719(17) was 
a first step in an increased role of the economic interests of the shipping industry, which had a 
rather small role in the early parts of the process. Nonetheless, the most important role of the 
Assembly resolutions in the second lens was to enable the one-sided focus on the costs and 
economic implications instead of evaluating the costs of regulation against the social costs 
without regulation. Although the resolutions put emphasis on the shipping industry, the focus 
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on the costs was put on the oil industry. These costs, in turn, had impacts on the shipping 
industry due to increased bunker fuel prices. The Assembly resolutions were frequently 
referred to by the intertwined oil and shipping interests as economic arguments against strict 
global regulations and large special areas. As with the first lens, the resolutions had a 
substantial role in determining the direction for the role of economic interests. Since costs and 
economic implications were emphasized in IMO’s institutional culture and formal procedures, 
it directed the role of economic interests towards a cost focus of industrial interests.  
 
From two lenses, this thesis has shown that these principles, of a compelling need and taking 
into account costs and economic implications, have been taken to their heights in this 
particular case of developing regulations on SOx emissions from ships. They have slowed 
down the process in two ways: (1) the focus on costs and economic implications, and (2) the 
creation of a critical policy environment in which scientific arguments, claims and uncertainty 
were used by different interests to compete. The formal institutional procedures of the IMO 
were thus of outmost importance to the way this process has come about and how the 
interplay of ‘science’ and different interests has been played out. This is a lesson for other 
policy issues with regard to reaching a balance between industry interests and environmental 
interests by institutionally controlling the directions that the roles of science and economic 
interests can take. 
 
7.3.6 Unexplained Policies of the NSS and the BSS 
Finally, one unexplained policy direction is highlighted. No explanation could be given by 
either the first or the second lens of the introduction of regional measures by the NSS and the 
BSS in their initial proposal on the 50% global reduction target. It can be argued that both the 
NSS and the BSS were the initiators of the MEPC’s global reduction target. Conversely, they 
also contributed in the firsts steps towards a regional approach by the presenting the first 
proposals of regional measures with stricter regulation in specific areas. However, neither 
science nor economics was presented to support these recommended strategies on SOx 
emissions. Explaining such a policy would require studies of the North Sea Conferences and 
HELCOM or domestic policies of the NSS and the BSS. 
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7.4 Methodological and Theoretical Discussion 
This section discusses the choices of the methodological approach and the use of the two 
conceptual lenses in relation to the results and general implications of research approaches. 
 
7.4.1 Pre-understanding and the Challenge of Changing Conceptual Lenses 
The thesis should be viewed within the contexts of the researcher. The analyst’s personal 
background decides on an initial conceptual lens for the research, whether consciously or not. 
Let us very briefly turn to the hermeneutic view of pre-understanding, initially introduced by 
Hans-Georg Gadamer with the word ‘prejudice’ (German: vorurteil). By prejudice he meant 
pre-judgement in our understanding. Pre-understanding is a fundamental condition for 
understanding. Interpretation of a social phenomenon or texts requires certain ideas of what to 
look for to guide our attention in certain directions. Here, concepts and language are 
significant factors. Certain concepts highlight certain aspects of a phenomenon, and other 
aspects are hidden (Gilje and Grimen, 2007; Jahnke, 2012; Malpas, 2014). This make us see 
the world through the concepts we know – our “invisible glasses” (Hanson, 1969, pp. 149-
170, quoted in Gilje and Grimen, 2007, p. 180). Other factors of pre-understanding include 
our world views, beliefs and personal experiences. All of these pre-understandings are 
brought to our interpretations of phenomena – researchers are no exceptions. We are aware of 
some but not all of our pre-understandings (Gilje and Grimen, 2007). So, let us discuss those 
parts of my pre-understanding of which I am aware – my personal conceptual lens – in 
relation to the chosen approaches of this thesis.  
 
My background is within the broad field of environmental science. My involvement in 
crossing disciplines started during my BSc and MSc studies through combined social science 
and natural science approaches to environmental science. My primary fields were human 
ecology and biology. Human ecology is an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary field 
focusing on relationships between human societies and natural environments. It transcends 
social science, humanities and natural science. I was then employed by the Swedish Maritime 
Administration (SMA) as a PhD candidate at Chalmers University of Technology towards a 
licentiate degree in 2011. During the time at the SMA, I worked at the unit for international 
cooperation and learned about governmental work in international policy-making for 
shipping, the IMO and the shipping industry. My research project has been a cross-
disciplinary cooperation between the School of Business, Economics and Law at the 
University of Gothenburg and Chalmers University of Technology. This cooperation 
continued after the licentiate thesis. When the work on this thesis began, I had supplemented 
my environmental science education with knowledge about shipping, the IMO and 
environmental policy-making. The SMA, the University of Gothenburg and Chalmers 
University of Technology further provided me the opportunity to participate in two IMO 
sessions (BLG 15 in 2011 and MEPC 66 in 2014) and the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Warsaw 2013
111
. I thus had the opportunity to observe the policy-making 
process behind IMO documents and to compare it with a process of the biggest format in 
international environmental politics.  
 
My supervisor steered me towards the concept of ‘conceptual lenses’. I began to look at how 
my research area has been studied previously among traditional disciplines with an extended 
                                                  
111 Observer delegation (RINGO) for the University of Gothenburg at the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference (COP 19/CMP9), the National Stadium, Warsaw, 18-22 November 2013 (19th session of the 
Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
9th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol). 
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period of finding the conceptual basis of the two lenses of this thesis. The choices made on 
methodological and analytical approaches should be viewed in this context, as should this 
research as a whole. It shows development across disciplines from a researcher in 
environmental science without disciplinary research traditions and thus with an open mind of 
methodological and analytical approaches.  
 
However, changing the conceptual lens is to change the way you think, to abandon what you 
take for granted and to abandon your view of ‘science’ and research in general. In many ways, 
this thesis has not only been a challenge but also a struggle to learn to think in different ways. 
The first conceptual lens was a challenge to embrace. I actually had the belief that science 
speaks truth to power and that more science was needed in environmental policy-making to 
make more informed decisions. I had a belief that science could be a consensus builder among 
different interests by providing knowledge to the policy-makers. Constructivism and radical 
relativism in science and technology studies changed this belief. SSK was found to be the 
least normative approach to studying the role of science in policy-making. In such an 
approach, as a researcher myself, I cannot be blamed for analysing the role of science based 
on university views that more of our science is needed in the policy-making process. Radical 
relativism was used more as a supplementary approach, though it, rather than SSK, was found 
to explain the outcome of the process. The first lens provided me with a new pair of glasses 
by looking at the empirical material. With the second lens, I initially had difficulties in 
personally accepting the traditional way of thinking within rational choice, though the chosen 
conceptual basis was found to be the most suitable way to analyse the role of economic 
interests in accordance with the research questions, aim and objectives of this thesis. The 
second lens moves further away from my personal background and radically changed my way 
of thinking. I was equipped with another pair of glasses. 
 
7.4.2 Choice of Approach and Methods 
Multiple sources of data on the same phenomenon – so-called data triangulation – are often 
used to strengthen the validity of the research (e.g. Yin, 2009). There are different forms of 
the concept of validity, but in general it can be said to involve the extent to which the research 
actually answers the questions it asks and how the findings correspond to the social world it 
addresses (Peräkylä, 2011; Bergström and Boréus, 2012). It is common to treat documents as 
secondary data with observations and interviews as primary data. Secondary data are then 
used to validate primary data or to provide a context. This thesis has documents as its single 
source, which could be seen as problematic if viewed from the traditional concept of validity 
when evaluating the quality of explanatory research. Triangulation with primary data in the 
form of interviews could have strengthened the validity of the findings from the secondary 
data. On the other hand, instead of viewing a single source as problematic for the validity of 
this thesis, I follow Atkinson and Coffey (2011) who stressed that documents should be 
regarded as data in their own right. Documents “often enshrine a distinctively documentary 
version of social reality” (Atkinson and Coffey 2011, p. 80).  
 
The historical approach of studying events in the past means that secondary data in the form 
of documents from a meeting are preferred over primary data in the form of interviews with 
persons in the meeting several years later. Sources that originated as close as possible to the 
studied event in both time and place are preferred by historians. The longer the time between 
an event and the source describing it, the higher the probability is of retrospective 
reconstruction of the event. Protocols and reports of a meeting are more reliable than an 
interview with a participant of the meeting 20 years later. Sources during and close to the 
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event are more credible due to people having a strong tendency to forget and rationalize in 
retrospect. A former decision-maker will also tend to exaggerate his/her own importance to 
the decision and to idealize the past. The richness of details is another advantage of using 
archived sources closer in time to an event than conducting interviews (Thies, 2002; Atkinson 
and Coffey, 2011; Esaiasson et al., 2012). 
 
It acknowledged that the studied session reports represent retrospective reconstruction of the 
sessions as well. The contents of the IMO reports are even negotiated, as described in 
Chapters 2 and 4. In this context, it should be noted that this was observed during my 
participation at MEPC 66. It is thus acknowledged that some interpretation made in this thesis 
could have been affected by my observations at two IMO meetings. It is however important to 
underline that this thesis focuses on what can be learnt from the documents of IMO 
negotiations. It does not claim that the findings of this thesis represent reality, but rather it 
follows hermeneutics in that our view of ‘reality’ depends on our interpretations. What is 
important is the way we interpret things and what we as researchers bring to our data. The 
conceptual lenses and my pre-understanding brought meaning to the empirical data connected 
to the phenomenon that was to be explained so that understanding could be reached. The 
observations made at the two IMO meetings should be viewed as part of my pre-
understanding.  
 
Qualitative historical analysis was used as a choice of research approach. Does this mean that 
this thesis is qualitative research with qualitative methods? Relationships between science and 
policy-making or economic interests and policy-making are not something we can measure, 
but we can interpret the documents and provide different explanations. In this sense, it is 
qualitative research. Qualitative research is about words and not numbers. However, this 
division in quantitative or qualitative research has been criticized (Bryman, 2012; Åsberg, 
2001). According to Åsberg (2001), we should forget the predominant division between 
qualitative and quantitative research and raise awareness of the a priori assumptions of a 
research approach. Åsberg (2001) suggested that the researcher needs to reflect on possible 
and real choices and not just be locked in a particular division of approaches. For this thesis, 
the aim and research questions along with the conceptual lenses were the primary guide in the 
choice of methods, rather than choosing predefined methods that would have limited the 
objectives of the research. 
 
7.4.3 The Use of Different Conceptual Lenses 
The theoretical framework of this thesis covers many different aspects and theoretical 
assumptions. Moreover, the contents of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 show fractions of more extensive 
literature in the different fields covered. Not all the theoretical aspects and assumptions of 
each conceptual lens were taken into account in the respective analysis. It would have 
required more sources than documents, and an extensive spatial scope including domestic 
politics as well as actions of individuals in both political settings and where the scientific 
claims were produced. In short, it would have been rather difficult to accomplish. SSK would 
require social conditions to be analysed at micro level where ‘science’ was produced. This 
was neither possible nor intended. The under- and over-critical models have many 
connections, and they were included where SSK lacked explanations, where micro-level study 
was needed and to confirm explanations of critical policy environments. The over-critical 
model was found to be a suitable model for explaining the outcome, but SSK has provided 
most of the explanations on the role of science in explaining the research questions.  
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The second lens has its basic foundation in rational choice theory. The basic unit of analysis is 
the individual, but the actions of individuals were not studied in this thesis. However, the 
reported actions and arguments of individual ‘actors’ were studied with regard to their self-
interests. A member State or organization was considered an actor with self-interests. This is 
in line with the use of collective action in explaining international environmental negotiations 
in which States are considered rational actors and their actions are explained in the same 
manner as those of individuals. Since rational choice has been criticized with regard to theory 
versus ‘reality’ and empirical observations (e.g.; Simon, 1959; Arlen, 1998; Ostrom, 2000; 
Pålsson Syll, 2013), it is important to emphasize that rational choice is viewed in this thesis as 
an assumption of a conceptual lens, and as a starting point to explain policy-making from the 
role of economic interests. According to Lyon (2009, p. 2), the assumption that individuals 
maximize their utility “is an approach, rather than a falsifiable hypothesis”. It is this view of 
rational choice theory that this thesis undertakes.  In this regard, it should be noted that it has 
not been intended to test a particular theory. A theory-consuming approach was chosen. The 
framework was used to fit the research questions and the empirical basis of this thesis and not 
the other way around. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the theoretic content is used to represent a 
way of thinking, and gathering and analysing the empirical grounds. In this context, the 
empirical chapters and the analytical sections of this thesis both show a number of differences 
with regard to assumptions, emphasis, scope and empirical details. These differences are 
discussed below. 
 
As a general rule, contextual extensions such as for developments in the UN, the EU and 
LRTAP during 1988-1997 were delimited to what was reported in the investigated IMO 
documents. However, some additional information on LRTAP was given in the first lens with 
regard to the concepts of framing, policy environments and scientific authority. Due to the 
focus of these concepts, the temporal scope was extended for the first lens to include 
preceding developments on reducing land-based emissions. These extensions were provided 
as background information derived from secondary sources and thus to contextualize the 
framing of the problem and issue. Extensions of the scope of the thesis were also made in the 
second lens. Although domestic politics and economic and scientific aspects in individual 
member States were not within the scope of the research, the analysis of the role of economic 
interests included some brief additional information on the main actors’ interests. This was 
necessary due to the conceptual basis with the focus on the self-interests of States (and NGOs) 
and because the aim and objectives of this thesis focused on the role of economic interests 
and not just the economic basis of decisions. Another difference is that the empirical 
investigation of the role of ‘science’ goes into more detail in the reports on methods and 
background information to show the ‘science’ behind the policy. It was not intended that the 
empirical investigation into the role of economic interests would go deeper into the 
methodology or the basis of economic calculations, e.g. calculations of the total costs for 
refineries. This was due to the fact that economic calculations are not within my area of 
expertise. This methodological difference in the level of empirical detail between the two 
explanations is a consequence of the challenge of changing conceptual lenses in relation to the 
pre-understanding of the analyst, which is emphasized in Section 7.4.1 above. 
 
Most importantly, the conceptual lenses of this thesis differ substantially in their assumptions 
of the way social phenomena are explained and in the emphasis on what was important to 
highlight or exclude. The selection of empirical data to investigate separately for two lenses is 
in itself important to these differences. As emphasized earlier, science and economics are two 
different world views. Science represents nature – the object. This means that the first lens 
included the natural science of the process (the object). However, as Lidskog and Sundqvist 
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(2011, p. 12) explained: “It is not the object per se, but those who speak for it or claim to 
represent it who are the driving causal agents in the political process”. The explanations in the 
first lens thus included many different social aspects of how it was claimed that the object was 
represented, how political actors addressed the claims and how political environments created 
different conditions for these claims to affect policy-making. Economics represents the 
economic interests of different actors – the subjects. Viewed from the second lens, more 
emphasis was placed on the actors. The focus was on the economic self-interests of the actors. 
The problem in itself was expressed in terms of costs and benefits and, in particular, the 
possible solutions to the problem. The foundation of the second lens is the economic 
reasoning of rational choice, which focuses on explaining individual behaviour on a simple 
deductive basis. The two lenses were thus expected to show many differences in explanations. 
Indeed, they did, but after the two lenses had been tried out, I found myself with a combined 
lens on the studied phenomenon. Connections between the two different explanations were 
manifested, as shown in Section 7.3. As final words in this discussion, the conclusions of this 
thesis are the result of viewing a phenomenon from different conceptual lenses and of my pre-
understanding.  
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7.5 Research Contributions 
This thesis makes a rich empirical contribution based on a large quantity of documents for a 
somewhat lengthy policy-making process at the IMO. This reveals – on the basis of what was 
reported in the documents – the scientific and economic grounds behind the policies of 
different actors and the policy choices and decisions made by two bodies of the IMO. This 
empirical basis can be used for further research on environmental policy-making of the IMO. 
Gaining access to and compiling useful information from older IMO documents is not an easy 
task and involves going through extensive archived prints if the time and authority are given 
to delve through archived material in governmental agencies.
112
 This thesis highlights the 
contents of IMO documents from a time before digitalization and thus sheds light on 
information that is hard to get hold of by researchers, governments, industry and civil society. 
In particular, this thesis contributes a description of the scientific and economic arguments, 
supportive information and discussions of the whole process towards the first version of 
sulphur regulations for shipping. No such research has been found on international 
environmental negotiations for shipping. Investigations of scientific and economic arguments 
and supportive information based on documents from international environmental 
negotiations are hard to find with similar details to those in this thesis. Research presented in 
book chapters and papers seems to focus on presenting the analytical parts and not to cover 
the empirical basis the way Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis have. Future research on other 
environmental policy issues should continue with such a detailed approach. 
 
This thesis enriches our understanding of environmental policy-making for shipping through 
the IMO, what roles science and economic interests could play and how the negotiations 
could result in internationally agreed regional measures. The main theoretical contribution is 
the use of different conceptual lenses to study the same phenomenon. In particular, this 
contribution applies to the very diverse and rather loosely defined fields of international 
environmental politics and global environmental governance. Within these fields today, the 
literature is covered by different disciplines and fields and is dominated by many disciplinary 
boundaries and traditions on how to analyse the same phenomenon in their own respective 
ways. The need for studies that break the traditional disciplinary borders is eminent. In 
particular, the dominance of regime theory and focus on institutions in the field of 
international relations suggests that the seminal contributions of Allison (1971) have been 
forgotten when studying international environmental negotiations. It is often said about 
environmental problems that they transcend national borders, which requires international 
action. When studying international actions, however, researchers seem to forget that 
understanding environmental issues requires recognition that environmental problems also 
transcend disciplinary borders. This thesis contributes to the fields of international 
environmental politics and global environmental governance by viewing an international 
environmental policy-making process through different conceptual lenses. It provides these 
fields with the lesson that one cannot understand the international action for environmental 
issues if one does not understand the scientific and economic aspects and arguments of the 
issue. Science and economics are different world views, and environmental problems force 
policy-makers to face both. We thus need to use different conceptual lenses in order to 
understand the policies of different actors and their collective decisions. 
 
With regard to more specific research contributions, detailed studies on the role of science in 
international environmental policy-making at the IMO have not been found. For STS focusing 
                                                  
112 Such documents not only include neutral documents from the IMO secretariat but also notes from the 
negotiations and governmental positions on specific questions. 
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on the role of science in policy-making, this thesis contributes empirical grounds for a case 
that goes against the traditional view that science speaks truth to power. The IMO has 
attracted little attention in this field on a subject that is overloaded with studies on land-based 
regimes. To focus on the IMO provides new perspectives on the role of science in policy-
making and the studied case show a big difference in social conditions for science to be 
successful in policy than the studied cases of for example the LRTAP regime. For this case, 
SSK could not provide an explanation for the outcome, instead the over-critical model 
showed an explanatory strength. Lidskog and Sundqvist (2011) highlighted that SSK was not 
fully theoretically and empirically mature in studies of international environmental policy-
making. Through a combination of SSK and radical relativism, this thesis contributes to the 
development of SSK in line with the need for and possibilities of cross-fertilization 
emphasized by different scholars in Lidskog and Sundqvist (2011). 
 
A common theme in environmental issues is the conflict of interests between, on the one 
hand, economics with the focus on the costs of regulation and, on the other, environmental 
and health protection. This thesis provides an insight into the dynamics of the two conflicts in 
the studied process. Interests, in particular those of the oil industry, have played essential roles 
in this process. There are numerous studies on the role of self-interests in environmental 
policy-making, but this thesis has shown that traditional collective action could not explain 
this particular case. Instead, the insights of DeSombre (2007) into directional issues have 
provided a foundation for explanation. This thesis has further shown that it is fruitful to 
supplement DeSombre’s approach with Wilson’s theory of politics. This combined approach 
has not previously been applied to an extensive empirical basis in studies of international 
environmental policy-making. 
 
 
143 
 
8 Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Research 
 
Viewed from conceptual lenses on the roles of science and economic interests, this thesis has 
analysed scientific and economic arguments (including supportive information and reported 
discussions) in documents of IMO negotiations during 1988-1997. To provide an 
understanding of why a regional approach was chosen to control SOx emissions from 
international shipping, the conclusions of this thesis were drawn from viewing the policy-
making process through the two lenses with an emphasis on their connections and differences. 
The conclusions are presented in three parts: findings for each lens and overall conclusions of 
the thesis. Recommendations for policy-makers and stakeholders are then given. This final 
chapter ends with propositions for further research. 
 
8.1 Findings on the Role of ‘Science’ 
The analysis on the role of ‘science’ found that a central factor in explaining the two research 
questions is the way the issue of SOx emissions from ships was framed by different actors as a 
global, regional or local problem requiring global, regional or local measures. Equally central 
is the character of the policy environment as uncritical (science accepting) or critical. 
 
Why Change the Focus to Regional Measures at the BCH? 
 
 The submitted studies of the process represented socially constructed factual claims by 
actors with certain policy beliefs, which guided their framing. One group of actors (the 
NSS and the BSS) framed the issue as global, emphasized the transboundary nature of 
the problem and presented scientific claims to show a need for global action. Its 
framing, scientific arguments and claims were accepted in the early years due to an 
uncritical policy environment along with a recognized scientific authority.  
 
 Another group of actors with other policy beliefs then arrived on the scene. This group 
framed the issue as regional/local and focused on showing a minimal contribution of 
ship emissions. They used scientific arguments and supporting claims as well as 
uncertainties and confusion over different scientific methods and concepts. This 
resulted in criticism of previous scientific claims, which were reconstructed to confirm 
their views. A critical policy environment had emerged at BCH 22 in 1992, and the 
framing by the actors had changed to a regional issue, no issue or local at most.  
 
 Due to its removal from the Assembly resolution, the 50% global reduction target lost 
its importance despite being part of the action plan. The BCH did not consider the 
reference levels and dates as instructed but instead initiated the regional concept.  
 
Why Adopt a Combination of Stricter SECAs and a Global Cap? 
 
 With a framing of the problem as regional/local, there was no need for a global 
emission reduction. A regional approach with sulphur limits in special areas was 
framed as the leading principle. No global reduction of emissions was intended with a 
global cap, but to prevent a possible future increase in the sulphur content of fuels.  
 
 A clear role of ‘science’ was as a restriction of regulating SOx emissions by the use of 
scientific criteria to establish special areas.  
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 The policy-makers faced a lack of sufficient scientific information for their policy 
choices and decisions. New studies primarily deconstructed and reconstructed existing 
factual claims instead of gathering new data. Scientific uncertainty and a lack of 
information were also used as arguments to postpone decisions on strict regulations.  
 
 The critical policy environment resulted in long discussions at the MEPC on scientific 
methods and concepts. The process had arrived at deadlocked negotiations with 
extensive technical debates. The agreement on the combined approach was nothing 
other than a compromise. 
 
 The two groups of actors with different framing never agreed on a clear framing of the 
issue. Instead the policy-making process was a process of negotiating the framing, 
with attempts to agree on measures at the same time. An identity between the problem 
of SOx emissions from ships and a specific spatial level was never established. 
 
8.2 Findings on the Role of Economic Interests 
The second lens showed that this policy issue has the characteristics of a directional problem 
in which the actors that caused the problem (the polluters) were not the same as those that 
suffered from it. The States affected by acidification sought global regulation on ship 
emissions while the States causing it opposed global regulation. The significant role of self-
interests in a directional problem along with the perceived distribution of costs and benefits 
made the policy-makers focus on oil industry costs and implications, which, in turn, is the 
ultimate factor explaining both research questions. The focus was put on the costs and impacts 
of regulations rather than the societal costs without regulations. The decisions were based on 
biased cost-benefit assessments that focused on the costs of the oil and shipping industries.  
 
Why Change the Focus to Regional Measures at the BCH? 
 
 The opposition to reducing the sulphur content was strongly connected to the 
economic interests of the oil industry and petroleum markets. Producers and exporters 
of high-sulphur petroleum products would have to pay for costly desulphurization 
processes. This was a concentrated group of actors that would have to pay for widely 
distributed benefits, which provided strong incentives for opposition.  
 
 The removal of the target from the Assembly resolution was a first breaking-point 
towards a regional approach. It enabled an increased role of economic interests with a 
strong focus on the costs of oil industries when the BCH begins its considerations. The 
highlighted costs for shipping were strictly connected to oil industry implications with 
increased bunker fuel prices.  
 
 The lack of support for a global approach was central to the choice of a regional 
approach. This was a result of the high costs of the oil industry and arguments that 
widely extended the scope of implications. Japan and OCIMF showed huge impacts 
on the global crude oil market, the energy supplies of many countries and the 
depletion of petroleum reserves. At the same time, the benefits were perceived as 
regional or even local. A regional approach would mean a concentration of the costs 
through lower costs for fewer actors, and the benefits would also be concentrated.  
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Why Adopt a Combination of Stricter SECAs and a Global Cap? 
 
 A global cap provided no benefits worth mentioning but significant costs for some 
actors. Any figures below a 5% cap would impose costs for the States that produced, 
exported or supplied fuels over 4% sulphur contents. The combined approach added 
unequally distributed costs to a policy of concentrated benefits. This provided 
incentives for strong opposition by a large group of intertwined oil and shipping 
interests, with emphasis on high costs and moral arguments of unequal cost burdens. 
 
 The response by the NSS, the BSS and environmental NGOs was to show social costs 
and cost-effectiveness of a ship emission reduction in Europe, and to threaten 
unilateral action. Since the intertwined interests had few incentives to cooperate, as 
they did not suffer from acidification, the BSS and the NSS had to accept 
compromises far beyond their own preferences.  
 
 In 1997, some actors with shipping interests broke away from the intertwined interests 
and criticized the SECA approach for the reasons of competiveness of shipping. 
However, the shipping interests’ earlier alignment with the oil interests had resulted in 
locked positions.  
 
 The principle of a level playing field was put aside by the shipping interests due to the 
fear of high costs, but then emerged when it was too late. The efforts of the NSS, the 
BSS environmental NGOs and shipping industry NGOs, however, explain the 
compromises at the end of the process. 
 
8.3 Conclusions of the Thesis 
 
 The two conceptual lenses used in this thesis differ substantially in assumptions and 
emphasis. They were expected to show many differences in explanations, but 
significant interactions were found. 
 
 One important shared factor towards a regional approach was the removal of the target 
from the Assembly resolution. Another was the significant role of INGOs. In 
particular, one oil industry organization (OCIMF) was able to shape policy through the 
use of both scientific and economic arguments and supportive information.  
 
 The framing of the issue, the scientific arguments and claims, and the positions of the 
actors were all shaped by interests. The interests of the policy-makers decided the 
policy relevance of science, which for this case was used by environmental and 
economic interests to compete rather than enabling consensus. 
 
 The MEPC faced great scientific uncertainty on ship emissions and their contribution 
to acidification on land. This enabled an increased role of economic interests, which in 
turn supported those scientific claims that backed the economic interests. Based on the 
economic interests of the actors that caused the problem and that would bear the costs 
of regulation, a critical policy environment emerged in which these actors showed a 
low contribution of ship emissions as well as extreme economic implications.  
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 Scientific arguments and claims were used to justify views with underlying economic 
arguments, which were strengthened with legitimacy. Uncertainties were highlighted 
as reasons not to take decisions with high economic consequences. Scientific claims 
further enabled the use of cost-effectiveness as an argument.  
 
 The policy-makers’ focus on oil industry costs and implications stands as the primary 
factor in explaining both research questions. A regional approach was drawn up based 
on strong economic interests of oil and shipping industries and environmental 
protection was down-prioritized. This thesis has found that economic self-interests are 
paramount in understanding both economic and scientific arguments and how these 
could shape policy-making through the power of persuasion.  
 
 Three Assembly resolutions determined the direction of the roles of science and 
economic interests. The principles of a compelling need and taking into account the 
costs and economic implications were the primary causes of the cost focus and the 
emergence of a critical policy environment. This is a lesson for future policy issues in 
terms of achieving a balance between industry interests and environmental interests by 
institutionally controlling the roles of science and economic interests. 
 
 This thesis shows that the use of two conceptual lenses provides different explanations 
and that these particular lenses complement each other with additional explanations. 
The combination of these conceptual lenses can increase our understanding of 
environmental policy-making processes and their outcomes.  
 
 In order to understand why policy-makers sometimes follow the path of environmental 
protection based on scientific claims and, at other times, follow the path of economic 
self-interests researchers studying international environmental policy-making need to 
take into account both by different conceptual lenses. We need to force ourselves to 
change our conceptual lenses to gain understanding. 
 
8.4 Recommendations to Policy-makers and Stakeholders 
The findings of this thesis should be viewed as an indicator for the IMO of how resolutions on 
its work procedures could affect the dynamics of economic and environmental interests. If a 
balance between these interests is sought by the IMO member States, then there is a need to 
evaluate possible implications of specific formulations in IMO resolutions. The member 
States should ask whether or not is more appropriate to add a requirement of cost-benefit 
assessments in its resolutions instead of a sole focus on costs and implications for industry 
and administrative burdens. If a balance is sought, the environmental interests need to be 
included in resolutions that the guides the work of the MEPC. The work should be guided by 
an emphasized focus on environmental impacts and on social costs instead of the phrase ‘a 
compelling need’. A starting point to strengthen the role of science when drawing up 
regulations for shipping is to look more closely at the different institutional conditions for 
science to influence policy in LRTAP and the IMO. It is recommended to consider a possible 
institutionalization of science in the same way as with the LRTAP regime.  
 
It is my sincere hope that the findings of this thesis will be used as lessons for governments, 
the shipping industry and environmental organizations in their efforts to affect the IMO 
process towards more proactive policy-making that takes into account the interplay of science 
and economic interests. A better understanding of the relationship between science and 
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economic interests in IMO policy-making could help the shipping industry to avoid waking 
up one day in a plethora of costly and different geographically located environmental 
regulations. With this knowledge, the recommendation is to take an active role in the 
development towards sustainable shipping together with governments and environmental 
organizations. Focus on the costs of regulation has not led the shipping industry towards a 
level playing field in this particular case, which shows a need for a different approach.  
 
8.5 Further Research 
This thesis has contributed a detailed empirical description of the scientific and economic 
arguments, supportive information and discussions for this particular process. Such detailed 
descriptions are lacking in studies of international environmental negotiations. Future research 
on other environmental policy issues should continue with this detailed approach. This thesis 
has further shown that the use of different conceptual lenses to study the same phenomenon is 
a fruitful way of understanding international environmental negotiations. In particular, this 
thesis maintains that the scientific and economic aspects of the issue need to be understood. 
Further studies on international environmental negotiations need to be open for cross-
fertilization without a search for a unified framework but rather applying different approaches 
to the same studied phenomenon. As researchers, our minds should not be constrained by one 
disciplinary explanation in our understanding of social phenomena. It is suggested that further 
studies are conducted that apply the theoretical framework of this thesis. This thesis has been 
delimited to the first process of Annex VI up to 1997. Further research is needed on the 
revision process 2006-2008 including interim developments from 1997. It is proposed that the 
present research be continued where it ended in order to gain an understanding through the 
use of different explanations.  
 
In order to better understand international environmental decisions, the findings on the NGO 
influence in this thesis suggest a need to look closer into NGOs as participants and members 
of international organizations. Peet (1994) studied the NGO influence during one session of 
the MEPC that included all the agenda items, though the author represented an environmental 
NGO at the IMO, and the paper had neither theoretical contributions nor any references. 
Betsill and Corell (2008) presented a revised analytical framework published earlier
113
 for 
analysing NGO influence in negotiation processes and outcomes. It is suggested that further 
research utilize this framework. 
 
This thesis excluded the reduction alternative of on-board exhaust gas cleaning (EGC) such as 
the use of scrubbers.
114
 EGC has been promoted as a cost-effective option for SECA 
compliance by the European Commission (2011). Approaching 2015, there are several 
uncertain environmental and practical factors of using scrubbers as compliance. It could lead 
to high levels of a number of harmful substances into the marine environment (AEAt et al., 
2009). Hassellöv et al. (2013) highlighted that large-scale use of seawater scrubbers in the 
current SECAs with seawater as the neutralizing base before discharge would merely act “as 
an efficient mechanism for transferring the acid to the surface water” (Hassellöv et al., 2013, 
p. 2735). The studied process and the revision process are crucial to study further in order to 
gain understanding how this uncertainty of environmental protection of SECAs emerged. 
 
                                                  
113 Betsilll and Corell (2001) and Corell and Betsilll (2001), cited in Betsilll and Corell (2008) 
114 Regulation 4 of revised Annex VI allows the use of methods with at least equivalent emission reductions as 
Regulation 14. The environmental issues of using EGC are regulated in (non-mandatory) IMO guidelines 
(Resolution MEPC.184(59)). 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
BCH  Sub-Committee on Bulk Chemicals Handling 
BIMCO   Baltic and International Maritime Council 
BLG   Sub-Committee on Bulk Liquids and Gases 
CONCAWE  Oil Companies’ European Organization for Environmental and 
Health Protection (Conservation of Clean Air and Water in 
Europe)  
DNV Det Norske Veritas 
ECA Emission Control Area 
EEC / EC European Economic Community 
European Community (officially from 1993) 
EGC   Exhaust Gas Cleaning  
EMEP   European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme 
ENGO  Environmental Non-Governmental Organization 
EU   European Union (former EC and EEC) 
FOC  Flag of Convenience 
FOEI   Friends of the Earth International 
GT  Gross Tonnage 
HELCOM   Helsinki Commission 
HFO  Heavy Fuel Oil 
HSFO  High-Sulphur Fuel Oil 
IACS  International Association of Classification Societies 
IAPH  International Association of Ports and Harbors 
ICCET  Imperial College Centre for Environmental Technology 
ICS   International Chamber of Shipping 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IFO  Intermediate Fuel Oil 
IGO   Inter-Governmental Organization 
IIASA  International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
IMCO   Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, see IMO 
IMO   International Maritime Organization 
INGO  Industry Non-Governmental Organization 
INTERTANKO  International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
IPIECA  International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation 
Association 
IR  International Relations 
ISO  International Organization for Standardisation 
kt kilotonne, 10
3
 t 
Marintek Norwegian Marine Technology Research Institute A/S 
MARPOL 73/78 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto 
MDO  Marine Diesel Oil  
MEPC  Marine Environment Protection Committee 
MGO   Marine Gas Oil 
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding 
MSC  Maritime Safety Committee 
mt  Million tonnes, 10
6
 t 
nm  Nautical miles 
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NOx   Nitrogen oxides 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
LRTAP  1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(also: CLRTAP) 
LSF  Low-Sulphur Fuels 
LSFO  Low-Sulphur Fuel Oil 
OCIMF   Oil Companies International Marine Forum 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PM   Particulate Matter 
PSSA  Particularly Sensitive Sea Area 
SECA   SOx Emission Control Area 
SEK  Swedish krona (the Swedish currency) 
SMA  Swedish Maritime Administration 
SO2   Sulphur dioxide 
SOx  Sulphur oxides (SO2 and/or SO3)
115
 
SOLAS  International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
SSK  Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
STA  Swedish Transport Agency 
STS  Science and Technology Studies  
UN   United Nations 
UNECE   United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
UNCLOS 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 
WWF  World-Wide Fund for Nature 
 
 
 
                                                  
115 Here: related to combustion. It could also include SO, S2O, SnO and SO4. 
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Annex 1: Atmospheric Processes and Impacts of SOx Emissions 
 
SO2 – Atmospheric Processes and Deposition 
The atmospheric processes from SO2 emissions to acidic deposition are illustrated below 
(Borell et al., 1997; Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts, 2000). In the atmosphere, SO2 oxidizes in two 
different forms: gas phase oxidation and heterogeneous oxidation. In the gas phase, SO2 is 
oxidized by hydroxyl (OH) radicals. The result is an adduct, HOSO2, which in turn is 
oxidized into SO3. SO3 then reacts with water (H2O) in the atmosphere and forms sulphuric 
acid (H2SO4). Heterogeneous oxidation includes both the oxidation in the aqueous phase in 
clouds, fogs or aerosols, and oxidation on the surfaces of solids, either in the air or in water 
droplets. The pH of water droplets has a strong influence on the reaction pathway and the 
oxidant that will be used. Ammonia (NH3) emissions change the acidity of cloud droplets and 
thus have the potential to regulate the pathway of SO2 oxidation (Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts, 
2000; Borell et al., 1997; Fowler et al., 2007). Acidic gases and particles can be transported to 
ground level and be absorbed or adsorbed by land surfaces, materials or water surfaces, which 
is called dry deposition. When pollutants dissolve in clouds, fog, rain or snow, they are 
deposited on the surface of the earth by wet deposition (Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts, 2000; Borell 
et al., 1997). The significance of dry deposition of sulphur decreases with the distance from 
the source and the significance of wet deposition increases (Lövblad et al., 2004). 
 
 
Acidification 
A characteristic of an acid is its ability to emit hydrogen ions in a solution. Thus, by 
acidification we mean an increased concentration of hydrogen ions. Water is generally 
classified as acidic at a pH
116
 level below 6.2. SO2 is the primary air pollutant causing 
acidification in many areas. Other pollutants are nitrogen oxides (NOx) and ammonia (NH3). 
In water, sulphuric acid (H2SO4) from SO2 emissions is dissolved into two hydrogen ions 
(2H
+
) and one sulphate ion (SO4
2-
). It is the hydrogen ions that cause acidification, though 
sulphate is as significant in the acidification process (Smith et al., 2004; Mason, 2002; Borell 
et al., 1997; Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts, 2000; Elvingson and Ågren, 2004). Natural buffering 
                                                  
116 pH is a measure of the acidity of a solution measured as the concentration of hydrogen ions. A neutral 
solution has pH 7. A lower pH value means a surplus of hydrogen ions, i.e. the solution is acidic. With a higher 
value, the solution is basic/alkaline. The scale is logarithmic and a pH of 6 is ten times more acidic than a pH of 
7 (Elvingson and Ågren, 2004). 
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reactions neutralize acidic inputs in both soils and lakes. In soils, there are several different 
buffer systems with complex processes, of which chemical weathering of minerals is the most 
important in the long term. Soils with large quantities of easily weathered minerals can 
receive large quantities of acidic deposition without acidification, while soils with hard-
weathered minerals have a low buffering capacity. Thus, acidification is likely to occur in 
areas with bedrock consisting of granite or gneiss. The surrounding geology and soils 
determine the neutralizing capacity of freshwater and thus the impacts of acidic deposition on 
lakes. In fact, freshwater acidification occurs mainly as a result of soil acidification. In lakes, 
the buffering system concerns mainly the availability of hydrogen carbonate (HCO
3-
), which 
originates from the surrounding soils (Warfvinge and Bertills, 2000; Mason, 2002; Elvingson 
and Ågren, 2004).
117
 
 
Effects of Acidification 
The chemical effects of soil acidification are first seen when the acidic deposition has 
depleted the soils’ buffering supply. The first effect is significant leaching of mineral 
nutrients. The second is decreasing pH levels, followed by rising aluminium ions (Al
3+
) in 
lakes and watercourses. The aluminium levels rise sharply in lakes with a pH level below 5.5 
(ibid.). There is strong evidence of big impacts on biological diversity in aquatic 
environments (Pleijel et al., 2001). Some organisms are sensitive to low pH levels while 
others are more resilient and benefit from the decline in other species. In particular, the 
presence or absence of fish controls the species composition in lakes. If the fish are 
eliminated, their prey increase, such as various insects (Elvingson and Ågren, 2004). The 
disappearance of several sensitive animal and plant species from acidified waters has been 
directly associated with leaching of inorganic aluminium compounds, mainly Al
3+
. 
Aluminium becomes toxic to fish in the range of pH 5.0-5.5 (Mason, 2002). The effects on 
biological diversity of acidic deposition are better known in freshwater ecosystems and are 
likely to be more severe than for terrestrial ecosystems. The impacts of soil acidification first 
and foremost concern leaching of important nutrients, particularly base cations, such as 
magnesium, potassium and calcium. The loss of nutrients leads to reduced growth. Together 
with low pH levels, sensitive species could be eradicated. In addition, releases of aluminium 
ions and heavy metals are absorbed by plant root systems, though the most serious effects are 
found in decomposers. Furthermore, phosphorus binds to released aluminium and forms 
aluminium phosphate, thus making it difficult for the plants’ uptake of the important nutrient 
(Pleijel et al., 2001; Elvingson and Ågren, 2004). 
 
Particles and SOx Emissions 
Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts’s (2000) definition of particles, or particulate matter (PM), includes 
solids and liquids between ~0.002 and ~100 mm in diameter. The distinction between 
particles and aerosols is not always apparent in literature. Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts define 
aerosols as “relatively stable suspensions of solid or liquid particles in a gas” (p. 349). By this 
definition, they include “both the particles and the gas in which they are suspended” (ibid.). 
Primary particles are particles formed during combustion, and their existence in the 
atmosphere originates directly from emissions. A smaller portion of the sulphur in the fuel 
forms SO3, which in turn forms sulphuric acid (H2SO4) when water is present in hot exhausts. 
Sulphate particles are formed when the acid nucleates (forms new particles) or condenses 
(attaches to existing particles) by the cooling of the exhaust. The quantity of sulphate particle 
emissions depends on how much SO2 or SO3 is formed from the fuel’s sulphur and on the 
                                                  
117 Note that natural acidification has taken place since the last ice age by a slowly declining weathering rate of 
soil minerals. Moreover, CO2 from decomposed humic substances in brown water lakes reacts with water and 
forms acidifying carbonic acid (H2CO3) (Warfvinge and Bertills, 2000; Elvingson and Ågren, 2004). 
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temperature and humidity of the gas. SO2 can form sulphate particles by gas-to-particle 
conversion. These particles are so-called secondary particles (or often secondary aerosols), 
meaning that they are formed by chemical reactions with their gas-phase precursors in the 
atmosphere (Winnes, 2010; Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts, 2000; Lighty et al., 2000). According to 
Adams et al. (2009), the contribution to the total particulate matter in the atmosphere by 
emitted primary particles is only about 10-15%, while the majority consists of secondary 
particles formed from the emissions of their precursors.  
 
Particles: Impacts on Human Health 
Increases in morbidity and mortality from extreme air pollution episodes have been well 
documented in the 20
th
 century (e.g. the Meuse Valley Fog of 1930 and the London Fog of 
1952). In the 1970s and 1980s, the link between cardiopulmonary diseases and extraordinarily 
high PM concentrations was generally accepted. In the early to mid-1990s, the attention to 
health risks from particulate matter increased when several epidemiologic studies in the US 
showed the health effects at low concentrations of ambient particulate matter. Similar results 
were reported in studies from Germany, Canada, Finland and the Czech Republic. According 
to Pope and Dockery (2006), these studies provided “a critical mass of evidence” of the health 
effects from particulate matter at low to moderate exposures (Pope and Dockery, 2006, p. 
709). Several recent epidemiological studies have increased the scientific and political 
interests in the health effects of particulate matter. These studies indicate correlations between 
increased mortality and PM concentrations. Furthermore, particulate emissions have showed 
associations with numerous health risks: in general cardiovascular and cardiopulmonary 
diseases (Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts, 2000; Pope and Dockery, 2006). While the correlation 
between short-term exposure and increased mortality and morbidity is shown in a large 
number of studies, studies on long-term exposures are fewer (Pershagen et al., 2009). Pope 
and Dockery concluded, however, that estimates of mortality are higher in studies on long-
term PM exposures. Size is an important factor for the impacts on human health from 
particulate emissions. Standard terms for different particle sizes are shown below (Lighty et 
al., 2000). 
 
Coarse particles > 10 µm (or > 2.5 µm) 
Fine particles 
 
PM10    < 10 µm 
PM2.5   < 2.5 µm 
PM1      < 1 µm 
Ultrafine particles    < 0.1 µm 
Nanoparticles < 0.01 µm (10 nm) 
Nuclei nanometre-sized particles formed by gas-to-particle conversion 
 
Particles originating from natural sources, such as mechanical erosion, are generally in the 
upper size range. Large particles that are inhaled are generally removed in the upper 
respiratory tract by a mucus layer. Natural particles are thus of less concern for health effects. 
Particles from fossil fuel combustion and gas-to-particle conversion, however, are generally 
below 2.5 µm. These particles can reach the alveolar region of the lungs, where there is no 
protective mucus layer (Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts, 2000). Ultrafine particles dominate urban 
aerosols by number. These can be deposited in deeper parts of the lung, as well as penetrate 
further into the body. The finest particles (nuclei or nanoparticles) are secondary particles 
formed by gas-to-particle conversions (Lighty et al., 2000). Air quality standards for PM have 
been developed along with environmental health policy and scientific results. PM10 was 
introduced as a measurement of the mass of suspended particulate matter less than 10 µm, 
followed by the more recent PM2.5, i.e. less than 2.5 µm (Pope and Dockery, 2006).  
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Annex 2: Purpose and Functions of the IMO from its Convention 
 
The following excerpts the primary purpose and functions of the IMO from the 1948 
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, as amended in 1977. 
 
Primary purpose of the IMO as defined in Article 1(a) 
 
“To provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of governmental 
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in 
international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable 
standards in matters concerning the maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention 
and control of marine pollution from ships; and to deal with administrative and legal matters 
related to the purposes set out in this Article.” 
 
Primary functions of the IMO as defined in Article 2 
 
a) … “consider and make recommendations upon matters arising” within the scope of the 
IMO 
 
b) “Provide for the drafting of conventions, agreements, or other suitable instruments, and 
recommend these to Governments and to intergovernmental organizations, and convene such 
conferences as may be necessary” 
 
c) “Provide machinery for consultation among Members and the exchange of information 
among Governments” 
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